

The Strategic Environment and Planning Assumptions for Swedish Total Defence 2025 – 2030





Foreword

Swedish total defence is a concern for the entire population and all parts of Swedish society. Together, and only together, can we defend ourselves and our Allies, protect the civilian population and ensure that vital societal functions can be maintained. To achieve this, everyone is needed. Every municipality, every business and every resident in Sweden is needed. All government agencies, all regional authorities and all civil society organisations. We are all responsible in different ways but ultimately share a responsibility that Sweden can stand strong in times of war.

We are preparing for the worst-case scenario: an armed attack against Sweden and our Allies. The current security situation is highly volatile and will most likely remain so for the foreseeable future. The course of events can be influenced. A key element is that civil and military defence provide a deterrent against any potential adversary and can operate across the entire threat spectrum – from peace to war.

Building a strong total defence is a major undertaking. It will require substantial military investments as well as strengthening the resilience of vital societal functions. It is easy to become focused solely on current deficiencies or tasks that appear difficult to accomplish. However, a guiding principle is that you and your organisation/business can make a difference in peacetime and in war. Preparations – through planning and taking necessary measures – make the difference.

In *The Strategic Environment and Planning Assumptions for Swedish Total Defence, 2025–2030*, we are establishing a common picture of how a military conflict might unfold. It is important to bear in mind that these are just points of departure. Once you and your organisation/business have read this document, you will need to add your own shared and individual analyses based on your area of responsibility, your geographical location, your competencies and capabilities. Identify what you need to do, take the initiative and implement the required measures.

Our mission is not an easy one, but Sweden has many valuable assets: a well-educated population, a strong industrial base, a vibrant associational life and a strong society built on democratic values. Every day we must remember that peace, freedom and democracy are neither to be taken for granted nor free. We have achieved them through hard work, and they are maintained through our determination as members of Swedish society, the NATO Alliance and the EU.

Now we need initiative and joint effort. Together, we will defend Sweden, our way of life and each other. No contribution is too small. Everyone's efforts are needed.

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Summary

The Strategic Environment and Planning Assumptions for Swedish Total Defence, 2025–2030, provides the foundation for the planning and development of Sweden's total defence in the period 2025–2030. It is based on the Government's policy, factoring in three key changes since the previous document, *Handlingskraft*, in 2021: Sweden as a NATO ally, lessons learned from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and a developed national structure for crisis preparedness and civil defence.

The threats are multifaceted and, besides conventional military attacks, include cyberattacks sabotage, influence operations, terrorism and economic pressure. The security environment demands a robust, flexible and coordinated total defence capable of facing multiple threats simultaneously, safeguarding vital societal functions and strengthening NATO's collective security. Therefore, it is paramount that there is coordinated and flexible planning on the part of civil and military actors. Civil actors have a key role to play in supporting military defence and ensuring the continuity of vital societal functions, even during a period of high tension and in war. Additionally, Sweden must be able to serve as a basing and transit area, providing host-nation support (HNS) in close collaboration with Allies.

Swedish total defence must be able to counter an armed attack on Swedish territory and on NATO's external borders. Sweden is thus integrating its operational planning with that of the Alliance and is adapting to a new threat. Sweden's integration into NATO is a years-long transformation process that involves Swedish government agencies and society at large taking measures and implementing activities that will facilitate and increase Sweden's capability to carry out NATO's core tasks. A strong and resilient Swedish total defence with credible defence capabilities acts as a deterrent and strengthens NATO's overall deterrence capabilities.

The assumptions set out in this document are based on seven dimensional cases that could occur simultaneously and in combination. Actors will need to adapt these to their own activities and geographical circumstances. The document emphasises the importance of a total defence able to sustain operations for a minimum of three months of a major war in Europe, a time frame that provides resilience and allows society to adjust to wartime conditions. In this three-month period, civil entities must have the capacity to sustain themselves for a minimum of two weeks relying on their own resources. At the same time, Sweden is obliged to protect the civilian population, including particularly vulnerable groups, in accordance with the principles of international law, among other things. The document ends with a number of conclusions which all total defence actors are urged to translate into action in their own organisations.



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1. Introduction

The Strategic Environment and Planning Assumptions for Swedish Total Defence, 2025–2030, stems from the Government's directive for the Defence Resolution period.¹ This document supersedes the previous document, *Handlingskraft*,² and is characterised by three pivotal shifts:

1. Since 7 March 2024, Sweden has been a NATO Ally, which means that not only Sweden's borders must be defended but also NATO's external borders. Consequently, Sweden's total defence planning must take into account the planning of our Allies and NATO's collective planning.
2. Since 24 February 2022, the world has been following developments and drawn lessons from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Sweden, along with many other EU and NATO members, is contributing significant military and civil resources.
3. Since 1 October 2022, an enhanced national structure for crisis preparedness and civil defence has been in place.³ Its implementation and development are ongoing, including the addition of new civil preparedness agencies and sectors in 2025.

1.1. Government mandate

In December 2024, the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) adopted the Total Defence Bill for the period 2025–2030.⁴ Subsequently, the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency and the Swedish Armed Forces were mandated by the Government to jointly promote and further develop coordinated total defence planning for the period 2025–2030.⁵ Within this framework, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency are to produce joint planning assumptions to support authorities responsible for civil preparedness and civil defence as well as all total defence actors. The planning assumptions are to:

- supplement and further specify the Government's planning assumptions;
- present dimensional cases; and

¹ Government of Sweden, *Gemensamma förutsättningar för utvecklingen av totalförsvaret 2025–2030* (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]), *Inriktning för civilt försvar 2025–2030* (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]) and *Inriktning för militärt försvar 2025–2030* (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]).

² Swedish Armed Forces and MSB (2021), *Handlingskraft – Handlingsplan för att främja och utveckla en sammanhängande planering för totalförsvaret 2021–2025*, FM2021-17683:2 och MSB2020-16261-3.

³ Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency, *Strukturreform av krisberedskap och civilt försvar*. <https://www.mcf.se/sv/amnesomraden/beredskap-for-kris-och-krig/beredskapssystemet/strukturreform-av-krisberedskap-och-civilt-forsvar/>

⁴ Government Bill (2024/25:34), *Totalförsvaret 2025–2030*.

⁵ Government of Sweden, *Gemensamma förutsättningar för utvecklingen av totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Shared Assumptions for the Development of Total Defence, 2025–2030] (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]).

- contain specified assumptions regarding possible developments in the event of an armed attack, including impacts on society.

1.2. Contents and use of the planning assumptions

Chapter 2 supplements and specifies the Government’s planning assumptions. Dimensional cases are described in Chapter 3, while Chapter 4 describes potential developments and impacts on society. Chapter 5 presents a number of key actions that the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency consider to be important for implementation. However, all chapters need to be analysed, supplemented and implemented into long-term or operational planning measures by the relevant actors in order to achieve the overall total defence objective.⁶

THE OVERALL OBJECTIVE FOR THE SWEDISH TOTAL DEFENCE AND OBJECTIVES FOR MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENCE

The overall objective for the total defence is to have the capability to defend Sweden and its population against armed attacks, assert our country’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and contribute to the defence of Allies. It will be possible to carry out activities within the total defence both independently and jointly with others, within our borders and beyond, and in accordance with Sweden’s commitments as a NATO member.

<p>Military defence objective</p> <p>The objective of the military defence is to have the capability to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » defend Sweden against armed attacks; » assert Sweden’s territorial integrity; » protect rights and national interests beyond Sweden’s borders in accordance with international law; » fulfil Sweden’s commitments as a NATO member within the framework of NATO’s collective defence and other duties; » promote our security, and prevent and manage conflicts and war by carrying out peacetime operations on our own territory and in our neighbourhood, and take part in international peace-promoting operations; and » protect society and its functionality by providing assistance using existing capabilities and resources during peace and a heightened state of alert. 	<p>Civil defence objective</p> <p>The objective of the civil defence is to have the capability to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> » safeguard vital societal functions; » contribute to the military defence’s capability within the framework of NATO’s collective defence and other duties; » protect the civilian population; and » maintain Sweden’s will to defend itself and society’s resilience to external pressure.
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Illustration 1. The overall objective for Swedish total defence and military objectives for and civil defence objectives.

⁶ Government Bill (2024/25:34), *Totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Total Defence, 2025–2030].



One of the document's key messages is that Sweden's NATO membership has fundamentally changed the conditions for Sweden's total defence. Sweden's integration into NATO means that Swedish government agencies and society at large need to take measures and carry out activities to ensure that Sweden can fulfil NATO's core tasks.⁷

There are three main areas where Sweden now needs to plan and act differently as an Ally:

1. Defence of NATO's external borders rather than solely Swedish territory;
2. The ability to act here and now and to deter aggression even in peacetime; and
3. Sweden's role and function as a basing and transit area.

When total defence actors prepare and plan based on a set of shared assumptions, civil and military defence will be better coordinated. This leaves Sweden better placed to take action and deal with peacetime crisis situations, the threat of war and actual war. It also improves Sweden's ability to act as a deterrent here and now. This document should therefore be used as an aid by *all* total defence actors to ensure coordinated total defence planning, especially by those actors not involved in the Swedish Armed Forces' operational planning. Those actors not participating in operational planning will in turn be able to use this document to support planning and preparation from a longer time perspective than what operational planning allows.⁸

This document describes what all total defence actors should consider in their planning, preparations and developments for the period 2025–2030. Actors must be able to adapt to the planning assumptions in order to decide *how* the measures deemed necessary are to be implemented in their specific area of responsibility. This work needs to be initiated, led and carried out by each responsible actor, supported by other relevant actors.

All actors that in some way participate in total defence preparations, whether or not they have a statutory responsibility to do so, will be able to use this document to support their efforts to strengthen Sweden's total defence and role as a member of the Alliance. The private sector should take this document as its starting point for

⁷ The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept lays down NATO's three core tasks: 1) deterrence and defence, 2) crisis prevention and management, and 3) cooperative security.

