Building Resilience in the Nordic Region

A Swedish perspective
Contact:
Sara Myrdal, 010-240 40 07
Minna Bodin, 010-240 42 60

Publ. no. MSB1395 – May 2019
ISBN 978-91-7383-946-4
Foreword

The Nordic ministerial cooperation within the area of preparedness for major accidents and emergencies, the Haga cooperation, has been ongoing since the ministers’ first meeting in 2009 at Haga Palace outside Stockholm. In 2018, Sweden was responsible for preparing and conducting the Haga ministers’ annual meeting.

Sweden also held the Presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2018, in addition to being responsible for coordinating the informal foreign and security policy partnerships that encompass all Nordic countries (N5) as well as the Baltic countries (NB8).

The continued Nordic cooperation is being pursued against the backdrop of a deteriorated security situation in the region. Although the Nordic countries have chosen different security policy solutions and different approaches to European integration, the countries’ established common outlook and extensive cooperation across all areas of society mean that the countries together can continue to increase security and stability in the region. The Nordic Solidarity Declaration from 2011 expresses the willingness and interest of the Nordic countries in addressing common foreign and security policy challenges.

Those of us working actively with crisis and emergency management in Sweden see great development opportunities in the Nordic cooperation in the region. There is already an intensive exchange between Nordic expert government agencies, but this can be made even more effective in order to strengthen security and resilience for everyone living and working in our countries.

Therefore, the process under way within the framework of the Haga ministers’ cooperation is essential. Here in Sweden, the support from neighbouring countries in combating the major forest fires in the past summer has been a reminder of the value of effective Nordic collaboration for common security and resilience.

The content of this publication is intended to contribute to the work of ensuring a more effective and structured exchange of information and cooperation between the Nordic countries in issues concerning security and resilience against threats and risks at all levels of the threat scale. The focus is on the cooperation that is conducted by government agencies and how this could be developed. It is MSB’s hope that this publication can also satisfy a broader information and knowledge need among those involved or otherwise interested in Nordic cooperation.

Dan Eliasson
Director General
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
# Table of Contents

Foreword .................................................................................................................................................. 3

Table of Contents.................................................................................................................................. 4

1. **How Nordic cooperation is achieved** ................................................................. 6
   1.1 The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers ...................... 6
   1.2 Cooperation on common security and defence......................................... 6
   1.3 Cooperation in other forms ........................................................................ 7

2. **Nordic cooperation within the area of crisis and emergency management** ........................................................................................................................................ 8
   2.1 The 2009 and 2013 Haga Declarations – A robust Nordic region without borders ........................................................................................................................................ 8
   2.2 Conclusions from the 2016 Helsinki meeting ........................................... 9
   2.3 The cooperation between Nordic government agencies responsible for crisis and emergency management ......................................................... 10
   2.4 Nordic high-level course ............................................................................ 11

3. **From present to future** ...................................................................................... 12
   3.1 A changed security situation ..................................................................... 12
   3.2 An initiative from MSB ............................................................................... 13
   3.3 General observations .................................................................................. 13
   3.4 Civil defence – a new dimension in Nordic cooperation ............................. 14
   3.5 Obstacles and limitations ........................................................................... 14
   3.6 Specific information on the Nordic security agreement ............................ 15
   3.7 Continuing to increase security in the Nordic region ................................. 16

**Appendix 1: Results of MSB’s study** ..................................................................................... 20
A brief summary

In light of the conclusions presented from the recent annual ministerial meetings within the Nordic Haga cooperation on crisis and emergency management, among other things, MSB has investigated ongoing collaborations between the countries within a number of different sectors of society relevant to the area. The findings in the study indicate breadth and diversity in the collaboration. It also indicates potential for development, particularly with regard to the changeable and complex threat scenario and the deteriorating security situation in the Nordic region.

Haga-related cooperation is more developed within certain areas, such as rescue services, energy supply, transport, cybersecurity and information security, and within the area of healthcare. At the same time, there are other areas where there are no agreements or other governing documents or fixed structures. This may sometimes create ambiguity regarding the expectations, purpose and goals of the Nordic cooperation. With civil defence as a new dimension in the Nordic cooperation, both new uncertainties and new opportunities are emerging. Improved knowledge on the different countries’ conditions and better access to secure communication are some examples of what is required.

In several sectors, the Nordic countries’ cooperation with the Baltic countries is being deepened. An increasing number of important areas are also being regulated within a wider EU and international framework.

MSB’s study was conducted in collaboration with twelve government agencies in Sweden. Following a continuous dialogue with these agencies, MSB has identified a number of needs and opportunities in the ongoing work with increasing security and resilience in the Nordic region. These needs and possibilities relate to 13 different themes, which are presented in the headings below. Further on in this publication, a more detailed commentary will be presented in connection with each theme.

1. Conduct joint assessment of risks, vulnerabilities and dependencies
2. Develop training in protective security and information management
3. Make use of existing agreements within security of supply and protective security
4. Develop effective preparation for providing and receiving civil and military support
5. Achieve borderless rescue service cooperation within Nordred
6. Further develop robust and secure communications for crises and emergencies
7. Exchange of situation reports during events with cross-border consequences
8. Expand cooperation within cybersecurity and information security
9. Strengthen Nordic health preparedness
10. Put in place effective handling of disruptions in all modes of transport
11. Develop a joint capability to handle disruptions and shortages in terms of energy and fuel
12. Strengthen cooperation within food supply, agriculture and veterinary medicine
13. Promote training, exercises and seminars – for a common culture
1. How Nordic cooperation is achieved

1.1 The Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers

Nordic cooperation has deep roots and encompasses almost all areas of society. Since the period immediately after the Second World War, the cooperation has been constantly evolving in terms of form, content and intensity. The formation of the Nordic Council in 1952 created a platform and a forum for an ongoing exchange at the highest political level. The Council consists of parliamentarians from all five Nordic countries, and the prime ministers and other government representatives participate in the annual sessions, thus permitting this exchange.

