# Naturgasutsläpp från en naturgasanläggning.

940209 MARS 1994\_12

En nödventil på en rörledning fallerade och naturgas släppte ut. Gasen skingrades utan att antändas. Katastrofplanen trädde omedelbart i kraft. Det tog 15 minuter att manuellt stänga nödventilen. Orsaken till utsläppet var fortfarande under utredning.

# Inblandade ämnen och mängder

	CAS Nr.	Mängd
naturgas, huvudsakligen metan	74-82-8	8,5 ton

#### Skador:

Människor: Inga. Materiella: Inga.

Miljö/ekologi: Inga effekter rapporterade.

Infrastruktur: Inga.

# Erfarenheter redovisade (Ja/Nej): Ja

Mycket kortfattat anges förebyggande åtgärder.

# **Report Profile**

# **Identification of Report:**

country: FA ident key: 1994 012 01

reported under Seveso I directive as major accident reports: SHORT+FULL

# Date of Major Occurrence: Time of Major Occurrence

start: 1994-02-09 start: 14:15:00 finish: 1994-02-09 finish: 14:30:00

# **Establishment:**

name:

address:

industry: 2005 power supply and distribution (electric, gas, etc.)

Natural Gas Processing

Seveso II status: not applicable: Yes art. 6 (notification):  $\ensuremath{\mathrm{No}}$ 

art. 7 (MAPP): No

art. 9 (safety report): No

# **Date of Report:**

short: full:

# **Authority Reporting:**

name:

address:

# **Authority Contact:**

rep\_cont\_name:

rep\_cont\_phone:

rep_cont_fax:	
Additional Comments:	
a) - not applicable -	
b) - not applicable -	
c) - not applicable -	
d) - not applicable -	
e) - not applicable -	
Short Report	
country: FA ident key: 1994_012_01	
Accident Types:	
release: Yes explosion: No	
water contamination: No other: No	
fire: No	
description:	
During a pigging operation, a 30" pipeline, bringing natural gas on-shore, failed between the emergency	
shut-down (ESD) valve and the pig trap. The intervention of the ESD valve from the control room failed and it	
had to be closed locally see Appendix Short Report / description of accident types	
Substance(s) Directly Involved:	
toxic: No explosive: Yes	
ecotoxic: No other: No	
flammable: Yes	
description:	
- Natural Gas [mainly Methane] (C.A.S. CODE: 74-82-8, E.E.C. CODE: 601-001-00-4): amount involved = not known.	
Immediate Sources of Accident:	
storage: No transfer: Yes	
process: No other: No	
description:	
The accident involved a 30" pipeline, entering the site on the seaward side, that was bringing natural gas	
on-shore. The pipeline was operating at a pressure of about 130 psi.	
Suspected Causes:	
plant or equipment: Yes environmental: No	
human: Yes other: No	
description:	
CAUSES: see Appendix Short Report / description of suspected causes	

# **Immediate Effects:**

material loss: No

human deaths: No

human injuries: No community disruption: No

other: Yes

ecological harm: No

national heritage loss: No

description:

OTHER:

No material losses occurred except the natural gas released at 130 psi for 10 minutes.

**Emergency Measures taken:** 

on-site systems: Yes decontamination: No

external services: Yes restoration: No

sheltering: No other: No

evacuation: Yes

description:

INTERANL TO THE ESTABLISHMENT:... see Appendix Short Report / description of emergency measures taken

**Immediate Lessons Learned:** 

prevention: Yes other: No

mitigation: Yes

description:

MEASURES TO PREVENT ANY RECURRENCE OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS:... see Appendix Short Report / description of

immediate lessons learned

# **A Occurrence Full Report**

country: FA ident key: 1994\_012\_01

1 Type of Accident

remarks: During a pigging operation, a 30" pipeline, bringing natural gas on-shore,

failed between the emergency shut-down (ESD) valve and the pig trap. The

intervention of the ESD valve from the control room failed and it had to be

closed locally. ... see Appendix Full Report A / type of accident

2 Dangerous Substances

remarks: Natural gas (mainly methane), at a pressure of 10 bar, was providing motive

power to a pig in a 30" pipeline between an offshore installation and the

onshore gas reception facilities. The pipeline failed onshore, releasing

approximately 8.5... see Appendix Full Report A / dangerous substances

3 Source of Accident

illustration: - not applicable -

remarks: A 30" pipeline (code 4011) entering the site on the seaward side, bringing