⁸ The Swedish Armed Forces' process for planning and monitoring their activities has three time frames: *using capability*, *driving capability* and *developing capability*. *Using capability* covers use of the Swedish Armed Forces' resources for operations and preparedness as well as planning to use the capabilities available today or within a year or two, as clarified in the operational plan. *Driving capability* is carried out to realise the financed and decided defence capability, which is operationalized through the Swedish Armed Forces' Strategic Plan, which is also the Swedish Armed Forces' operational plan. *Developing capability* seeks to improve an existing capability, close an identified capability gap or meet future threats or opportunities, as shown by the Swedish Armed Forces' *Perspektivstudie* [Strategic Outlook].



planning and preparation, e.g. consider how business models and supply chains may need to be adapted to a deteriorating security environment. In addition to carrying out the preparatory planning that ties into the operational planning of military defence, the actor with a statutory⁹ responsibility for civil defence will need to carry out capability planning that addresses other aspects of the civil defence objectives. In other words, this document will firstly serve as a basis for preparatory civil defence planning in order to clarify how existing capabilities are to be used, and secondly as support for capability planning.¹⁰

The Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency have been tasked by the Government to ensure and promote the development of coordinated total defence planning during the period 2025–2030.¹¹ The Swedish Armed Forces are to communicate their need for support from other government agencies in the areas of military defence¹² and civil defence to enable Swedish and Allied military operations on Swedish territory, in peacetime, during a heightened state of alert and ultimately in wartime. Needs must also be communicated to the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency to enable the coordination of civil defence planning prior to heightened states of alert. The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency¹³ has the national coordinating responsibility for civil defence. The Agency is mandated to develop, support and promote civil defence efforts as well as to lead and coordinate the civil component of total defence for the purpose of preventing and dealing with the consequences of war. In this role, the Agency shall support, strengthen and provide guidance for the coordination of civil defence planning carried out by the relevant actors. The Agency shall, in particular, ensure effective coordination with military defence. In the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency's *Föreskrifter och allmänna råd om statliga myndigheters uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap* [Regulations and General Guidelines concerning the Duties of Government Agencies in Preparation for and during Heightened State of Alert],¹⁴ the specific obligations of civil preparedness authorities are explicitly delineated.

⁹ See, for example, the Act (1992:1403) and Ordinance (2015:1053) on Total Defence and Heightened State of Alert, and the Ordinance (2022:524) on the Preparedness of Government Authorities.

¹⁰ Civil defence plans its operations through civil preparedness planning. Civil preparedness planning is divided into planning to *use capabilities* and planning to *create capabilities* (of 1–10 years and beyond). Using capabilities encompasses *advance planning* (generic or scenario-specific planning in order to tackle potential events that may have significant consequences for society), and *response planning* (planning for dealing with actual or imminent events) respectively. Planning to *create capability*, in the short to medium term (1–10 years), seeks to strengthen capabilities that are needed to prevent, deter, combat or counter risks and threats.

¹¹ Government of Sweden, *Gemensamma förutsättningar för utvecklingen av totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Shared Assumptions for the Development of Total Defence, 2025–2030] (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]).

¹² The Swedish Armed Forces, the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, the Swedish Defence Conscription and Assessment Agency, the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish Fortifications Agency and the Swedish Defence University are to contribute to achieving the military defence objective set by the Riksdag. Fö2024/02054 (in part).

¹³ On 1 January 2026, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) was renamed the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency (Myndigheten för civilt försvar). The new agency has been assigned a clearer and broadened mandate to support the Government and coordinate national civil defence, and to represent civil defence at the national level.

¹⁴ Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency (2025), *Föreskrifter och allmänna råd om statliga myndigheters uppgifter inför och vid höjd beredskap*, MSBFS 2025:4, [Regulations and General Guidelines concerning the Duties of Government Agencies in Preparation for and during Heightened State of Alert].



This document also forms the basis for the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency's *Planeringsinriktning för krisberedskap och civilt försvar* [Planning Guidelines for Crisis Preparedness and Civil Defence],¹⁵ which provides additional guidance for civil defence actors.

For the Swedish Armed Forces, the planning assumptions are operationalized in *Försvarmaktens strategiska plan 2025* [The Swedish Armed Forces' Strategic Plan, 2025].¹⁶ The operational planning is carried out at all levels of command in the Swedish Armed Forces, and civil actors are also involved. At national level, the Swedish Armed Forces mainly work with authorities responsible for civil preparedness and civil defence and at regional level with county administrative boards responsible for the civil defence regions, regions, municipalities, the private sector and other civil defence actors or organisations. Civil-military cooperation¹⁷ is carried out through agreements or contracts and is guided by relevant operational plans, regulations or decisions.

Key points

- Sweden is now a member of NATO and our total defence planning is aligned with NATO's operational planning – we are no longer defending only Sweden but also NATO's external borders.
- Total defence requires coordination between civil and military defence. This document serves as a starting point for all actors, both civil and military, in planning their capability to act effectively in periods of high tension, under threat of war and when at war.
- Lessons learned from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine need to be taken into account in Sweden's total defence planning. Security developments demand a greater deterrent capability even in peacetime, and Sweden must be ready to provide support in the form of military and civil resources.
- As a total defence actor, you will need to translate this document into your own activities. Each actor is responsible for preparing, planning and implementing necessary measures in their area of responsibility.

¹⁵ Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency (2026), *Planeringsinriktning för krisberedskap och civilt försvar – Planering för att skapa och använda förmåga*, MCF0019

¹⁶ Swedish Armed Forces (2024), *Försvarmaktens Strategiska Plan 2025*, FM 2024-21844:1.

¹⁷ Within NATO, the cooperation and interaction conducted between non-military actors and military NATO bodies are termed CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation) and CMI (Civil-Military Interaction) respectively.



2. Planning requirements

The Government's directive *Gemensamma förutsättningar för utvecklingen av totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Shared Requirements for the Development of Total Defence, 2025–2030]¹⁸ sets out the planning requirements for the development of total defence in the following areas:

- *Sweden's total defence must be sufficiently robust to deal with an armed attack,*
- *Security policy,*
- *Sweden's deterrence and defence efforts,*
- *Geographical perspectives and transport perspectives,*
- *Resilience and capacity for transformation,*
- *Total defence is a whole-of-society effort.*

The directive can be found on the Swedish Government's website¹⁹ (in Swedish). In this chapter, the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency and the Swedish Armed Forces specify and concretise the Government's planning assumptions.

2.1. Implementing the Government's directive

Threats

Sweden faces wide ranging and complex threats with ongoing hostile activities that must be addressed by both civil and military means, even without a heightened state of alert being declared.²⁰ All actors must be prepared for the international security environment to deteriorate rapidly.

An armed attack on Sweden or our Allies cannot be ruled out; therefore, total defence actors must plan and act to counter such an attack. The cost of attacking Sweden and our Allies must clearly exceed any possible gains for a potential adversary.

Lessons learned from the war in Ukraine illustrate how a future war can be conducted. Total defence actors need to plan for a variety of possible dimensional

¹⁸ Government of Sweden, *Gemensamma förutsättningar för utvecklingen av totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Shared Assumptions for the Development of Total Defence, 2025–2030] (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]).

¹⁹ Government of Sweden, <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/c32aca4f96cc4c4f89d337aaecb64b6a/gemensamma-forutsattningar-for-utvecklingen-av-totalforsvaret-2025-2030.pdf>

²⁰ A heightened state of alert may be declared for a specific part of the country or a specific activity. A heightened state of alert enables the use of a number of laws that may only be used in times of war or threat of war. The wording "*inför höjd beredskap*" (prior to heightened states of alert), found, for example in the Act (2006:544) on Municipal and County Council Measures prior to and during Extraordinary Events in Peacetime and during Periods of Heightened Alert, concerns planning, preparations and measures that need to be taken. In the view of the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency, "prior to heightened states of alert" is the status here and now.



cases. An armed attack on Sweden may seek to control land and sea territory, prevent NATO action or weaken Sweden's role as a member of the Alliance. It may begin with attacks on military infrastructure and civilian objects and include cyberattacks and sabotage. Intensive combat may occur in parts of Sweden, with major impacts locally and regionally. Surprise and deception are expected to play a key role. Influence operations are likely to target our decision-making and determination to defend ourselves.

Sweden as a NATO ally

Sweden joining NATO changed the military strategic context. Previously relying on its own capabilities and on bilateral, non-binding agreements with other states, Sweden has now signed the North Atlantic Treaty,²¹ where Articles 3 and 5 constitute the bedrock of Sweden's and the Alliance's security.

The Government's *Instruktion för myndigheters verksamhet i Nato* [Instructions for Government Agencies' Work within NATO]²² sets out Sweden's guidelines for working in NATO committees and working groups. Sweden is to ensure that the European security order is upheld, that international law, founded on the UN Charter, is respected and that NATO's core tasks – deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security – are fulfilled.

NATO is Sweden's most important defence policy arena. As a member of NATO, Sweden is part of the Alliance's collective defence, including nuclear defence, and must be a credible partner based on solidarity. NATO's defence concept is built on deterrence in peacetime through military means, civil defence and crisis preparedness. Deterrence will be achieved by means of a strong Swedish total defence, active engagement in NATO's advanced forces and activities and a credible self-defence capability. As part of NATO's civil preparedness efforts, three fundamental capabilities are highlighted as being especially important to a functioning society: continuity of government, continuity of vital societal functions²³ and civil support to military operations.

Sweden is to maintain a strong national defence capability as a basis for both national and collective defence in accordance with Articles 3 and 5. Under Article 3, the Allies individually and collectively will maintain and develop their individual and collective capability to resist an armed attack through continuous preparedness and mutual aid. In a situation covered by Article 5, where Sweden or another member of the Alliance is subjected to an armed attack or under the threat of war,

²¹ North Atlantic Treaty, https://carefully_removed_external_link_due_to_policy.

²² Government of Sweden, *Instruktion för myndigheters verksamhet i Nato* [Instructions for Government Agencies' Work within NATO] (Fö2023/01707).

²³ An essential service to the population is a function of society that is necessary for the fundamental needs, values or security of society. A list of these is provided in Myndigheten för civilt försvar (2026), *Lista med de viktigaste samhällsfunktionerna – Utgångspunkt för att stärka samhällets beredskap* [Established Vital Societal Functions], MCF0018 – januari 2026.