In 1962, the Helsinki Treaty was signed, which constitutes the foundational document for the official and substantive cooperation. In 1971, the Nordic Council of Ministers was created, which is the official body for Nordic intergovernmental cooperation. The Council of Ministers works in several different constellations of councils of ministers for specific policy areas as well as the council of ministers for the ministers for cooperation. The Presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers rotates between the five Nordic countries, and Sweden held the Presidency in 2018. A large number of committees of senior officials under the Council of Ministers work on common issues within a variety of areas. A secretariat with just under one hundred Nordic officials is located in Copenhagen.

1.2 Cooperation on common security and defence

Nordic cooperation on foreign, defence and security policy falls outside the mandate of the Nordic Council of Ministers. The cooperation in the area of defence has fixed structures within the framework of NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation) as of 2009 and aims to promote the countries’ defence capabilities, for example through the joint development and procurement of defence equipment, and also aims to develop capabilities for international military interventions within the framework of the EU, NATO and the UN.

The cooperation in the area of preparedness for major accidents and emergencies also falls outside the mandate of the Nordic Council of Ministers. This is instead based on the Haga Declarations I and II from 2009 and 2013 respectively. It is primarily this cooperation that this publication aims to highlight and contribute towards.
1.3 Cooperation in other forms

Nordic cooperation also takes place through largely informal activities, through expert exchanges and networks where representatives from government agencies and organisations communicate directly with each other. The Confederation of Nordic Associations was formed after the First World War and these civil society organisations have been an inspiration and a driving force for Nordic cooperation over the last century. This also happens bilaterally and trilaterally, in different constellations. Nordic cooperation therefore takes place on a daily basis, in an ongoing exchange of information, knowledge and culture in a variety of formats. At the same time, there is a common political vision for the Nordic region to be the world’s most integrated region. The work with eliminating various traditional or emerging border obstacles is ongoing within most areas of society, including the area of crisis and emergency management.
2. Nordic cooperation within the area of crisis and emergency management

2.1 The 2009 and 2013 Haga Declarations – A robust Nordic region without borders

The Nordic ministers responsible for preparedness for major accidents and emergencies met on 27 April 2009 at Haga Palace outside Stockholm for discussions on strengthened Nordic cooperation in the area. The ministers noted that similar developments are taking place in the Nordic countries. The common and overarching goal was to prevent and limit the potential consequences of major accidents, natural disasters and other societal emergencies.

In this way, a common political umbrella was created for the efforts to strengthen both the ability of the individual Nordic countries and that of the collective Nordic region to withstand and deal with vulnerabilities and threats of various kinds. There are differences in how the countries individually organise their work in these respects, and there are differences in the arrangement of the various Haga ministers’ specific responsibilities. The vulnerabilities and threats, on the other hand, are to a large extent common in nature and there is a shared understanding of the value of cooperation in strengthening the resilience of our societies.

The Haga ministers have generally been meeting annually since 2009 and the cooperation is supported by a Nordic group of senior officials. At their meeting in Vaxholm on 4 June 2013, the ministers agreed on a new Haga Declaration, the Haga II Declaration. It includes a common vision; A robust Nordic region without borders. The vision aims at a society where vulnerability decreases, while at the same time the ability to handle serious accidents and emergencies and restore functionality is strengthened.

In the Haga II Declaration, it was established that Nordic cooperation will be even more systematic and goal-oriented than before. Areas of cooperation that contribute to a Nordic region without borders shall be prioritised. It involves, among other things, removing various border obstacles and reducing vulnerabilities with cross-border effects. Furthermore, the Haga II Declaration states that the practical conditions for assistance in accordance with the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity and EU guidelines for Host Nation Support should be developed. The ability to coordinate the reception of support and assistance during serious emergencies and accidents in the Nordic region is to be reinforced.

On the basis of the Haga II Declaration and the Nordic Solidarity Declaration, the ministers decided at their meeting in Denmark in 2015 to establish 12
policy development goals for the Haga cooperation for the period 2016-2018. The development goals describe objectives for joint Nordic initiatives that concern, for example,

- the assessment of cross-border risks and analyses of the countries’ ability to manage these risks,
- cooperation between the countries regarding emergency preparedness and the management of emergencies after they have occurred,
- cooperation linked to the use of volunteers in emergency preparedness, and
- cooperation aimed at providing and receiving support between the Nordic countries in accordance with the Solidarity Declaration.

The Nordic group of senior officials is responsible for the overall coordination of the cooperation. The government agencies are responsible for the implementation, which means that they produce and work in accordance with the so-called Haga Action Plan. The plan describes the measures that the government agencies have agreed to implement in connection with the goals.

New goals for the Haga cooperation will be adopted for the period 2019-2021.

### 2.2 Conclusions from the 2016 Helsinki meeting

At the Haga ministers meeting in Helsinki on 21 September 2016, the ministers discussed the change in the security situation in the Nordic countries, including the new non-military challenges. In the conclusions from the meeting, the ministers highlighted threats in the form of extreme weather conditions caused by climate change, extensive migration, hybrid threats, cyber threats, threats of terrorism and threats to health, and threats to critical infrastructures. The ministers emphasised that these challenges can best be dealt with through strong resilience and emergency preparedness, which in turn requires effective and structured information exchange between the Nordic countries. The ministers suggested that a proposal be prepared jointly within the framework of the Haga cooperation that addresses the possibilities to structure the cooperation in this area.