natural gas (code 3301) on-shore failed at a conical reducer at a

pre-existing hydrogen induced crack at the toe of a weld. Pipe constructed

in 1968 and not subject ... see Appendix Full Report A / source of accident

- remarks

4 Meteorological Conditions

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precipitation none: fog: rain: hail: snow:
Yes No No No No
wind speed (m/s): 3
direction (from): NE
stability (Pasquill):
ambient temperature (\inftyC): 3
remarks: Conditions not severe and generally quite reasonable for the time of the year.
Meteorological conditions did not significantly contribute to the incident.
5 Causes of Major Occurrence
main causes
technical / physical 5101 operation: vessel/container/containment-equipment failure
- not applicable -
- not applicable -
- not applicable -
- not applicable -
human / organizational 5308 organization: design of plant/equipment/system (inadequate,
inappropriate)
5310 organization: manufacture/construction (inadequate, inappropriate)
5312 organization: isolation of equipment/system (none, inadequate,
inappropriate)
5401 person: operator error
5403 person: wilful disobedience/failure to carry out duties
remarks: When the Original Report was prepared, the causes of pipeline failure were not fully
identified. It may be linked to pigging operation that was underway, with the pigs
possibly entering the on-shore section of pipe at high speed and then st... see Appendix
Full Report A / causes of major occurrence
6 Discussion about the Occurrence
- not applicable -
Type of Accident country: FA ident key: 1994_012_01
event:
major occurrence 1101 release: gas/vapour/mist/etc release to air
initiating event 1101 release: gas/vapour/mist/etc release to air
associated event - not applicable -
Dangerous substances
country: FA ident key: 1994_012_01
a) total establishment inventory
CAS number: 74-82-8 identity: Methane (natural Gas)
name from Seveso I Directive: - not applicable -
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name from Seveso II Directive: - not applicable -

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category from Seveso II: - not applicable -
other hazards (1): - not applicable -
other hazards (2): - not applicable -
maximum quantity (tonnes): 328
use of substance as: STARTING MATERIAL
b) substance belongs to relevant inventory directly involved: Yes
actual quantity: 8,5 potential quantity: 125
c) substance belongs to relevant inventory indirectly involved: No
actual quantity: -1 indir_pot_quant: -1
Source of Accident - Situation country: FA ident key: 1994 012 01
situation
industry
inititating event 2005 power supply and distribution (electric, gas, etc.)
associated event - not applicable -
activity/unit
major occurrence 3301 transfer: pipeline/pipework transfer
inititating event 3301 transfer: pipeline/pipework transfer
associated event - not applicable -
component
major occurrence 4011 general pipework/flanges
inititating event 4011 general pipework/flanges
associated event - not applicable -
B Consequences Full Report
country: FA ident key: 1994_012_01
1 Area concerned
affected
extent of effects installation: Yes
establishment: No
off-site; local: No
off-site; regional: No
off-site; transboundary: No
illustration of effects - not applicable -
remarks The flammable gas cloud was limited to the area immediately around the failed pi... see Appendix
Full Report B / area concerned - remarks
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#### 2 People

establishment popul. emergency personnel off-site population

total at risk 10 0 0

immediate fatalities 0 0 0 0 subsequent fatalities 0 0 0 hospitalizing injuries 0 0 0 other serious injuries 0 0 0 health monitoring 0 0 0

remarks Since the release was controlled relatively quickely, only those persons in and ... see Appendix

Full Report B / people

#### 3 Ecological Harm

pollution/contamination/damage of:

- residential area (covered by toxic cloud) Suspected
- common wild flora/fauna (death or elimination) Suspected
- rare or protected flora/fauna (death or elimination) Suspected
- water catchment areas and supplies for consumption or recreation Suspected
- land (with known potential for long term ecological harm or Suspected

preventing human access or activities)

- marine or fresh water habitat Suspected
- areas of high conservation value or given special protection Suspected

remarks The natural gas released, predominantly methane, dispersed to the atmosphere and... see Appendix

Full Report B / ecological harm

# 4 National Heritage Loss

effects on:

- historical sites Suspected historic monuments Suspected
- historic buildings Suspected art treasures Suspected

remarks Since ignition of the gas did not occur, no historical sites were threatened.... see Appendix