NATO's defence measures will constitute collective defence. Defence begins at NATO's external borders, which means that Sweden has a responsibility also for security outside its own territory and territorial waters.²⁴

Among other things, NATO efforts are based on joint operational planning. NATO's regional plans constitute the military resources that could be used in Sweden and its neighbouring area, the areas that are of strategic importance, and the capabilities that are required, e.g. for HNS and reinforcements. NATO's military forces are organised in line with a model in which Sweden's forces and capabilities are part of the Alliance's combined forces. The NATO Defence Planning Process and Capability Targets determine requirements in four-year cycles. The Riksdag and the Government are responsible for translating capability requirements in the governance of both military and civil defence, which affects total defence development and planning.

The EU is Sweden's most important foreign policy platform. The EU's importance for Swedish security has increased as the security situation has deteriorated. The EU preparedness union strategy²⁵ from 2025 strengthens both civil and military preparedness and clarifies the division of responsibilities between the EU and NATO.

Sweden's geographical location and host-nation-support capability

Sweden's geostrategic location and security interests are fundamental to shaping its role as a NATO member, with a specific focus on NATO's northern and eastern flank – from Norway to the Baltic States. This includes a regional responsibility for primarily the Baltic Sea area and the North Calotte, with the specific expertise that is needed when operating in these environments. Strategically important areas include the North Calotte, the West Coast, Gotland, the Baltic Sea and the Baltic Sea inlet. The Arctic is of increasing military importance, in terms of both access to natural resources and Russia's nuclear capability.

Sweden's geographical location also means that its own territory and territorial waters could become a basing and transit area as the Alliance builds up its forces. East–West transport routes through Sweden are vital to the Alliance's ability to defend Finland and the Baltic States. Gotland's location is pivotal in this context. Of particular importance are the transport links from Götaland and the West Coast to

²⁴ Sweden's territorial waters and maritime zones (contiguous and economic zones), under the Swedish Sea Territory and Maritime Zones Act (2017:1272).

²⁵ Brussels, 26.3.2025 JOIN (2025) 130 final JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS *on the European Preparedness Union Strategy*. Alongside the EU's internal security strategy, *ProtectEU – A New European Internal Security Strategy*, and *White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030*, the preparedness strategy provides a framework for strengthening the EU's civil and military preparedness.

the Stockholm area, Western Svealand to the Oslo area, Jämtland to Trondheim, Norrbotten via Narvik and through²⁶ the Baltic Sea and the Öresund area.




Illustration 2. Map of Sweden and a schematic diagram of the logistics network.

Sweden is to develop both a collective and national capability for effective HNS. For example, this includes Allies or NATO establishing command and control (C2) resources and bases for air and naval forces on Swedish territory and in our sea areas. Sweden provides HNS, e.g. in the form of transport and logistics services (food, fuel, healthcare, electricity, communications and infrastructure, etc.). The Swedish Armed Forces must be able to maintain a robust logistics network, which will require a strong total defence response, designed and scaled for war in which

²⁶ See, for example, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS), <https://shipping.nato.int/nsc/page14865015>. NCAGS is the interface between military operations and merchant shipping, for providing military cooperation, guidance, advice and aid to merchant shipping.



infrastructure, societal functions and logistics are to function as best they can. Civil and military defence must therefore collaborate, and government agencies need to involve municipalities, regions, the private sector and civil society in their planning.

Defining capabilities and capacity to transition

Total defence capabilities must be designed to meet an armed attack launched with little or no warning, where the adversary actively uses surprise and misdirection. It will be difficult to obtain and share confirmed information and there will be great uncertainty. At the same time, Sweden must initially be able to counter an attack using its own resources because the activation of NATO's Article 5 requires political decisions, preparation and movement of forces.

Military and civil defence must prepare and plan to counter and cope with a war in Europe *for a minimum of three months*, one that seriously impacts the functioning of society. During these three months, Swedish total defence actors may need to rely on supplies of goods and services from other domestic actors. This will be achieved by adapting the scope and quality of operations, reallocating resources and establishing alternative plans for supply solutions. It is crucial to prepare and plan for the transition from a peacetime organisation to a wartime organisation in order to be able to cope with a long war. As we have learned from the war in Ukraine, such a war may last for years.

During decisive phases, for example in the initial phase of an attack, the Government will ultimately need to prioritise civil defence resources so as to best support military defence, in the manner most appropriate for the combined total defence war effort. This may involve prioritising the transport of personnel and materiel, or access to essential supplies that enable the mobilisation of the Swedish Armed Forces, at the same time needing to ensure the continuity of vital societal functions even in extremely trying conditions. Civil defence therefore needs to scale up its capability to maintain vital societal functions during the initial phase of a war, largely relying on its own resources *for a minimum of two weeks*. This capability means that anyone involved in vital societal functions, whether in the public or private sector, can – notwithstanding extremely trying conditions and major uncertainty – continue to do so by drawing up plans, acquiring and stockpiling essential supplies and goods, securing staff and putting other practical steps in place.²⁷

The purpose of building such robustness based on capability for a minimum of two weeks is to sustain the ability to act during an initial or critical phase of an armed attack and provide greater scope for a structural transition of the entire society to a wartime situation, one with changed production conditions and transport and goods flows.

²⁷ The brochure *In Case of Crisis or War* urges Swedish households to take steps to cope independently for at least a week. MSB (2024) publ.no: MSB 2398.

Civil support to military defence

Civil support to military defence largely involves civil actors' contributions to maintaining vital societal functions.²⁸ Military defence depends on the basic functioning of Swedish society in order to deter hostile attacks, defend Sweden and NATO, restore peace and maintain national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Many civil actors participate in the Swedish Armed Forces' operational planning at different levels and time horizons to provide the necessary support, e.g. regarding the basing and transit of Allied forces. Civil actors not participating in military operational planning support military defence indirectly by strengthening their capability to maintain vital societal functions.




Illustration 3. Swedish total defence consists of military and civil defence.

²⁸ In general, the ability of many of the civil actors to provide support to military defence depends on the fundamental capabilities in other sectors, especially the following: energy supply, transport, personnel supply, healthcare, and electronic communications and postal services.



International humanitarian law and the protection of particularly vulnerable groups

Sweden's obligations under international law and international humanitarian law (the law of war) require measures to be taken already in the preparation and planning phase of military and civil defence.²⁹ Giving total defence personnel sufficient training in and information about the rules of international law in times of war and neutrality is an important part of this.³⁰

The relevant Swedish authorities need to put preparations in place to investigate, gather evidence and provide support to victims of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes.³¹ In peacetime, certain authorities are charged with preparing to designate personnel and material using distinctive emblems and signs protected under international law.³² Planning measures are also required to prevent property important for total defence or property of historic or cultural significance from falling into enemy hands.³³ In addition, a national information bureau needs to be set up in the event of armed conflict.³⁴

There are three fundamental principles of international humanitarian law that are vital to preparedness planning. First, the *principle of distinction*, under which belligerents must always distinguish between military targets and civilians and civilian objects, and an attack may only be directed at military targets. If civilian objects, e.g. civilian ships, aircraft, vehicles and buildings, contain combatants or military equipment and supplies, they risk being considered military targets. As a consequence, the civilian population and civil defence personnel would risk being attacked. Second, the *principle of proportionality*, under which an attack on a military target may nevertheless contravene the rules if there is a risk that it will harm civilians and damage civilian property in a way that is not proportionate to the military advantage anticipated. Third, the *principle of precaution*, under which the belligerents must take all reasonable precautions to avoid harming civilians or

²⁹ The core rules are laid down in the four Geneva Conventions and their three Additional Protocols. The four Geneva Conventions were adopted in their current wording in 1949 and today are also considered to constitute customary law. Compliance with international humanitarian law is one of the EU's priorities, and Sweden has been a driving force in efforts to demand accountability for war crimes through, for example, the International Criminal Court.

³⁰ See the regulations on this in Sections 20, 28 and 31 of the Ordinance concerning the Status of Total Defence Personnel according to International Law (1990:12).

³¹ Government Bill (2024/25:34), *Totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Total Defence, 2025–2030]. Ds 2023:34 Kraftsamling, p. 226. See also the analysis by Elin Malmköld, 'Civilbefolkningens riskutsatthet och behov vid ett väpnat angrepp på Sverige' [The Risk Exposure and Needs of the Civilian Population in the Event of an Armed Attack on Sweden], *Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, Analys & perspektiv*, 2024:3.

³² See Sections 20a–26 of the Ordinance concerning the Status of Total Defence Personnel according to International Law (1990:12).

³³ See the Act on Evacuation and Destruction (1992:1402). These provisions are, for instance, based on the Cultural Property Convention (Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and Additional Protocols, The Hague, 14 May 1954), where the signatories undertake to respect cultural property such that it is not damaged or destroyed in the event of war.

³⁴ Every municipality, region and owner of a public graveyard must provide information to the national information bureau on prisoners of war and other protected people. In peacetime, municipalities and regions are to help prepare the activities of the national information bureau. See Chapter 6, Section 1 of the Act on Municipal and County Council Measures prior to and during Extraordinary Events in Peacetime and during Periods of Heightened Alert (2006:544), and Chapter 8, Section 4 of the Funeral Act (1990:1144) and the Ordinance relating to the Obligation to Provide Information concerning Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons (1996:1475).



damaging civilian objects. For example, this means all feasible precautions must be taken to verify that attacks are only directed at military targets. It is important that both military and civil defence observe these principles and safeguard the protection of civilians in their planning so as to protect as far as possible the civilian population and objects from the dangers posed by military operations.

In times of war, children are often a particularly vulnerable group, and the children's rights perspective is central to total defence planning. In accordance with its obligations to protect the civilian population in armed conflict, Sweden must undertake all possible measures to ensure the protection and care of children affected by armed conflict,³⁵ which may, for example, involve providing round-the-clock childcare and maintaining the capacity for online teaching.

Sweden will work to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.³⁶ In accordance with direction from the Riksdag and the Swedish Government, government agencies and municipalities have a duty to integrate a gender equality perspective into, among other things, the planning, implementation and evaluation of civil and military defence.³⁷

A reduced societal capacity does not equally affect people, the reason being they have different physical, psychological, linguistic and socio-economic circumstances.³⁸ As part of their planning, Swedish total defence actors therefore need to analyse how their prioritisation of activities and resources in heightened states of alert will affect different groups and take these conclusions into account in their decision making.