With the aim of contributing to achieving the goal established by the Haga ministers at the 2016 meeting concerning a more effective and structured exchange of information, and with the support of a number of relevant government agencies in Sweden with sector responsibility, MSB has conducted a study on ongoing Nordic collaborations within security and resilience across the whole threat and risk spectrum. This publication and its appendix give a description of how the study has been carried out and the findings that have emerged. Following a continuous dialogue with the government agencies, MSB has identified a number of needs and opportunities for the ongoing Nordic cooperation.
2.3 The cooperation between Nordic government agencies responsible for crisis and emergency management

The heads of the government agencies in the Nordic countries who have responsibilities within the area that we in Sweden have chosen to call crisis and emergency management, meet annually to discuss how the cooperation can be developed (Nordic Director-General meetings). Sweden is represented by MSB, Norway by the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (DSB), Finland by its Ministry of the Interior, Denmark by the Danish Emergency Management Agency and Iceland by the National Police Authority. The Presidency rotates between the countries.

Over the years, the deliberations during the Director-General meetings have touched on issues related to both national and Nordic preparedness, but also to international readiness in the broader sense, as many of the countries are very involved in international humanitarian interventions. Important priorities for the Directors-General have in recent years included risk and capability assessments, expanded information exchange, expert exchanges, research collaboration, exercises and training, Nordic cooperation on response capacities, Host Nation Support and increased cooperation between the Nordic crisis and emergency management authorities’ functions for duty officers and for situation reporting.

The Director-General meetings also provide an opportunity for the exchange of experiences and lessons learned by the countries in their handling of major events, such as the terrorist attacks in Oslo and Utøya in 2011, in Copenhagen in 2015, and in Stockholm and Turku in 2017. The volcanic eruption in Iceland in 2010 and the extensive forest fire in Sweden in 2014 are other examples. The refugee situation in 2015 posed challenges of a particular kind, and the countries have been able to discuss their respective experiences.

At the meeting in Copenhagen in September 2017, the Directors-General noted the importance of following up on activities in line with the Haga ministers’ conclusions from the Helsinki meeting in 2016. It was also noted that it is relevant to follow up on activities related to emergency preparedness in peacetime and related to civil defence. This is a consequence of the increased importance that total defence planning in the different countries has now been accorded.

In relation to total defence planning in particular, there has been an increased exchange of a bilateral nature between Sweden and Finland, but also between Sweden and Norway, as well as trilaterally between these countries. Here, the focus is on identifying the prerequisites for exchanging information on each country’s national planning, the need for support from and cooperation with neighbouring countries, and providing a description of mutual dependencies.

In the background, there are older bilateral agreements in the area of security of supply between Sweden and Finland, as well as between Sweden and Norway, which have not been applied for several years. However, the Swedish-Finnish agreement, which was signed by the two countries’ governments in
1992 and which relates to economic cooperation in international crisis situations, has gained increased relevance in recent years, in pace with the intensified bilateral contacts between Finland and Sweden with regard to preparedness for emergency and war conditions in the region.

In October 2017, at the invitation of the National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) in Finland, a trilateral expert seminar was held in Helsinki where representatives of a number of government agencies in Finland, Norway and Sweden attended. On this occasion it was concluded that the conditions are in place for continued and expanded trilateral cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden in the areas of security of supply and the protection of critical infrastructure.

2.4 Nordic high-level course

Among the ongoing and well-established Nordic collaborations related to the Haga cooperation, the annual Nordic high-level course should also be mentioned. This course has proved important as a tool to achieve an increased mutual understanding of the Nordic countries’ organisational structures (divisions of responsibility), capacities, legal frameworks and priorities in the work with common security and resilience. The course was held for the first time in Sweden in 2011 and the hosting duties now alternate between the countries. In 2018, the course was held in Helsinki and in 2019 outside of Oslo. The course gathers representatives at the highest levels from the public sector, business and media.

In the past two years, the content of the course has reflected the increased insecurity in the region as experienced by the Nordic countries. The theme for the 2017 course was “Emergency preparedness and total defence – what do changing threats, risks and societal conditions entail?”. In 2018 the theme was “The change in the regional security landscape and the influence of the hybrid operation on resilient society” and in 2019 “Security policy challenges in the Northern Areas and around the Baltic Sea”.

3. From present to future

3.1 A changed security situation

The Swedish Government stated in its defence policy orientation bill to the Riksdag in April 2015 that the security situation in Europe has deteriorated. The Government therefore concluded that Sweden’s bilateral and multilateral defence and security collaborations should be deepened. The cooperation with Finland was emphasised as particularly important. At the same time, the Government pointed out that the planning for total defence (military and civil defence) should be resumed.

The Government has subsequently instructed the relevant central and regional government agencies to resume planning for civil defence, and has instructed the Swedish Armed Forces and the MSB to jointly and continuously promote and develop coherent planning for total defence. Increasingly intensive work is now under way in accordance with these assignments, and the work to a greater extent involves municipalities and county councils as well as companies, organisations and individuals. This means that issues concerning supply security, the protection of essential services and many other issues of importance to society’s preparedness against various types of threats have become increasingly important.

In Sweden, the Swedish Defence Commission, which comprises members of the eight parties of the Riksdag, experts and a secretariat, is currently working with preparations for the next five-year defence decision. The report submitted by the Swedish Defence Commission to the Government in December 2017 states that there is a need and opportunity to develop bilateral cooperation, in particular with Finland and Norway, in the area of civil defence. The Commission also calls for the conditions for trilateral cooperation between Sweden, Finland and Norway to be examined in more detail. Such cooperation is expected to strengthen the preparedness of all three countries. The Commission proposes that Sweden identifies a number of sectors within civil defence for joint planning together with Finland and Norway, respectively. This may relate to the security of supply and delivery, not least with regard to transport and logistics, population protection, the repair, operation and maintenance of critical infrastructure, healthcare resources and medication supply. The Commission points out that the general part of the existing agreement between Sweden and Finland from 1992 on economic cooperation in international crisis situations can serve as a starting point for expanded bilateral cooperation.