Full Report B / national heritage loss

#### **5 Material Loss**

establishment losses off site losses

costs (direct costs to operator) (social costs)

in ECU ECU

material losses

response, clean up, restoration

remarks Actual costs not obtained. However, no offsite losses occurred. Main onsite loss... see Appendix

Full Report B / material loss

# 6 Disruption of Community Life

establishment/plant evacuated disabled/unoccupiable destroyed

- nearby residences/hotels No No No
- nearby factories/offices/small shops No No No
- schools, hospitals, institutions No No No

- other places of public assembly No No No interruption of utilities etc. no / yes duration - gas No - electricity No - water No - sewage treatment works No - telecommunications No - main roads No - railways No - waterways No - air transport No significant public concern none local level national level - off site populations Yes No No - media interest No No No - political interest No No No remarks Since the ignition of the release gas did not occur, the incident did not escula... see Appendix C Response Full Report country: FA ident key: 1994\_012\_01 1 Emergency Measures taken - on site - not applicable - - not applicable -- not applicable - - not applicable -- not applicable - - not applicable -- off site - not applicable - - not applicable -- not applicable - - not applicable -- not applicable - - not applicable still - on site - not applicable - - not applicable required - not applicable - - not applicable -- not applicable - - not applicable -- off site - not applicable - - not applicable -- not applicable - - not applicable -- not applicable - - not applicable continuing contamination or danger -on site not applicable -off site not applicable remarks - not applicable -

# 2 Seveso II Duties

# pre-accident evaluation Article item not due yet not done done/submitted evaluated 6 notification No No No No 7 policy (MAPP) No No No No 9 safety report No No No No 9, 10, 11 update No No No No 11 internal plan No No No No 11 external plan No No No No 13 informing public No No No No 9, 12 siting policy No No No No post-accident evaluation Seveso II duty was actual were actual compared with actual contingency consequences consequences, the addressed? addressed? predicted extent was? Article item 7 policy (MAPP) not applicable not applicable not applicable 9 current safety report not applicable not applicable not applicable 11 internal plan not applicable not applicable not applicable 11 external plan not applicable not applicable not applicable 13 informing public not applicable not applicable not applicable 9, 12 siting policy not applicable not applicable not applicable evaluation of safety organisation organisational element element existed did element relate to actual circumstances of yes / no no / partly / yes adequate? - written policy objectives No - specified management No structure - specified responsibilities No - specified working procedures No - specified procedures for No assessment/auditing of management system - specified procedures for $\ensuremath{\text{No}}$ review and update of management policy - specified general training No procedures - specified emergency No

training procedures

evaluation of ecological impact control

organisational element element existed did element relate to actual circumstances of

yes / no no / partly / yes adequate?

- ecological status review No

before incident

- potential ecological No

consequences assessment

- ecological impact review No

after incident

- ecological restoration No

procedures

- subsequent review of No

restoration success

remarks - not applicable -

#### 3 Official Action Taken

#### legal action

- not applicable -

#### other official action

- not applicable -

#### 4 Lessons Learned

#### measures to prevent recurrence

 $Plant-re-HAZOPed.\ Improved\ wor...\ see\ Appendix\ Full\ Report\ C\ /\ lesson\ learned\ -\ prevent$ 

#### measures to mitigate consequences:

 $Emergency\ shut\ down\ system\ to\ ...\ see\ Appendix\ Full\ Report\ C\ /\ lesson\ learned\ -\ mitigate$ 

useful references:

Report no. 620551/1/94, "Inves... see Appendix Full Report C / lesson learned - references

#### 5 Discussion about Response

- not applicable -

# Appendices for the FA / 1994\_012\_01 report

#### **Appendix Short Report / description of accident types:**

During a pigging operation, a 30" pipeline, bringing natural gas on-shore, failed between the emergency shut-down (ESD) valve and the pig trap. The intervention of the ESD valve from the control room failed and it had to be closed locally. Released natural gas did not ignite, but was a serious risk to personnel.

# Appendix Short Report / description of suspected causes:

CAUSES:

When the Original Report was prepared, the causes of pipeline failure were not fully identified. It may be linked to pigging operation that was underway, with the pigs possibly entering the on-shore section of pipe at high speed and then sticking, causing stresses in the pipe. The ESD valve failed to operate because, before the accident occurred, it had been isolated from the control room for maintenance work but the need to de-isolate had been overlooked.