³⁵ The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child Act (2018:1197). In addition to Articles 38 and 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Additional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000) and UN Security Council Resolutions 1261 (1999) and 1314 (2000) on children in armed conflict are among the most important.

³⁶ Government of Sweden, *Gemensamma förutsättningar för utvecklingen av totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Shared Assumptions for the Development of Total Defence, 2025–2030] (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]). Under UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, women and girls have special needs for protection in conflict and the equal participation of women is necessary to achieve peace and security.

³⁷ See 'Sweden's 2024–2028 National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security'. The Geneva Conventions also contain specific rules on the protection of women, children, the environment and refugees.

³⁸ Swedish Red Cross (2024), *Värn i allvarstider* [Protection in Critical Times].



Key points

- Sweden faces a broad spectrum of threats – even in peacetime – that require both civil and military action. Sweden can bolster the Alliance’s collective defence efforts and thus NATO’s overall deterrence by undertaking preparations and early action in peacetime.
- An armed attack cannot be ruled out, and Sweden’s total defence must be designed to deal with such an eventuality. Initially, Sweden must defend itself using its own resources.
- Sweden’s total defence must prepare and plan to respond to and handle a war in Europe for a minimum of three months and successfully transition to a more protracted scenario.
- In the event of an attack, civil organisations must maintain vital societal functions primarily using their own resources for a minimum of two weeks, and notwithstanding a lack of information and difficult conditions.
- International law and its central principles must permeate all total defence planning.

3. Global security environment and dimensional cases

This chapter begins with a brief description of the global security environment to outline the context in which Sweden's total defence actors find themselves. This is then followed by seven dimensional cases serving as a common planning basis to develop and employ total defence capabilities. By using the same dimensional cases as a starting point, and sharing a common understanding of potential developments, Swedish total defence actors are better equipped to coordinate planning. The individual dimensional cases are not exhaustive or mutually excluding.³⁹ Instead, they must be combined, analysed, further developed and adapted based on each actor's area of responsibility so they can be used when planning, conducting exercises⁴⁰ across different geographical areas and undertaking various activities.

3.1. Global security environment⁴¹

The current global security environment is characterised by instability, uncertainty and other serious challenges. Countries such as Russia, China and Iran are likely to take action against Sweden and its Allies using the instruments of power at their disposal. Their hybrid warfare capabilities are characterised by preparation and opportunism and are expected to grow in significance. State actors may take action against multiple levels of Swedish society and various societal functions, including those not formally defined as vital.

Russia's war against Ukraine is crucial to security developments in Sweden's immediate vicinity. Russia considers itself to be in a strategic conflict with the West; its external actions reflect the Russian leadership's worldview and perception of threats.

Russia could potentially concentrate its military forces in Sweden's neighbourhood within a short time frame, but its ability to conduct combined-arms and sophisticated military operations is severely limited as long as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues. The likelihood of Russia launching a sudden large-scale military operation in Sweden's neighbourhood has thus decreased. On the other hand, Russia might carry out a limited armed attack in the Baltic Sea region. It still has military capabilities in Sweden's neighbourhood, such as naval and air forces, cyber assets, special forces units and nuclear weapons.

³⁹ Variations might include the point at which the level of alert is raised, an extended period of deniable and covert attacks below the threshold of an armed attack, protracted warfare, the main focus of the attack, the geographical situation and societal functions, the scope and intensity of attacks, CBRN attacks and/or attacks against industrial facilities and the transport of hazardous substances.

⁴⁰ For exercises up to 2026, see MSB (2024), *Övningsinriktning för beredskapsmyndigheter på nationell och regional nivå avseende samverkansövningar under 2022–2026* [Exercise Policy for Preparedness Agencies at National and Regional Level regarding Collaborative Exercises in 2022–2026]. MSB 2517 – revised November 2024.

⁴¹ The section in this chapter supplements the Government's guiding planning assumptions and is based on *Försvarsmaktens Strategiska Plan 2025* [Swedish Armed Forces' Strategic Plan, 2025], FM 2024-21844:1.



Russia has announced long-term measures to develop bases and units in the western part of the country and is considered capable of enhancing its military capabilities in the near term. Russia also possesses long-range strike capabilities and can, if deemed necessary, equip the majority of its conventional long-range weapons with nuclear warheads.

3.1. Dimensional cases

The international security situation described above has been translated into seven dimensional cases. These are not presented in order of priority or according to the severity of their consequences. Taken from *Försvarsmaktens Strategiska Plan 2025*,⁴² the dimensional cases have been adjusted and supplemented to reflect the purpose of this document.

Sweden's total defence must be sufficiently robust to deal with an armed attack. The adversary's level of ambition regarding an attack on Swedish territory is determined by, among other factors, available military resources, their assessment of Sweden's defensive strength, opportunities to utilize the element of surprise and disinformation, the effects of hybrid activities, potential Swedish counter-measures, and their risk propensity.

The assessment is that the following dimensional cases are more relevant as long as the full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues: hybrid threats (1), Host-Nation Support (HNS) (2) and remote attacks (5). The relevance of the other dimensional cases, which would involve larger Russian ground operations, will increase once Russia has rebuilt its capabilities or regrouped larger military resources.

The dimensional cases describe possible aspects of a military conflict; a real conflict would likely include situations that deviate from and combine the dimensional cases in various ways. The dimensional cases must be combined, analysed, further developed and adapted to each actor's area of responsibility, activities, geography and conditions.⁴³

Sweden's total defence must be sufficiently robust to deal with all of the dimensional cases in parallel, even when the preparation and lead times are limited.

Dimensional case 1 – Hybrid threats

Hybrid warfare refers to the use of a combination of military and civil instruments, such as cyber operations, electronic- and telecommunications warfare; influence

⁴² Swedish Armed Forces (2024), *Försvarsmaktens Strategiska Plan 2025*, FM2024-21844:1.

⁴³ For example, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency recommend that the dimensional cases should be combined, analysed, further developed and adapted. See Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI – memo 8923, *Resultat från spel Maritim säkerhet 2025* [Findings from the Maritime Security Exercise 2025], <https://www.foi.se/rapporter/rapportsammanfattning.html?reportNo=FOI%20Memo%208923>



operations; intelligence collection; acts of sabotage against, for instance, the electricity supply, underwater cables and transport infrastructure; and special operations. The purpose of the attacks may be to complicate and delay decision-making, impair Sweden's situational awareness, exhaust and fragment resources and erode public trust in government authorities and national leadership. Russia is continuously preparing to carry out sabotage and other operations to influence decision-making and public trust in Sweden's leadership and other actors, including private-sector actors, engaged in critical total defence activities.

At the outset of a conflict, hybrid attacks are primarily conducted using means that allow plausible deniability, such as cyberattacks and cyber operations, influence operations or support for separatist movements and organised crime. Fabricated and genuine events (such as accidents and demonstrations) can be used in influence operations and disinformation activities. If war breaks out, these methods are expected to become more aggressive. Hybrid warfare targets both civil and military actors in peacetime as well as in war.

Dimensional case 2 – Host-Nation Support (HNS)

This dimensional case covers Sweden's HNS capabilities. For example, it includes Allies or NATO establishing C2 assets and air bases on Swedish territory. Sweden provides HNS in the form of transport and logistics services, as well as protection. This dimensional case also covers the ability to maintain logistics flows and transport to and from Allies through Swedish territory by land, air and sea.

The Swedish Armed Forces have the overall responsibility for the HNS that Sweden will provide to other Allied forces. HNS requires widespread support from civil actors, civil-military cooperation and coordination involving municipalities, regions, county administrative boards, other government agencies, businesses, voluntary defence organisations and other civil society organisations, as well as the general population.

Allied forces to reinforce a front in Finland and the Baltic States will mainly pass through Sweden and its territorial waters. In addition, civilian and military flows – such as refugees and casualties – from areas near the frontline are expected to move through Swedish territory. Some supplies for both Allied forces and civilians in the Baltic States and Finland may transit through Sweden.

In the event of an armed attack, civil actors in Sweden may also be required to support international civilian organisations, such as the Red Cross, to facilitate the reception of civil and humanitarian assistance to maintain the functioning of society. This may include transportation, permits and exemptions, healthcare and the preparing and staffing of reception and staging points.



Dimensional case 3 – Limited attack on northern Sweden

In this dimensional case, airborne or special forces – supported by long-range weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) and air combat forces – are inserted by airborne assault into northern Sweden. The attack may seek to disrupt logistics flows to Finland and Norway and to control key terrain. This case may also include more limited attacks by enemy special forces in other parts of Sweden, with the aim of disrupting activities.

Limited attacks are a way for Russia to disrupt logistics flows and vital societal functions using relatively small means. Russian units may be capable of operating covertly and operating within Swedish society. There are no large-scale operations in this dimensional case but instead time-limited operations (days or weeks long) conducted with limited resources. By identifying and designating targets for other forces, Russian units may also cause damage to fortified installations and infrastructure.

Dimensional case 4 – Attack on Gotland

In this dimensional case, enemy troops – supported by naval and air forces – are inserted by airborne or amphibious assault on Gotland. The attack is carried out with little warning and protected by naval task groups tasked with maintaining maritime control in parts of the Baltic Sea. The attack seeks to establish integrated air and maritime defence zones on and around Gotland.

The Baltic Sea region is critical to the supply of Allied states bordering the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea is also critical to Russia's supply lines, especially those to Kaliningrad. Sea and air routes in and across the Baltic Sea are also vital to NATO operations in the region. Russia might attack Gotland so it can deploy air defence and other weapons systems as part of efforts to restrict NATO's freedom of action in the Baltic Sea region.

It is important to Russia that an attack on Gotland is carried out before Sweden or its Allies can reinforce the island's defences. Surprise and misdirection are therefore expected to be central to this kind of Russian military operation.

Dimensional case 5 – Long-range attacks

In this dimensional case, long-range enemy attacks are conducted against civilian infrastructure, military assets and densely populated areas using conventional long-range weapons (mainly missiles and drones⁴⁴ and, to a lesser extent, fighter aircraft). Also in this dimensional case, special operations are conducted against civilian objects and military targets, key personnel and infrastructure, etc., in line with Dimensional case 1 – Hybrid threats. The attack seeks to neutralise activities critical

⁴⁴ I.e. loitering munitions.



to Sweden's total defence, combat Swedish military forces and influence the Swedish people's will to fight, thus weakening Swedish interests and military capabilities.