---


2 Resilience – The total defence concept and the development of civil defence 2021-2025, Ds 2017:66.
3.2 An initiative from MSB

As mentioned above, in view of the Haga ministers’ preferences in the Helsinki conclusions of 2016 and the orientation of the Nordic Directors-General from the 2017 meeting, MSB has initiated a study into relevant Nordic cooperation within a selection of societal sectors. The main purpose of the initiative was to investigate how the work towards increased common security could be strengthened through a more effective and structured exchange of information. The purpose included identifying any obstacles to the exchange of information and determining how these could be limited or eliminated. The work was carried out during the first half of 2018, in collaboration with twelve selected government agencies in Sweden.

In the following, a number of observations and conclusions are presented based on data received by MSB from the twelve government agencies. It is important to point out that there has not been an opportunity for any more extensive dialogue with the government agencies on the issues and the responses, and that the conclusions drawn must be evaluated on this basis. MSB is nevertheless of the opinion that the initiative can contribute to the continued efforts to deepen Nordic cooperation within the Haga ministers’ area of responsibilities.

A brief summary of how the work has been carried out and what has emerged in the respective sectors can be found in the appendix to this publication. A more detailed summary of the government agencies’ responses to the questions asked by the MSB is available from MSB.

Following some supplementary exchanges with the government agencies, MSB has identified needs and opportunities in the ongoing work with increasing security in the Nordic region within the framework of 13 different themes.

3.3 General observations

The material collected by MSB confirms the breadth and diversity of Nordic cooperation relevant to the Haga ministers’ area of responsibility. The study also indicates the importance of and the potential for development in the cooperation, particularly with regard to the deteriorating security situation in the Baltic Sea region, but also with regard to increasingly extreme weather events and other complex threats. As the Haga ministers have emphasised, these challenges can best be dealt with through strong resilience and preparedness, which in turn requires effective and structured information exchange between the Nordic countries.

The study indicates that cooperation on issues concerning preventive and preparedness measures (planning) in many cases is less developed than cooperation on operational issues, i.e. the capability to respond to occurred events. One example of the latter is the so-called Nordred cooperation, which enables rescue forces to participate in interventions in another Nordic country.

Collaboration focused on the changed security situation has only just begun and such issues have not been addressed within a common Nordic framework.
for a long time. Within several areas and sectors, there is a need to develop agreements or governing documents, as well as technical systems that enable information exchange relating to civil defence and total defence planning.

There are areas where there are no agreements or other governing documents or fixed structures, which results in uncertainty regarding the expectations, purpose and goals of the ongoing cooperation.

In several areas, the Nordic countries’ cooperation with the Baltic countries is being deepened. At the same time, a number of important areas of cooperation are being regulated within a wider international framework. There is also a tendency for new common rules within the EU to encompass areas that have been dealt with within the Nordic framework.

3.4 Civil defence – a new dimension in Nordic cooperation

The deteriorating security situation and the resumed total defence planning mean that the ongoing Haga cooperation needs to be viewed in a new light. Namely, the cooperation can also contribute to strengthening the individual countries’ civil defence capabilities, as well as collective civil defence capabilities of the Nordic region. At the same time, there are uncertainties about the new needs and about the requirements and expectations that are in play. What will the cooperation focus on in the future and what needs will it entail in terms of new collaboration structures and new technologies? All Nordic countries are either members or partners of NATO, which can be expected to influence how the countries act jointly in civil defence matters.

In the military area, bilateral cooperation between Sweden and Finland has developed rapidly and with a clear impact on increasing joint capabilities. One expression of the continuing level of ambition for the collaboration is that, on commission from the Swedish Government, a proposal has recently been presented for a new law on operational military support between Sweden and Finland. The development of military cooperation suggests the need to also develop civil defence capability within the Nordic family, including the protection of the civilian population against the consequences of war. This development may need to take place at different speeds, and it may need to be pursued bilaterally as well as through trilateral and Nordic partnerships.

3.5 Obstacles and limitations

The lack of knowledge on the different countries’ legislation and organisation can make cooperation more difficult. Sometimes, the differences that exist between the countries’ legislation can be set boundaries on or complicate the development of cooperation.

At times, there is uncertainty about how broad and how deep the cooperation can be. With what mandate can the government agencies themselves develop and drive Nordic cooperation forward? When is there a need for support from
the political level, for example, by signing agreements at the government level or in the form of political signals in other ways? Such uncertainty may hamper new initiatives.

Inadequate access to secure communications appears to be an obstacle in several areas. This inadequacy may become increasingly evident as the exchange of information necessitates the inclusion of more sensitive information. Moreover, secure communication is not technological development, but also about knowledge and administrative procedures. Maintaining and developing Nordic cooperation may therefore become more demanding in numerous ways.

3.6 Specific information on the Nordic security agreement

A general security agreement on mutual protection and the exchange of classified information was concluded in 2010 between all five Nordic countries. The purpose of the agreement is to protect the classified information exchanged between two or more of the parties, or between contracting parties within the respective jurisdiction of the parties, within foreign, defence, security, police or business cooperation, or which has been established based on, or originates from, the information exchanged.

The agreement entails a mutual commitment between the parties to ensure that classified information has the same level of protection in all countries. The agreement is based on a division into four information security classifications. For Sweden’s part, such a division becomes mandatory in both the military and civilian areas when new protective security legislation comes into force, which is expected to happen on 1 April 2019.

The agreement also includes rules regarding competent security authorities entrusted with monitoring the implementation of the agreement in each country, regarding visits that entail access to classified information, regarding translation, reproduction and destruction of classified information, and regarding the transmission of such data. Transmissions between the parties shall be done using diplomatic mail or couriers, unless the relevant competent security authorities have agreed otherwise. Such an agreement has been reached for the transfer of data between the Nordic countries' CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team).