# Appendix Short Report / description of emergency measures taken:

#### INTERANL TO THE ESTABLISHMENT:

On-site emergency procedures were activated and all on-site personnel (approximately 70 people) were evacuated to muster points. The intervention of the ESD valve from the control room failed and it had to be closed locally. It took about 15 minutes to manually close the ESD valve.

EXTERNAL SERVICES:

Police was alerted about the accident but off-site emergency plan was not activated because it was controlled in about 15 minutes.

#### Appendix Short Report / description of immediate lessons learned:

MEASURES TO PREVENT ANY RECURRENCE OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS:

When the Original Report was prepared, the pipeline and pigs were being inspected to ascertain the causes of failure.

MEASURES TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDENT:

After the accident, maintenance procedures had to be reviewed with respect to valve isolations.

#### Appendix Full Report A / type of accident:

During a pigging operation, a 30" pipeline, bringing natural gas on-shore, failed between the emergency shut-down (ESD) valve and the pig trap. The intervention of the ESD valve from the control room failed and it had to be closed locally. Natural gas was released over a period of 10 minutes (code 1101). The natural gas cloud was not ignited.

#### Appendix Full Report A / dangerous substances:

Natural gas (mainly methane), at a pressure of 10 bar, was providing motive power to a pig in a 30" pipeline between an offshore installation and the onshore gas reception facilities. The pipeline failed onshore, releasing approximately 8.5 tons of gas to atmosphere before the onshore emergency shut down valve was closed.

#### Appendix Full Report A / source of accident - remarks:

A 30" pipeline (code 4011) entering the site on the seaward side, bringing natural gas (code 3301) on-shore failed at a conical reducer at a pre-existing hydrogen induced crack at the toe of a weld. Pipe constructed in 1968 and not subject to any modifications since. Pipe failed during arrival of a significant slug of liquid during the pigging which subjected it to a high impact loading. The release of natural gas occurred at 130 psi over a period of about 10 minutes.

#### Appendix Full Report A / causes of major occurrence:

When the Original Report was prepared, the causes of pipeline failure were not fully identified. It may be linked to pigging operation that was underway, with the pigs possibly entering the on-shore section of pipe at high speed and then sticking, causing stresses in the pipe. Failure of pipeline at latent defect when subject to stresses well in excess of those experienced during normal operations. Design of plant not adequate to cope with this although such stresses are not forseeable.

#### Appendix Full Report B / area concerned - remarks:

The flammable gas cloud was limited to the area immediately around the failed pipe. Ignition did not occur and therefore there were no significant effects.

#### **Appendix Full Report B / people:**

Since the release was controlled relatively quickely, only those persons in and around the immediate area of the pipeline failure were at risk. If ignition had occurred, it is likely that these numbers could have increased.

#### Appendix Full Report B / ecological harm:

The natural gas released, predominantly methane, dispersed to the atmosphere and therefore did not threaten any serious ecological harm.

#### **Appendix Full Report B / national heritage loss:**

Since ignition of the gas did not occur, no historical sites were threatened.

#### Appendix Full Report B / material loss:

Actual costs not obtained. However, no offsite losses occurred. Main onsite losses have been a result of loss of production rather than material lost. Figures of 15-20 million pounds lost production have been talked about.

# Appendix Full Report B / disruption of community life:

Since the ignition of the release gas did not occur, the incident did not esculate to have offsite consequences. As a result, there was no offsite disruption and the incident did not become public knowledge.

# Appendix Full Report C / lesson learned - prevent:

Plant-re-HAZOPed. Improved work instructions have been developed, a reassessment of "fitness for purpose" of all onsite pipework has been conducted. Competence testing in use of permit to work system to be introduced.

# Appendix Full Report C / lesson learned - mitigate:

Emergency shut down system to be tied into fire and gas detection systems to allow automatic activation.

#### **Appendix Full Report C / lesson learned - references:**

 $Report\ no.\ 620551/1/94, "Investigation\ of\ a\ failure\ associated\ with\ a\ sphere\ T\ at\ the\ Phillips\ Petroleum\ Bacton\ Gas\ Terminal",\ The\ Welding\ Institute,\ Cambridge.$