Depending on what Russia is looking to achieve, remote attacks will target different parts of Swedish society. Sweden's military defence can be assumed to be a particularly prioritised target, followed by infrastructure and other targets that have a major impact on the combined defence effort. Densely populated areas may be attacked to erode the Swedish people's will to fight. Lessons from Ukraine show that remote attacks may be carried out with a large number of missiles and drones simultaneously to saturate active air defences (anti-aircraft, fighter aircraft, etc.) and achieve the maximum possible devastation. As a result, periods of heavy strikes may be followed by long lulls as Russia prepares a new show of force.

Stationary objects without passive air defences, camouflage or physical protection may be easy targets for an adversary to attack. Even though Russia has access to several different types of remote combat systems and can adapt these to achieve the desired effect, it will prioritise targets where the desired effect can be achieved with as minimal resources as possible.

Dimensional case 6 – Reinforcement of NATO's northern flank

In this dimensional case, Swedish ground forces, along with air and naval forces, would reinforce NATO's northern flank in Finland to defend the Alliance's territory. This dimensional case encompasses both defensive and offensive operations.

See below the additional information for Dimensional cases 6 and 7.

Dimensional case 7 – Reinforcement of NATO forces in the Baltic region

In this dimensional case, Swedish ground forces, supported by air and naval forces, would reinforce NATO in and around the Baltic States to defend the Alliance's territory. This dimensional case encompasses both defensive and offensive tasks as well as transportation operations in and across the Baltic Sea.

In dimensional cases 6 and 7, parts of Sweden's military defence are placed under NATO command and become part of operations on the Alliance's northern flank (Norway and Finland) or in the Baltic region. These dimensional cases also entail that civil actors may be assigned tasks that extend beyond Sweden's territory or territorial waters. Offensive tasks, such as establishing control over areas controlled by the adversary (e.g. recapture areas of Finland occupied in an initial attack), are expected to result in more casualties and deaths for Sweden's military defence compared to defensive duties, such as protecting or monitoring an area.



Key points

- No single dimensional case covers the whole range of possible outcomes. The dimensional cases need to be combined, analysed, further developed and adapted to each actor's area of responsibility and/or activities, geography and circumstances in general.
- Russia already has military capabilities in Sweden's neighbourhood, such as naval and air forces, cyber assets, special forces and nuclear weapons.
- Russia's ability to conduct larger ground operations will increase with time.
- Sweden's military defence – including civil support to military defence – can be assumed to be a particularly prioritised target, as are civilian objects. An attack can affect the overall defence effort individually or in combination.
- Densely populated areas may be attacked to weaken the Swedish people's will to fight.
- Unprotected and stationary targets are more likely to be hit in a remote strike.



4. Potential developments and impacts on Swedish society

This chapter sets out potential developments and impacts on vital societal functions in peacetime and in heightened states of alert. These potential developments are examples that can vary and be combined in different ways. The same can be said of the assumptions presented regarding the impact on vital societal functions; they represent a sample where several functions are mutually dependent. These assumptions are intended for use in total defence planning by actors who need to understand, prepare and plan based on their dependence on vital societal functions.

4.1. Potential developments

Sweden's total defence is part of NATO's deterrence and defence posture. This marks a shift in focus for Sweden – from defending its own territory to becoming an active part of NATO's deterrence. Facilitating early action even in *peacetime* will enable Sweden to bolster the Alliance's collective defence efforts and thus NATO's overall deterrence. Sweden thus has a clearer role in peacetime, namely seeking to ensure that the country never finds itself at war. Being able to conduct large-scale peacetime operations is a vital element here.

Developments in peacetime

The number of Allied forces based in Sweden may need to increase rapidly, at the same time as there is a massive reinforcement of troops in Finland and the Baltic region to quickly deter Russia. The HNS that Sweden is to provide may affect society, including disruption to roads, railways, airports, shipping lanes and ports. The hybrid threats facing Sweden and its NATO Allies, as set out in dimensional case 1, may escalate and intensify with the aim of making it more difficult to set up logistics and transit areas, as set out in dimensional case 2 – Host-Nation Support. Russia may also carry out attacks and disinformation operations to undermine the Swedish people's will to fight. The need for intelligence, situational awareness and information sharing will increase as a result of NATO activities and the threat facing the Alliance.

The Swedish Armed Forces' ability to deter and to strengthen NATO's collective security during a state of basic readiness⁴⁵ is based on standing forces. These forces can, for example, be used to provide HNS to Allies, conduct exercises or protect Sweden's or Allies' defence assets within and outside Sweden's land territory and territorial waters. If the security environment deteriorates rapidly, and an armed attack cannot be ruled out, the Chief of Defence may issue the command *Givakt*

⁴⁵ Basic readiness is in effect until the Government has declared a heightened state of alert. *ÖB aktivering* (CHOD activation) may be triggered during a state of basic readiness, as a result of which wartime units are organised without the Government having put Sweden on a heightened state of alert. The primary purpose of a CHOD activation is to increase the Swedish Armed Forces' freedom of action to conduct operations but also to carry out rapid capability enhancement.



(Attention), thus activating the whole of the Swedish Armed Forces. Home Guard soldiers may be called up in compliance with their obligation to serve. The aim is to ensure that military resources are quickly made available to counter a continued escalation. In a heightened state of alert, the Swedish Armed Forces, among others, will be organised for war (mobilised) to the extent determined by the Government, while municipalities and regions will transition to a war footing.⁴⁶ If the Government has declared an elevated or the highest state of alert, those with total defence duties and a wartime posting are obliged to complete their wartime service. Once the Government has declared a heightened state of alert, it may also impose general compulsory service.⁴⁷

Sweden's freedom of action during the highest state of alert is based on the entire wartime organisation, including the Home Guard units, and support from civil actors that comes from a mobilised total defence, and may be increased with support from Allies. During the highest state of alert, Sweden's total defence is a whole-of-society endeavour.⁴⁸ The Swedish Armed Forces will prioritise their main task: to defend Sweden and Allied nations from an armed attack, based on NATO's collective defence principles. Their ability to provide support to civil defence will be very limited.

Developments in the event of an armed attack

In the event of an armed attack, NATO will move from a deterrence posture to a collective response. An armed attack on Sweden and its Allies would comprise a combination of several of the dimensional cases above. Dimensional case 1 – Hybrid threats will not cease in the event of an armed attack and would be expected to continue along with more conventional warfare. Efforts using various types of hybrid attack and disinformation operations to undermine the Swedish people's will to fight are likely to increase in the event of war. Dimensional case 2 – Host-Nation Support must also be provided during an armed attack.

A Russian military attack on the Baltic States and/or Finland, as set out in Dimensional case 6 – Reinforcement of NATO's northern flank, and Dimensional case 7 – Reinforcement of NATO forces in the Baltic region, could lead to Sweden being used as a basing area for Allied forces. The transit of Allied forces to reinforce Finland and the Baltic States will mainly pass through Sweden's land territory and territorial waters and within its marine areas. In addition to that, supplies (e.g. food, fuel, medicines) for Allied forces and civilians in the Baltic States and Finland will come via Sweden in line with Dimensional case 2 – Host-Nation Support. At the same time, Sweden will need to receive casualties and a large number of people fleeing war-torn areas.

⁴⁶ Sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance on Total Defence and Heightened State of Alert (2015:1053). See also provisions on emergency alarms, Sections 13–15.

⁴⁷ Chapter 6, Sections 1 and 2 of the Total Defence Act (1994:1809). Duty to serve means, among other things, that employees are to remain in their posts and that enlistees are obliged to serve in accordance with their contracts.

⁴⁸ Section 1 of the Ordinance on Total Defence and Heightened State of Alert (1992:1403).



Even if Sweden is mainly considered a logistic and transit area, we cannot rule out combat. Military activities, transit routes, supply flows and critical infrastructure will be targets of Russian remote attacks, as set out in Dimensional case 5 – Remote attacks. Electricity grids, fuel depots, telecommunications, data centres, hospitals, densely populated areas, ports, airports, bridges and industries might be among the civilian objects attacked. Besides causing material damage, remote attacks may result in a large number of fatalities and casualties depending on the targets and objects under attack. Not every part of Sweden will be equally affected by hostilities. Actors in certain geographical areas will therefore need to support actors in worse affected areas, similar to the large disparities between western and eastern Ukraine.

Recruiting new soldiers and carrying out repairs and forced procurement of defence materiel or infrastructure will be important in order to maintain the defence effort over the course of a protracted war. Continued production and innovation with our Allies in support of our common defence will be required to maintain defence capabilities and ultimately win the war.

As a variation, Dimensional case 4 – Attack on Gotland and Dimensional case 3 – Limited attack on northern Sweden may form part of an armed attack on Sweden. The enemy would probably conduct a surprise airdrop and landing of troops on Gotland, with the aim of controlling parts of the Baltic Sea and limiting the Allies' freedom of action in this region. A limited attack on northern Sweden (an airdrop or special forces) may, in turn, be a way for an adversary to hamper troop movements and logistics flows to Finland and Norway. Nor can a limited attack on other parts of Sweden be ruled out.

Sweden's total defence also needs to take into consideration less likely developments that would have serious consequences. This includes CBRN⁴⁹ weapons since their use cannot be ruled out either in war or in terrorist attacks, and other criminal acts that impact our lives, our health and our environment.⁵⁰ The use of nuclear weapons would have vast psychological, political and material consequences and result in many deaths and injuries. It is important that the total defence tasks are carried out despite the threat these types of weapons pose and the impact they would have.

4.2. Impacts on Swedish society

Societal consequences may arise during peacetime and must be dealt with without the declaration of a heightened state of alert, e.g. transport interruptions, the use of

⁴⁹ Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear.

⁵⁰ Emissions of toxic industrial substances may be caused by intentional combat or the sabotage of industrial facilities and warehouses.



infrastructure and other types of societal disruptions that may affect both civil and military activities. When NATO moves from a deterrence posture to a collective response in the event of an armed attack, all actors in Swedish society need to involve themselves in the defence effort. Available civil and military resources must be used effectively in total defence and principles for prioritising resources must be put into action.