It is important to note that the Nordic security agreement does not answer any questions regarding when classified information can or should be transmitted between the countries. Nor does the agreement answer the question of what information is to be security classified, and at what level. Each authority concerned is responsible for answering these questions. For Sweden’s part, the

---

new protective security legislation and its preparatory work will provide better support for these assessments compared with previously.

3.7 Continuing to increase security in the Nordic region

Nordic cooperation within the area of civil contingencies needs to be continuously developed in order to address common challenges. Cooperation that addresses all levels of the threat scale is dependent on both common visions and an effective and structured exchange of information between the countries.

Following a continuous dialogue with the government agencies that participated in MSB’s study according to section 3.2 above, MSB identifies the following needs and opportunities in terms of increasing security in the Nordic region by 2025.

1. Conduct joint assessment of risks, vulnerabilities and dependencies
In order to be able to focus and develop the cooperation at all threat levels, responsible actors need to be knowledgeable on cross-border vulnerabilities and critical dependencies within vital societal functions. Work with cross-border effects of accidents and other serious events in different areas is underway within the framework of several broad international agreements or in accordance with rules and guidelines within the EU. However, cross-border impact assessments and knowledge-building on supply security also need to be conducted with a specific Nordic perspective, both within and between sectors and in dialogue between public and private actors.

2. Develop training in protective security and information management
Developed Nordic cooperation may place greater demands on the exchange of classified information. There is a need for national training initiatives within protective security and information management. Responsible actors need to be trained in assessing the secrecy level of information and considering the possibilities of sharing information with other countries. Nordic training initiatives for learning about the respective countries’ protective security legislation and societal organisation should also be promoted, as well as initiatives for staff exchanges between countries.

3. Make use of existing agreements within security of supply and protective security
There are currently bilateral agreements in place within the area of supply security between Sweden and Finland, and between Sweden and Norway. Although the agreements are not updated with regard to which goods are covered, they lay the foundation for a resumed information exchange and cooperation between the countries on issues concerning supply security in international crisis situations. There are also several other agreements and arrangements within different sectors of the Nordic cooperation. In addition, the Nordic countries have the opportunity to make agreements based on the
Nordic security agreement to protect classified information exchanged between the countries. Opportunities to further utilise existing agreements based on national and current needs need to be identified. Furthermore, lessons learned and experiences from established information exchanges need to be identified and disseminated to other areas.

4. Develop effective preparation for providing and receiving civil and military support
A prerequisite for the Nordic countries being able to live up to the joint Solidarity Declaration from 2011 is a well-developed ability to provide and receive assistance during emergencies and disasters. There needs to be a mutual understanding between the countries regarding the practical and logistical arrangements for receiving civil and military support. Existing reinforcement resources in different areas need to be identified, and border obstacles that can complicate effective support between the countries must be eliminated.

5. Achieve borderless rescue service cooperation within Nordred
The rescue services in the Nordic countries should be borderless. Remaining obstacles to supporting each other between the countries and for carrying out joint rescue operations need to be eliminated. Cooperation through border rescue councils needs to be developed to become more comprehensive along the relevant national borders.

6. Further develop robust and secure communications for crises and emergencies
There is a great need for secure communication when exchanging information, especially in connection with operational cooperation during major events. Linking the Nordic countries’ radio communication systems using TETRA’s standardised Inter-System Interface (ISI) functionality, i.e. Norway’s Nødnett, Sweden’s Rakel and Finland’s Virve, enables the effective management of cross-border accidents and other events. The Swedish and Norwegian networks have been linked since 2016. Projects for linking networks between Finland and Sweden and between Finland and Norway are under way. An important step forward will be the development of a broadband solution for faster and more secure transmission of speech and images, which will eventually replace the current TETRA system.

7. Exchange of situation reports during events with cross-border consequences
The joint ability to exchange situation reports during events that have, or may have, cross-border consequences, needs to be strengthened in order to ensure that the Nordic countries can help each other and contribute to a more efficient handling of events in the region.

8. Expand cooperation within cybersecurity and information security
The Nordic cooperation regarding strategic and operational CERT collaboration needs to be pursued further and adapted to a changeable threat and risk landscape. A new network for sharing information classified as
SECRET is being developed and will be commissioned in early 2019. In the future, it is likely that a new version of the network will entail new functionality, such as video conference. This will create important opportunities for expanding the exchange of information between the countries with the aim of enabling all Nordic countries to share operational information, including that obtained from sensor systems. In the coming years, new functionality may be developed and implemented in the collaboration.

9. **Strengthen Nordic health preparedness**
In order to strengthen the Nordic capacity to provide and receive assistance in connection with serious events at all levels of the threat scale, procedures and other preparations need to be developed within the area of health preparedness. One example in this context is the development of a Nordic burn injury mechanism to handle serious events involving a large number of patients with burn injuries. The work within the Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement should continue in other areas in order to increase capacity and further operationalise the cooperation. Drug preparedness and the role of the social services in serious events are important areas where regional cooperation should be strengthened in the coming years.

10. **Put in place effective handling of disruptions in all modes of transport**
Capacity needs to be strengthened among actors within all modes of transport to effectively handle extensive disruptions in one or several of the Nordic countries. The ongoing cooperation between Sweden and Finland should gradually be extended to the other Nordic countries. The extent to which responsible actors can assist each other needs to be clarified. The goal in the long term is joint planning within all modes of transport with regard to the management of disruptions in the Nordic countries, and a guarantee of transport routes in all emergency situations.

11. **Develop a joint capability to handle disruptions and shortages in terms of energy and fuel**
The Nordic countries should strengthen their capability to handle major disruptions in the energy supply and extensive energy shortages. Joint analyses should be produced regarding energy and fuel transmission in the event of disruptions, and the need for measures that cannot be taken by an individual country should be identified. The development work can build on what is already being done between the Nordic countries, for example within the cooperation for electricity preparedness, NordBER, and the cooperation that is under way within the framework of the International Energy Agency. In the area of fuel, a joint forum under state management should be established for storage companies/depot owners with the aim of streamlining the management of energy shortages. A corresponding forum should be established for logistics and depot managers with the aim of streamlining the management of energy shortages, especially in border regions.
12. **Strengthen cooperation within food supply, agriculture and veterinary medicine**

The cooperation between responsible actors within food supply, agriculture and veterinary medicine needs to be strengthened. The information exchange regarding legislation, organisation and methods in each country needs to increase in order to create the conditions for joint action during events at all levels of the threat scale. National contingency planning can lead to the need for joint operational planning between the Nordic countries. There may also be reason to collaborate on the import and distribution of critical goods, the exchange of information on alternative transport routes, and evacuation logistics.

13. **Promote training, exercises and seminars – for a common culture**

Joint training initiatives, exercises, games and seminars help to build a common culture where there is an increasing exchange of reference frameworks, languages, networks, working methods and approaches. Through scenario-based games in training initiatives, practical obstacles to cooperation can also be identified and then eliminated. The common Nordic high-level course within civil contingencies is one example of an activity that is designed to achieve these effects. Work hours and resources need to be allocated for several of these Nordic training activities and gatherings within, and especially between, different sectors.
Appendix 1: Results of MSB’s study

MSB identified seven sectors of society for participation in the study, namely

- food supply, including agriculture and veterinary medicine,
- health and social care,
- transport,
- energy supply with an emphasis on electricity and fuel,
- protection and security with an emphasis on rescue services and population protection,
- information and communication and
- collaboration and management.

MSB then asked twelve Swedish government agencies to describe the conditions within their area of responsibility with regard to the following.

1. Ongoing or planned collaborations and information exchanges relevant to the joint crisis management capacity and resilience in the Nordic region.
2. The existence of relevant agreements and other governing documents linked to Nordic collaborations and information exchanges according to point 1.
3. The need to develop the cooperation and the exchange of information as a way to strengthen the joint crisis management capacity and resilience in the Nordic region.
4. The existence of legal, technical or other limitations in respect of further developed cooperation.
5. The need to exchange sensitive security information.

What follows is a description, broken down by sector and in a highly compressed form, of the content of the responses from the government agencies to the questions posed by MSB as above. The collaborations described

---

4 The National Food Agency, the Swedish Board of Agriculture, the National Veterinary Institute, the National Board of Health and Welfare, the Swedish Transport Administration, the Swedish Transport Agency, the Swedish Maritime Administration, Affärsverket svenska kraftnät, the Swedish Energy Agency, the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, the Post and Telecom Authority, and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency.
can be regarded as illustrative examples, and the compilation does not claim to describe any aspect in its entirety. The needs and assessments in the description are those that have been reported by the government agencies concerned.

**Food supply, including agriculture and veterinary medicine**

A large number of collaborations and information exchanges are under way within this area. These often take place trilaterally, between Finland, Norway and Sweden. In the area of drinking water, Sweden has had bilateral cooperation with Norway in connection with the establishment of a body in Norway equivalent to the Swedish national water disaster group. Examples of collaborations that also include the Baltic countries are within the areas of animal contamination and plant protection. To date, the partnerships have to a large extent been limited to information exchange and knowledge building.

The work with civil contingencies within NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) and within the planning group Joint Health, Agriculture and Food Group (JHAFG) also forms a special framework for cooperation between the Nordic countries, especially between Finland, Norway and Sweden.

Nordic cooperation within the food chain, including the work within the veterinary security group, is based on formal agreements within the Nordic Council and on direct agreements between the relevant government agencies and their representatives, in a way that could be said to be characteristic of Nordic cooperation in general.

The relevant Swedish government agencies in this area see the need for increased Nordic cooperation. Not least, there is a need for increased collaboration, storage etc. There may be a need for joint operational planning with the possibility of joint action. There may also be a need to collaborate on the importation and distribution of critical goods, the exchange of information on alternative transport routes, and evacuation logistics. In some sub-areas, there are few key competencies, which makes operations vulnerable.

So far, legal or technical issues have not been perceived as limiting for the cooperation, and the Nordic security agreement has not had to be applied. This may change if joint operational planning is started or when exchanging sensitive security information becomes relevant. This also increases the need for secure communication in the technical sense.

**Health and social care**

The cooperation in this area is based on the Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement signed by the Nordic governments in 2002. The agreement forms the basis for cooperation between the countries to prepare and develop healthcare preparedness in order to better manage emergencies and disasters. The work according to the agreement is mainly conducted in a joint working group (the Svalbard Group) that reports to the Nordic Council of Ministers via the Committee of Senior Officials for Health and Social Affairs (ÄK-S).
The work of the Svalbard Group is based on a strategy with target areas and prioritised measures related to these. It can involve ensuring access to relevant and quality-assured information, prepared procedures for offering and receiving assistance, strengthened capacity for Host Nation Support, and systematic learning from exercises and past events. The work also involves collaboration within the social services regarding crisis management and the social service’s relation to healthcare. Furthermore, the work of the Svalbard Group aims to increase the Nordic countries’ influence in the broader international cooperation.

For cross-border healthcare interventions, there are legal obstacles that need to be resolved and which relate to, among other things, pharmaceutical issues and authorisation issues for staff. A secure exchange of information, which for Sweden’s part is based on the Rakel system, also needs to be ensured. It has not thus far been perceived that the exchange of information has been of such a nature that it has required specific security measures or some application of the Nordic security agreement. However, situations may arise where sensitive security information may need to be exchanged – especially in connection with support during certain events and from a total defence perspective.