Under Swedish enabling legislation,⁵¹ a number of statutes may be applied in a heightened state of alert (elevated or the highest state of alert).⁵² This impacts society, e.g. the rationing of supplies and the Government needing to claim and commandeer property (e.g. requisitioning vehicles), possibly resulting in restrictions imposed on people's day-to-day lives by, for example, rationing decisions and the loss of property, the processes for and consequences of which need to be prepared for and dealt with by the responsible actor in accordance with the applicable enabling legislation. The enabling legislation may also affect the procedures of municipalities, administrative agencies and courts.⁵³ The Government may, for example, decide that a government agency's regular work is not to be carried out, that its work is to be taken over by another government agency or that a government agency employee is to serve in another role or take on other tasks.⁵⁴

Below are examples of impacts on vital societal functions, based on the dimensional cases and potential developments.⁵⁵ The assumptions are overarching in nature so that the document does not need to be classified. The responsible actor or sector will need to put forward more-detailed assumptions.

The impacts that occur in a heightened state of alert are based on the lesson we have learned, namely that, despite their status under international humanitarian law, civilian infrastructure and the civilian population in Ukraine are not exempt from Russian attacks. The impact assessments also draw on the lesson learned, namely that civilian personnel have been targets in Ukraine.⁵⁶ Personnel working in vital services, such as the police, emergency services, healthcare and maintenance and repair, may be targeted by enemy strikes. Key civilian personnel in all sectors of society risk being killed.⁵⁷

⁵¹ A collective term for the Swedish statutes that grant the Government special powers in time of war, dangers of war, or certain extraordinary circumstances associated with war. The term refers to Sweden's pre-established wartime legal framework within total defence, not a general constitutional state of emergency

⁵² Section 13 of the Ordinance on Total Defence and Heightened State of Alert (2015:1053).

⁵³ Act concerning Procedure for Local Authorities, Administrative Authorities and Courts of Justice in the event of War or Danger of War, etc. (1988:97).

⁵⁴ See, for example, the Ordinance on the Use of the Coast Guard by the Swedish Armed Forces (1982:314).

⁵⁵ The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency compiles a list of and assesses the impacts of particularly serious threats and risks as part of its mandate to provide a national risk and vulnerability assessment (NRSB). This can be used as a basis for determining further potential impacts on society. See *Nationell risk- och sårbarhetsbedömning (NRSB) 2025* [National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment]. Pub. no. MSB2585 – April 2025.

⁵⁶ MSB, *Erfarenheter från Ukraina – lärdomar för det civila försvaret* [Experiences from Ukraine – Lessons for Civil Defence], MSB 2318 – June 2024.

⁵⁷ Government of Sweden, *Gemensamma förutsättningar för utvecklingen av totalförsvaret 2025–2030* [Shared Assumptions for the Development of Total Defence, 2025–2030] (Fö 2024/02054 [in part]).



Support from civil defence to military forces, including Allies, in turn, impacts most vital societal functions, the reason being the military forces need access to healthcare, fuel, food and water, and accommodation. They also need to be protected and guarded. Support may also be needed in the form of transport; provision of supplies; access to infrastructure such as warehousing and storage; reception at the Swedish borders, airports and ports; staffed locations; and the handling of legal and administrative matters, such as duty-free shipments, tax exemptions and agreements on access to local services.

Impacts on vital societal functions

Impacts on vital societal functions should be understood as peacetime impacts also continuing during a heightened state of alert and in the event of an armed attack. The vital societal functions are divided according to the preparedness sector in which they are found.⁵⁸

(P) means that the impacts may arise in peacetime (Dimensional cases 1 and 2) and no decision has been taken to declare a heightened state of alert.⁵⁹

(HA) means that Sweden has come under an armed attack, that the Government has declared a heightened state of alert (highest preparedness) and that all the dimensional cases apply (impacts under P remain and those under HA are added).

(P, HA) means that no distinction is made in the text between the impacts in peacetime and during a heightened state of alert. However, it should be assumed that the level of impacts will be more serious in terms of their duration and scope during a heightened state of alert.

Assigning impacts to **(P)** and **(HA)** is only one way of showing potential impacts and should not be taken as an absolute truth.

Economic security:

- **(P, HA)** For a period of time, it may be difficult to pay salaries, allowances and benefits such as unemployment insurance, social insurance and pensions, as well as various types of public funding to the private sector, including private welfare providers, and to carry out tax settlements for municipalities. Payment delays of several weeks will soon affect people with little financial leeway.
- **(P, HA)** The work of local government service centres may be affected by various events, as a result of which it may not be possible to provide some

⁵⁸ The functions can be derived from the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency's (2026) *Lista med de viktigaste samhällsfunktionerna – Utgångspunkt för att stärka samhällets beredskap* [Established Vital Societal Functions], MCF0018 – januari 2026.

⁵⁹ Large-scale cyberattacks are the most common cause of the loss of a vital societal function in peacetime.



services. This can lead to people not being able to make ends meet, to collaborating government agencies/the Government not being able to inform citizens, and to service centres not being able to support the Armed Forces as planned, or perform possible additional tasks, such as managing population movements and administering cash payments or ration cards.

- **(P, HA)** Government agencies' online self-payment services, such as those used for registering sick leave and leave to care for a sick child, may suffer stoppages or disruption.
- **(HA)** Payments of various taxes and contributions to the public sector may decrease, resulting in reduced government, regional and municipal revenue.

Electronic communications and postal services:

- **(P, HA)** Cyberattacks and physical attacks on communications infrastructure, or the prolonged interruption of supply flows, may lead to lasting local and regional disruptions (days or weeks) and/or severely reduced functionality of electronic communications networks and services. The severity of the impact on suppliers may vary depending on the nature of the incident. Users who have prepared more-robust or alternative/redundant communications solutions will be less severely affected. Severe or prolonged impacts may lead to a need to prioritise vital societal functions.
- **(P, HA)** There may be radio spectrum interference, leading to reduced functionality in specific areas, e.g. communication radio and mobile networks.
- **(P, HA)** Disruptions and interruptions may be expected to space services, such as positioning (GNSS⁶⁰), timing and voice and data communications. **(HA)** There may be a greater need to obtain an overview of war-torn areas, thus requiring access to satellite imagery.
- **(P, HA)** Regional stoppages and disruption to letter and parcel services.

Energy supply:

- **(P)** Cyberattacks on and sabotage of energy infrastructure may have a major impact on, for example, the electricity supply, resulting in power cuts of varying severity.
- **(HA)** Local, regional or national power cuts may occur and last days, weeks or months. Businesses and organisations that are heavily dependent on electricity need to review their own needs in order to guarantee continued functionality.

⁶⁰ Global Navigation Satellite System is an umbrella term for satellite-based systems that provide positioning, navigation and time information.



- **(HA)** Long-term energy or power shortages may lead to prioritising energy use if this is possible, e.g. by means of rota load disconnection (access to electricity for a few hours a day) and/or rationing. This could be at local, regional or national level depending on the reason for the outage. In the event of a rota load disconnection, electricity users need to plan for flexible energy consumption, e.g. how to manage access to electricity for only a few hours of the day.
- **(HA)** Electricity supply cannot be guaranteed by islanding.⁶¹ Local or regional islanding is only possible in areas where there is suitable electricity generation for the purpose and where the electricity grid can otherwise cope with operating in a weak network. Local or regional islanding will usually involve very tough priorities being made as to who gets electricity, and rota load disconnection will not always be possible.
- **(P, HA)** Access to liquid fuels may be severely restricted due to import limitations and logistics chains breaking down. This includes fuel for backup power and vital transport.
- **(P, HA)** District heating and cooling may suffer daily disruptions and prolonged shutdowns.

Financial services:

- **(P)** There may be disruptions to electronic payments, such as wages, supplier payments, card payments and instant payments (e.g. Swish). Access to cash may also be disrupted. **(HA)** Recurring and prolonged nationwide outages (days, weeks or months).
- **(P)** Cyberattacks on financial companies or their subcontractors may disrupt financial services or ultimately mean financial services cannot be used or provided at all. This may affect granting credit for cash flow management and investments, trade in financial instruments and access to marketplaces, financial advice, payment promises and logging in to customer accounts (e.g. online banking). At the same time, demand for some of these services may increase.
- **(HA)** In addition to cyberattacks, sabotage and disruptions to electricity and telecommunications may lead to recurring and prolonged interruptions in the availability of financial services.
- **(HA)** Misinformation and disinformation can fuel public concern and risk affecting financial stability.

⁶¹ See svk.se for more information about islanding.



- **(HA)** The insurance market may be severely affected, and demand for war insurance is expected to increase.⁶²
- **(HA)** The economy could face a sharp downturn with major disruptions to international trade and high volatility in financial markets. Commodity and energy prices would rise, and so would interest rates. This would be accompanied by a fall in the value of the Swedish krona, leading to higher import costs. Private consumption is expected to plummet, while public spending will rise due to increased expenditure on the war effort.
- **(HA)** All actors in society, including financial companies, may face higher refinancing costs. Financial companies will experience rising credit losses and secured assets may suffer a significant drop in value. The number of business insolvencies will increase. Ultimately, financial stability may be affected, including trust in individual private actors or in the financial system as a whole.

Basic data:

- **(P)** Access to basic data shared across the public administration, such as personal and address data, information on companies and organisations and geographical data, may be reduced and the processing of cases may be delayed. **(HA)** Prolonged interruptions (days, weeks or months). For example, the judicial process and health and social care would be negatively impacted by a lack of personal data. Access to up-to-date information about roads, bridges and other infrastructures would be negatively impacted.

Health, medical care and welfare:

- **(P)** Cyberattacks targeting health and social care may affect medical records systems, access to medication and medical devices, safety alarms and other essential systems. Manual fallback procedures and inaccessible systems can affect access to health and social care, dental care and social services.
- **(HA)** Due to a sharp influx of injured and ill people, the healthcare system will be under severe strain and dependent on Sweden's combined resources. Resources and patients will need to be reallocated and healthcare will need to be rationed. Some care would need to be provided in shelters as a result of attacks on medical facilities.
- **(HA)** After a while, higher demand and import and distribution restrictions would lead to a shortage of drugs, medical devices and personal protective equipment.

⁶² The War Insurance Board is tasked with processing insurance against war risks, etc., under Section 4 of the Act (1999:890) on Insurance Activities during War or Risk of War, etc.