**Transport**

In the transport sector, there are several global agreements that also govern the cooperation between the Nordic countries. This applies in particular to aviation and shipping, where the collaborations within ICAO and IMO have resulted in the establishment of extensive international regulations.

At the same time, there are several Nordic collaborations within all modes of transport, i.e. road, rail, aviation and shipping. This applies, for example, to icebreaking and maritime surveillance, where there are both Nordic agreements and bilateral agreements on cooperation. There is potential for increased Nordic cooperation within all modes of transport.

Between Sweden and Finland, bilateral cooperation is under way to secure transports with all modes of transport based on different preparedness conditions, both in peacetime and during heightened alert and war. The goal of the collaboration is to conduct planning with concrete measures. For example, it may involve developing and signing agreements with the transport industry in areas that are considered most urgent. The intention is for the cooperation to be formalised in a bilateral agreement between the countries. The participating government agencies from Sweden are the Swedish Transport Agency, the Swedish Maritime Administration, the Swedish Transport Administration and the Civil Aviation Administration. From Finland, the Finnish Transport Agency, the Finnish Transport Safety Agency and the National Emergency Supply Agency. As a next step, there is also a need to develop the cooperation with Norway and Denmark on these issues.

The Swedish Maritime Administration cooperates with the Nordic countries within the winter shipping industry’s icebreaking operations. The collaboration
is based on each country’s icebreakers being allowed to be active in other countries’ territories to address common needs. There is a joint agreement between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in this regard. There is an extended cooperation agreement between Sweden and Finland with reference to the Nordic agreement where the countries’ icebreakers will serve as a common icebreaker fleet for both countries. The cooperation is a prerequisite for addressing the current needs of winter shipping in the Baltic Sea. Without the agreements, each country would have to have additional resources to conduct these activities.

The Nordic government agencies involved in the transport sector have discussed what mandate they have to develop the cooperation and when a continued partnership needs to be decided at the government level.

Issues regarding emergency preparedness and civil defence are increasingly in focus, especially in the Swedish-Finnish cooperation, and there is much to do in a relatively short time. This means that there may be a lack of skills or resources. In this context, there has also been a discussion on the opportunities that exist to exchange classified information based on the technical systems that are currently available. This applies both between and within the Swedish government agencies and in relation to Finland. The Nordic security agreement does not describe any digital solutions, while at the same time there is a need to exchange sensitive security information between the Nordic countries. The security agreement has thus far in principle not been applied, but there will be a need to do so, and there are some practical problems associated with its application.

**Energy supply**

For electricity supply, there is a declaration of intent on cooperation regarding preparedness in the Nordic countries (NordBER). The declaration is signed by the Nordic energy and electricity preparedness government agencies and the countries’ grid operators. The NordBER cooperation is currently being implemented according to an action plan that applies for the period 2016-2018. The goal of NordBER is to regularly share information and experiential knowledge, collaborate on common issues, and supplement national electricity preparedness with joint Nordic preparedness. The work is organised by a central group, with representatives from all ten parties, who meet twice a year. In addition, the concrete work is conducted through a number of working groups that regularly report to the central group. These include working groups for risk and vulnerability analysis, contingency planning, repair readiness and training and exercises. The cooperation needs to continue to develop, and this also applies in relation to the Baltic countries.

At the same time, negotiations are under way within the EU regarding a regulation on emergency preparedness for the electricity sector. The aim is to create a common framework of rules and coordinated procedures to enable Member States and stakeholders to cooperate effectively across national borders.
Within the gas sector, Sweden cooperates primarily with Denmark. In 2017, the EU adopted a new regulation (2017/1938) concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply. Regional cooperation is part of the regulation, and the Member States are divided into different risk groups with the aim of developing joint regional risk assessments. Sweden is part of three such groups. Sweden will also be able to enter into a solidarity agreement with Denmark to secure the gas supply to customers who are protected by solidarity if a supply crisis arises and the regular crisis measures are not sufficient.

Oil preparedness is also regulated within a wider framework than that restricted to the Nordic region. There are therefore country-specific commitments concerning emergency storage of oil, primarily through the IEA (International Energy Agency) but also through the EU. A close dialogue within the area of security fuel supply, including emergency storage, exists between the Nordic countries in relation to the IEA, and between the Nordic Member States in relation to the EU.

In the electricity sector, the differences in security legislation between the Nordic countries are perceived as limiting the cooperation to some extent. The lack of secure communication channels is also perceived as a problem, as the capability to share sensitive information is needed. Such a need is also considered to exist within other energy areas.

The Nordic security agreement is applied to a certain extent in the energy supply area.

**Protection and security**

Nordred is a collaboration within rescue services where all Nordic countries are now included. The purpose is to collaborate across countries’ territorial borders to prevent or limit injuries to people or damage to property or the environment in the event of accidents or imminent risk of accidents. The cooperation is governed by a framework agreement text from 1989, which has been ratified by all countries. The agreement obliges the countries to adapt their national legislation and other regulations in order to eliminate obstacles to cooperation as far as possible. The agreement enables local government agencies responsible for rescue services to make agreements across a territorial border regarding preparedness for participation in a rescue operation in the neighbouring country. A large number of such agreements have been reached between municipalities in Sweden and municipalities in Denmark, Finland and Norway.

For the ongoing and overall cooperation between the countries in connection with the Nordred agreement, there is a permanent contact group (the Nordred Group) consisting of representatives from the central government agencies in each country that are responsible for rescue services. Within the framework of the group’s work, a number of issues of importance for the coordination and development of the rescue services in the Nordic region are addressed. The group has a rotating chairmanship of three years with a concluding conference that sets the direction for the next three-year period. In addition, bilateral and
trilateral cooperation takes place between the countries. There are also border rescue councils along the national borders, where the Swedish county administrative boards and their counterparts in the other countries initiate collaboration.

The cooperation within the maritime and aviation rescue services takes place within the framework of a global system for SAR (Search and Rescue) and which is ultimately based on work conducted within IMO (International Maritime Organization) and ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). Each country that participates in the cooperation shall be responsible for the rescue services within a specified geographical area. Sweden has bilateral agreements with all the surrounding nine states, which also means that the countries assist each other within their respective areas of responsibility, when the responsible country so requests.

In the field of radiation safety, the Nordic countries collaborate within a number of different areas of expertise and under the supervision of a Nordic management group, consisting of the heads of the Nordic radiation safety authorities, who meet annually. There are also agreements on mutual assistance in the event of a nuclear accident, and bilateral agreements that Sweden has concluded with Denmark, Finland and Norway on the exchange of information and notification concerning nuclear facilities.

There is a great need for exchanging information, especially in connection with operational cooperation during major events. The interconnection between the Swedish and Norwegian TETRA systems, Rakel and Nødnett, enables robust and secure communication between actors at the local, regional and national level during cross-border events. A corresponding interconnection is currently under way between Finland and Sweden and between Norway and Finland. In 2019, a project will be started to create rescue groups for the actors in the three countries when assistance is needed in the event of accidents or emergencies. The interconnection is intended to be used in the Barents Rescue 2019 exercise.

**Information and communication**

In the field of information and cybersecurity, there in cooperation between the Nordic countries’ national CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team). The collaboration takes place both at a strategic and operational level. It is governed by two MoUs between responsible government agencies in all five countries. These agreements establish a steering group to continuously monitor and develop the strategic cooperation between the countries, which includes the CERT cooperation and a special network for sharing Nordic CERT information up to the level of SECRET. The security measures and responsibilities with regard to using the network for CERT information are also regulated. In 2018, the technical environment currently in operation is being replaced, and Sweden has the main responsibility for the migration. These regulations expand on and supplement the general Nordic security agreement, according to which diplomatic and courier mail is the normal method, unless otherwise agreed, when transmitting sensitive security information between the countries.
The Nordic postal and telecommunications authorities have formalised cooperation in accordance with an agreement signed by the relevant heads of authorities. Among other things, the cooperation concerns issues such as network and information security. Planned meetings among the heads of authorities take place twice a year, and there is otherwise continuous operational cooperation. There is also a supervisory group that meets twice a year and, if necessary, forms temporary subgroups for specific issues.

**Collaboration and management**

Areas specifically investigated under this heading are those relating to MSB’s tasks within national risk and capability assessment, national situation reporting, and duty officers (TiB).

There are several Nordic collaborations found here. Since 2013, there has been a well-established collaboration within the area of risk assessment and strategic future analysis, where the cooperation has so far mainly been aimed at experiential exchange concerning methods, processes and dissemination of results.

Within the framework of the work with status information and situation reporting, cooperation between the Nordic countries’ national functions for duty officers has been established for some time. The collaboration aims to facilitate the sharing of status information during events in order to increase capacity within crisis management. Connection tests between the duty officer functions in the Nordic countries are carried out with some regularity according to a procedure.

The partnerships have a clear connection to the Haga cooperation and the Haga action plan. There are no formal agreements or governing documents established, but there are procedure and work descriptions, check lists and the like.

The collaborations concerning risk analysis, status information and cooperation between the countries’ duty officers need to be developed. Firstly, information needs to be shared in a secure manner (other than e-mail and telephone), and secondly, the cooperation needs to be developed with the aim of achieving a more coherent common overview during major events that are cross-border in nature. At the same time, some uncertainty has been expressed regarding mandates and expectations. Clarifications in these respects can in turn create a need for legal and technical support in the development of the work. This applies, for example, to the exchange of information on risks and vulnerabilities and regarding measures taken to mitigate these. It also applies to exchange of status information in the operational event management.

Nordic cooperation to improve the practical conditions for providing and receiving support began in 2014 following the Haga II Declaration. Haga’s strategic development plan for 2013–2015 clarified that the capacity in the Nordic countries to coordinate the reception of support and assistance in the event of serious accidents and emergencies would be strengthened. The authorities produced a number of proposals in the report “Förbättrade
möjligheter för stöd i Norden” [Improved opportunities for support in the Nordic region]. The proposals revolve around the same areas contained in the EU’s Host Nation Support Guidelines: preparatory planning, coordination, logistics, and legal and financial issues. The government agencies cooperate on the implementation of several of the proposals.

For example, certain elements relating to Host Nation Support have been practised to some extent in recent years within the framework of various cross-border exercises, where staff from the Nordic countries are invited to be observers or to act as responders. There is also an exchange between the Nordic countries’ respective reinforcement resources for Host Nation Support, and there has been contact in connection with the development of the countries’ respective manuals or guidelines for Host Nation Support. Host Nation Support is also a prominent issue in the EU project “European Nordic Modules” run by Finland, Denmark and Sweden during 2017–2018. Much of the work has focused on potential situations where civil resources may be required.

In light of the total defence planning resumed in Sweden and several of the other Nordic countries, the increasingly in-depth military cooperation between Sweden and Finland and the Host Nation Support agreement with NATO that both Sweden and Finland have concluded, the interest in developing the conditions for the countries to be able to provide and receive military support is increasing. Effective Host Nation Support when receiving military resources requires clarification of support from civilian actors in terms of practical and logistical arrangements. There is a clear development potential in increased Nordic cooperation. Continued development needs to take place in collaboration with the Nordic countries’ defence forces. This may in turn create the need for technical and legal support.