- **(HA)** The need for functional care for the elderly, support and services for people with disabilities, and social services will increase as groups in need of such services are particularly vulnerable in times of war. These services are also essential for ensuring that Sweden's total defence has sufficient personnel available.
- **(HA)** A greater number of people may need social services or municipal healthcare due to population movements, higher rates of mental illness and social vulnerability leading to exploitation, domestic violence and child abuse.

Industry, construction and commerce:

- **(P, HA)** A lack of resilient and diversified supply chains and limited stockpiling of critical inputs in industry, construction and trade will hinder the sector's own operations and its ability to support other vital societal functions. Supply chains need to be diversified, and stocks of tradable goods and components need to be set up and secured. Contracts need to be in place to safeguard capabilities, personnel, machinery, equipment, spare parts and components.
- **(P)** Cyberattacks on or sabotage of industrial control systems,⁶³ logistics platforms and payment solutions may halt operations and lead to loss of production and supply problems. **(HA)** Loss of electricity, fuel or inputs can severely limit industrial production, the supply of vital goods, and construction.
- **(HA)** There is a need to rapidly mobilise infrastructure construction and repair capacity, but resources may be insufficient or unavailable.

Food supply and drinking water:

- **(P)** Cyberattacks and sabotage may lead to difficulties maintaining basic supplies linked to primary production, the food industry and food distribution and to shortages of inputs. **(HA)** After a while, access to food may be limited due to limited imports of food, raw materials and inputs, disrupting primary production, food manufacture and food distribution.
- **(P)** The drinking water supply may be the target of cyberattack or sabotage, causing disruption or cutting it off. There may be an increased need to boil drinking water to avoid health risks, which will also affect food industry production. **(HA)** Daily disruptions and prolonged interruptions may occur.
- **(P, HA)** Depending on the type of farming (animal or arable), primary production may experience disruption from the computer systems of

⁶³ Industrial information and control systems (ICS) are IT-based systems used to control and monitor physical processes and systems in real time. Many vital societal functions, such as drinking water production and electricity distribution, rely on this type of system. See more information at mcf.se.



machinery and vehicles, digital systems for feeding, milking, ventilation, monitoring, etc. All in all, this will increase the risk of poor animal health, animal welfare problems and unsafe food, as well as technical problems and an increased burden on veterinary services.

- **(P, HA)** An increased incidence of animal health problems may lead to disease outbreaks in animals and humans (zoonoses) and/or in food, including drinking water, placing a greater burden on government agencies in the food chain.
- **(P, HA)** Waste collections may be disrupted, increasing the risk of spreading infection and of negative impacts on the environment and the energy supply (district heating and electricity). Interruptions to discharges and treatment of waste water may increase the risk of spreading infections, sanitation problems for businesses and the population, negative environmental impacts and contamination of drinking water sources.
- **(P, HA)** Meal service providers may find it difficult to continue operating due to power cuts and water and heating shortages.

Public order and security:

- **(P, HA)** Existing divisions in society such as segregation, crime and increased polarisation may be exacerbated by the enemy in order to provoke protests or violent riots so as to create social unrest and place the institutions of society under strain.
- **(P, HA)** There may be an increase in the number of drone incidents for illegal purposes, such as intelligence collection, cyber warfare/disruption, distraction or sabotage.
- **(P, HA)** The presence of foreign troops stationed in or transiting through Sweden may require communicating and ensuring compliance with Swedish law.⁶⁴
- **(P, HA)** The personnel and facilities involved in providing vital societal functions may be subject to attack or sabotage and there will be a greater need for protection and surveillance. Limited staffing will mean priorities will have to be made regarding such protection.
- **(HA)** The burden on the judicial chain of arrest, investigation, sentencing, prisons and detention centres may be increased. Court cases may be delayed and other types of crime may arise as cases such as war crimes, disobedience or dereliction of duty may become more common. War crimes such as

⁶⁴ In accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA).



torture and sexual violence may occur in areas where enemy troops are present.⁶⁵

- **(HA)** Refugees will place demands on the ability of the public sector to take care of them. Other demands that will be placed on the public sector are confirming the identity of people in uncontrolled population movements and large-scale cross-border evacuations, protecting the civilian population and ensuring no negative impacts on military capabilities.⁶⁶
- **(P)** Internal border controls may need to be set up due to large population movements. Border surveillance may be challenged by infiltration, organised migration (false asylum seekers or citizenship obtained using fake identities) and deliberately created refugee flows that place the control, protection and monitoring of Sweden's borders under pressure. **(HA)** Functions tasked with controlling, protecting and monitoring Sweden's borders may have their duties changed when there is a need to streamline military movements at the same time as border surveillance legislation⁶⁷ enters into force.
- **(P, HA)** Cyberattacks may impair Sweden's ability to raise the alarm and its capacity to lead and carry out rescue operations. GNSS disruptions⁶⁸ can affect air and sea rescue services as well as municipal and other government emergency services. When geolocation is unavailable, the chain of alerts can take longer, delaying rescue efforts.
- **(HA)** People may need to take refuge in shelters and other safe spaces due to enemy action. Areas affected by fighting and combat may need to be evacuated and people will need to be housed. Spontaneous evacuation may also occur. Children, the sick, the elderly and people with disabilities may need help with mobility and reaching shelters.
- **(HA)** Many people may be fleeing. They may be Swedish or foreign citizens, especially those from neighbouring countries, such as Finland and the Baltic States. It can be assumed that the majority will be women and children, and attention will need to be paid to particularly vulnerable groups.
- **(HA)** The adversary may use exhaustion tactics, such as remote attacks during the night. This causes the outdoor warning system to sound the alert constantly, affecting people's sleep at night and their mental health.
- **(HA)** The emergency services may need to undertake operations to deal with unexploded ordnance and mines. The use of CBRN weapons cannot be ruled out and nor can the spread of radioactivity as a result of a nuclear weapon attack or damage to nuclear power plants. Destruction of infrastructure

⁶⁵ See, for example, MSB (2024), *Erfarenheter från Ukraina – lärdomar för det civila försvaret* [Experiences from Ukraine – Lessons for Civil Defence], MSB 2318 – June 2024.

⁶⁶ See the final point under public order and security.

⁶⁷ See the Act (1979:1088) and Ordinance (1979:1091) on Border Surveillance in War, etc.

⁶⁸ Global Navigation Satellite System.



containing hazardous substances, including chemical plants, can lead to the spread of oil products, explosives residues and metals in land and water, causing damage to people and the environment.

- **(HA)** Rescue operations will need to prioritise to a far greater extent than in peacetime, on the basis of total defence benefit. Rescue resources with basic and specialised skills may need to be redeployed across the country to relieve other areas and perform specialised tasks. Swedish emergency resources may need to be used to support rescue operations in Finland, for example.

Transport:

- **(P, HA)** Hybrid attacks can severely disrupt transport.
- **(P, HA)** HNS can have displacement effects, disrupting or stopping transport. This will require setting priorities.
- **(P, HA)** Disruptions to supply chains, e.g. for electricity and fuel, will affect transport provision.
- **(HA)** Key transport infrastructure may be attacked and taken out, potentially causing severe delays.
- **(HA)** Air and maritime threats may restrict civilian transport. Civil aviation may cease entirely, with the exception of individual prioritised transport vital to society.

Foreign trade:

- **(P, HA)** There may be disruption to Sweden's trade or global disruption depending on the scale of the crisis or war. This may affect imports of inputs, such as chemicals, metals and electronics.
- **(HA)** There will be an impact on supplies to Sweden and neighbouring countries, and our exports of critical goods and services. Transport routes in and out of Sweden and the Nordic region may need to be reorganised to maintain trade. Cross-border mobility will be impaired, potentially limiting deliveries of services and access to labour.
- **(P, HA)** Military transport requirements may create a need to prioritise or redirect transport, resulting in disruption to trade.

Democracy and preparedness:

- **(P)** Access to information and management systems may be disrupted or systems may be taken down. **(HA)** C2 and coordination capability and the means for total defence actors to communicate with each other may be severely impaired or rendered non-existent.



- **(P, HA)** Misinformation and disinformation by a foreign power may increase, making decision-making more difficult, polarising groups and creating distrust and scepticism towards government recommendations, advice and orders. Not listening to public institutions or official recommendations would potentially put the general public at risk, and the functioning and legitimacy of democracy would be weakened.
- **(P, HA)** Misinformation and disinformation may entail significant socio-economic costs as public institutions will have to redirect staff resources to deal with communications and counter disinformation. It may also be financially costly if extensive efforts are required to rebuild trust and handle negative publicity and criticism.
- **(P)** Disruptions and stoppages in the production and distribution of news and public information may occur. **(HA)** Daily disruptions and stoppages.
- **(HA)** *Nationally*, greater restrictions on several fundamental rights and freedoms may be a result of legislation enabling a heightened state of alert, as this allows restrictions to be imposed on people's freedom of movement, freedom of expression, freedom of business, protection of property, etc. This legislation is designed to bolster Sweden's ability to defend itself. Regionally, under existing legislation, restrictions may be placed on individual freedoms and rights, such as temporary bans on entering a geographical area or evacuation.
- **(HA)** Cultural heritage may be attacked, both as a direct target and as a result of secondary damage. The adversary will want to break down the morale of their enemies, erase cultural memory and show their dominance by destroying cultural sites, buildings or objects.
- **(HA)** Staff may have difficulty getting to work and some may be absent, including staff with a duty to attend. Staff shortages may arise in various organisations and businesses when labour is called up for other duties as part of total defence.
- **(HA)** There may be a need to coordinate and manage an influx of spontaneous volunteers, whether individuals or various types of organisations and companies, seeking to support the war effort and help victims and those in need.
- **(HA)** International civilian and humanitarian assistance may be requested and received if Sweden's resources are insufficient. As a rule, such assistance is requested at national level and distributed to local level.
- **(HA)** The burden of dealing with the fatalities, including funeral services and associated pastoral care, may significantly increase.



Preschool, education and research:

- **(HA)** There may be a significant increase in the need for childcare, for extended periods and overnight.
- **(HA)** Education and research may need to be adapted and run remotely or at times provided in places which offer physical protection from attack.
- **(HA)** Population movements may mean that some preschools and schools receive a huge influx of students while others experience shrinking rolls.

Key points

- In a heightened state of alert and war, Sweden must be able to facilitate the transit of large numbers of Allied forces, which may displace civilian traffic on roads, railways, airports, sea lanes and in harbours.
- Civil entities must be able to support both Swedish and Allied forces and provide them with healthcare, fuel, accommodation, transportation and infrastructure.
- The intensity of hybrid attacks may increase both in peacetime and during war, with the aim of undermining societal resilience, weakening the Swedish people's will to fight and disrupting the execution of HNS operations.
- Not all parts of Sweden will be equally affected by combat operations. Actors in less affected areas of the country must be able to support those in more heavily impacted regions.
- Activities that are dependent on electricity, fuel, electronic communication networks, or transport – systems that may experience disruptions with the consequences described – must ensure they are able to meet their own essential needs in order to maintain functionality.
- Swedish total defence must consider low-probability but high-impact CBRN attacks, as the potential use of such weapons cannot be ruled out.



5. Conclusions

It is crucial that Sweden is resilient in peacetime in order to strengthen NATO's deterrence capability, ultimately seeking to avoid an escalation to war. All total defence actors are responsible for strengthening Sweden's and our Allies' preparedness even further. Drawing on the assumptions in this document, you as a total defence actor need to analyse what its content means for you and your organisation or business, and plan and put measures in place accordingly. This work needs to be managed, initiated and carried out by every responsible total defence actor, with the aim of rapidly increasing total defence capabilities, strengthening deterrence and achieving the overall total defence objectives.

Should a situation escalate, it is crucial that Swedish total defence acts decisively to meet the threats that the nation faces. At times of heightened alert, and ultimately war, civil defence operations should focus, in every situation, on supporting military defence, including Allied troops, in the most appropriate way to support the combined war effort of Sweden's total defence. At the same time, the continuity of vital societal functions must be maintained and the population must be protected.

Individually and collaboratively, all actors must be able to maintain vital societal functions in extremely trying conditions *for a minimum of two weeks*, managing predominantly with their own resources, e.g. in the initial phase of a war. This means being able to continue operating at a sufficient level despite tough conditions, working under a lack of information and severely strained supply chains.

All total defence actors must possess the fundamental capability and resilience to maintain vital societal functions and support military defence under difficult circumstances, threat of war or war itself. Supporting material in this respect can be found on the websites of the agencies concerned, including those of the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency.⁶⁹ The planning guidance for civil defence, *Planeringsinriktning för krisberedskap och civilt försvar*, provides support and further advice for civil actors in this work. In addition to addressing basic capabilities, the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency summarise a number of important conclusions⁷⁰ in the three areas where differences have emerged since the previous total defence action plan, *Handlingskraft*, was adopted in 2021.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Swedish Armed Forces and MSB (2023), *Krigets krav – en samlad bedömning av förmågan inom totalförsvaret*, [The Demands of War – A Comprehensive Assessment of Total Defence Capabilities], Appendix: *Förmågor och indikatorer per analysområde* [Capabilities and Indicators per Analysis Area], FM2021-17683:6 och MSB 2022-08173-31. Other actors can also make use of MSBFS 2025:4, MSB's Regulations and General Advice on the Duties of Government Agencies prior to and during Heightened States of Alert, in their work. Swedish Armed Forces (2025), *Skyddsvården för försvaret av Sverige* [Protecting Assets for Sweden's Defence], <https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/globalassets/02-om-forsvarsmakten/organisation/gemensamma/militara-underrattelse--och-sakerhetstjansten/skyddsvarden-for-forsvaret-av-sverige.pdf>

⁷⁰ Points may concern more than one area.



5.1. Sweden as a member of NATO

Sweden's total defence needs to be adapted to the demands made as a member of NATO and particular importance must be placed on meeting NATO requirements and implementing measures that will swiftly produce the greatest impact and increased total defence capability. Total defence activities must be conducted individually and jointly with others, *in* and *outside* the country and in accordance with Sweden's NATO commitments. Sweden strengthens the Alliance with its military capabilities and civil defence efforts, with a particular focus on NATO's northern and eastern flank – from Norway to the Baltic States.⁷¹

- Those with a role in providing HNS will need to ensure their capabilities.⁷² Others will need to maintain vital societal functions and be prepared to support other actors. HNS is a commitment that needs to be providable in different forms in peacetime and in heightened states of alert.
- Initiate joint planning with civil and military actors based on your organisation's responsibilities. If relevant, cooperation with Allied neighbouring countries or other international cooperation should also take place. Should a sudden crisis or armed attack occur, it will be easier to respond if you are already mutually aware of each other's organisations and working methods.
- Regularly train and practise the role of your organisation in total defence.⁷³ If necessary, include a NATO angle so that you can develop and test plans as a member of the Alliance.
- Ensure that you are able to handle classified information and participate in security-sensitive operations in accordance with requirements laid down in the Protective Security Act (2018:585) and the Protective Security Ordinance (2021:955). Actors concerned should also be able to handle NATO classified information.

5.2. Lessons learned from Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine

The war in Ukraine looks different with every year that passes and developments in warfare are rapid. Russia and Ukraine are constantly developing their warfare measures and counter-measures, with civil and military technologies working together. Public services must function if the population is to retain its trust in the

⁷¹ One example is joint civil-military operations to increase Baltic Sea security led by the Joint Expeditionary Force or NATO.

⁷² Those with an HNS role are informed of this via the Swedish Armed Forces' operational planning.

⁷³ The Swedish Civil Defence and Resilience Agency's website, mcf.se, contains methodological support for exercises.



state apparatus and not have a negative impact on the Swedish people's will to fight.⁷⁴

- Be prepared to rethink and adapt your organisation's working methods to the prevailing circumstances.⁷⁵ Should the security situation rapidly deteriorate, it is important to act quickly, decisively and proactively. It is better to make a decision, implement it and then backtrack if circumstances allow, than to do too little.
- Draw on the strength and capabilities of the population and utilize the potential in the population's strong determination to defend Sweden. For example, increase capacity to process and analyse intelligence from the population in order to be able to reach out to them with correct, coordinated information in return.
- Seize the initiative to exchange knowledge and engage in joint planning with the private sector (e.g. the defence industry, the technology sector and knowledge-intensive companies) to improve innovativeness and capacity to deal with a rapidly changing threat environment.
- Prioritise measures that increase readiness to carry out repairs and increased redundancy. The ability to restore crucial total defence operations is vital, and it is necessary to be highly capable of rapidly repairing, but also building and constructing, new military and civil infrastructure.
- Develop your own organisation's or business's ability to identify and deal with antagonistic actions and hybrid attacks. Gain a greater understanding of cyber threats and the ability to tackle them. Cyber security and information security need to be maintained throughout all levels of war and preparedness, and handled at all management tiers, even for business and private actors. A high level of cyber security in society contributes to a robust basis for civil defence and to effective cyber defence.
- Increase awareness and take action to continue operating despite threats of or use of CBRN weapons. Russia is using chemical weapons in Ukraine, and further escalation in the use of CBRN weapons cannot be ruled out.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Swedish Armed Forces (2024), *Fördjupade lärdomar och erfarenheter från kriget i Ukraina* [In-depth Lessons Learned and Experiences from the War in Ukraine], FM 2023-2379:18 and FM2023-2379:9. MSB (2024), *Erfarenheter från Ukraina – lärdomar för det civila försvaret* [Experiences from Ukraine – Lessons for Civil Defence], MSB 2318 – June 2024.

⁷⁵ There are specific rules in the Instrument of Government and in a number of other statutes that seek to simplify decision-making in times of war and to make the transition of society from peacetime needs to defence of the nation easier. The umbrella term for these statutes is *administrative preparedness*. This comprises *legislative preparedness*, i.e. statutes to plan and regulate society's transition from peace to war and to ensure that society continues to function in times of war, and *organisational preparedness*, i.e. provisions on the duties and organisation of government agencies in war or when facing the threat of war and when planning in peacetime.

⁷⁶ See Sweden's CBRNE strategy, for example: *CBRNE-strategi – För en stärkt beredskap* [CBRNE Strategy – For Enhanced Preparedness], MSB2197 – 2023.

5.3. A developed national structure for crisis preparedness and civil defence

The developed structure better facilitates a coordinated total defence planning. The security situation demands that, even now in peacetime, decision-makers in the public and private sectors establish a culture and approach that pays more attention to the potential impacts of war than is currently the case. When planning, measures need to be put in place here and now, with particular importance attached to those that rapidly increase impact and capability, but also those required to achieve impact in the longer term. Prepare and plan for several time frames simultaneously, both regarding the use of existing resources and when developing capabilities. The plans must not stand in the way of the reality on the ground, and they need to be constantly reviewed, revised and updated to remain current.

- Prepare and plan to ensure that vital societal functions for which your organisation is responsible can be maintained to the greatest extent possible with limited external dependencies. All actors need to carry out the preparedness planning necessary to continue their essential operations on their own and in extremely trying conditions.
- Perform supply analyses, conduct procurement and sign public–private contracts as well as contracts within the private sector. Depending on the wording of the contract, it may include financial payments, e.g. for warehousing, for maintaining production capacity or for providing a service. Such preparations will fundamentally facilitate a robust security of supply.
- Prepare your business to face a deteriorating security situation, e.g. by diversifying imports, switching to domestically produced inputs and securing access to stockpiled materials and supplies.
- Take total defence needs into account in town and country planning⁷⁷ and based on Sweden as a member of NATO. This needs to be done as early as possible in preparations and planning with the aim of bolstering the robustness of society and minimising future costs. Crucial total defence activities need to become a central aspect in urban development or when decisions are being made between different societal interests. Also take threats to critical infrastructure into account in planning and preparation of the activities concerned, including in Swedish sea areas.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ See, for example, MSB (2024), *Totalförsvarets civila intressen i samhällsplaneringen* [Total Defence's Civil Interests in Urban Planning], MSB 2370 and Swedish Armed Forces, *Riksinintressen för totalförsvarets militära del* [National Interests regarding the Military Aspect of Total Defence]

⁷⁸ Sweden's territorial waters and maritime zones (contiguous and economic zones), under the Swedish Sea Territory and Maritime Zones Act (2017:1272).