

United States Fire Administration



Technical Report Series

**Apartment Building Fire
East 50th Street
New York City**



Federal Emergency Management Agency



**United States Fire Administration
National Fire Data Center**

**Apartment Building Fire
East 50th Street
New York City
(January 11, 1988)**

Investigated by: Randolph E. Kirby

This is Report 019 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.



Federal Emergency Management Agency



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SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues	Comments
Cause	Believed accidental; started in sofa in psychologist's office on first floor of high-rise apartment building.
Detection/Reporting	Building visitor and employees investigated and attempted to extinguish fire before reporting it. Building occupants made aware of fire by other residents and by smoke penetrating their units.
Fire Fighting	Heavy smoke throughout building, made search and rescue difficult. Five alarms needed to provide sufficient manpower.
Building Structure	Sound construction coupled with quick and effective fire extinguishment prevented structural failure. Pre-finished wood paneling in office area provided tremendous fuel load for rapid fire spread.
Doors	Both stairway doors propped open, providing paths for heat and smoke to penetrate the building, led to fatalities. Metal apartment doors had half-inch space below them for ventilation.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES cont'd

Issues	Comments
Fire Protection Equipment	<p>No smoke detectors in office of origin.</p> <p>Building lacked minimum fire protection equipment - no alarm system, no illuminated exit signs, no emergency egress lighting, no panic hardware on doors.</p> <p>Individual apartment units had battery-operated smoke detectors; however, majority were inoperable at time of fire.</p> <p>No sprinkler system.</p>
Code Compliance	<p>Building not subject to current code requirements for fire protection systems and devices as long as its use is not changed.</p> <p>Building previously cited for propped open fire doors.</p>
Evacuation	<p>Stairwells useless because of immediate smoke and heat penetration.</p> <p>Exterior fire escapes available to occupants on north side of building only.</p> <p>Occupants not having access to exterior fire escapes were rescued by firefighters from apartment windows on front of building.</p> <p>Exit doors to roof had slide bolt locks, making them difficult to unlock under dark and smoky conditions. This probably contributed to two deaths.</p>
Refuge	<p>Tenants who stayed put in their apartments behind closed doors were unharmed.</p>

**Apartment Building Fire
East 50th Street
New York City**

Investigated by: Randolph E. Kirby

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OVERVIEW

On January 11, 1988 at 2019, a fire in New York City was reported at 135 East 50th Street, a 10-story, 120 apartment unit building with professional offices on the first floor.

First arriving fire fighting units were greeted by heavy smoke and flame coming from the lobby area. The two stairwells serving the upper floors of the building and located off the lobby area had their doors propped open and provided a path for smoke to rapidly fill the building, rendering the stairwells useless for evacuation.

Occupants were compelled to use a rear fire escape, which required some people to travel through smoke-filled corridors. Approximately 50 people were rescued by firefighters at the front of the building using

ground ladders. Others remained in their apartments. Smoke spread throughout the building, claimed the lives of four tenants, and injured at least two others. In addition, five firefighters were injured while fighting the fire.

The Fire Department utilized approximately 200 firefighters and 38 units. The fire was confined to the first floor and the situation was brought under control at 2216, approximately two hours after it started.

THE STRUCTURE

The building is located in the Borough of Manhattan, with other high-rise buildings bordering three sides. The only entrance to the building is on 50th Street. It was constructed in 1922, using poured concrete floor-ceiling assembly. It is brick-faced and approximately 100 x 70 feet. (For floor plans, see Appendices C, D, and E.) The building is equipped with a service elevator and a passenger elevator. The basement contains the heating system and laundry.

There are two stairwells (A & B) located on the east and west sides. Stairwells begin at the lobby entrance and terminate at the 10th floor, with exit doors opening on the roof. Windows are provided in both stairwells from ground level to the 10th floor, with a skylight at the top of each stairwell shaft. All apartment units from the 2nd to 10th floors are served by a 50 foot central corridor between the two stairwells. There are several apartment units on each floor whose only entrances open directly into Stairwell B. The apartment separation walls and corridor walls are constructed of solid masonry materials with painted wall surfaces.

The first floor contains several offices which had been refurbished with prefinished wood paneling over sheetrock and plaster walls, and suspended tile ceilings throughout the offices and corridors. The office of fire origin was used by a psychologist. One third of the apartment units are rent-controlled (meaning very low rent), and the remainder are rent stabilized (meaning a somewhat higher rent).

There are exterior fire escapes located on the north side. Only the apartment units on that side have direct access to them.

All exit and apartment doors are metal fire doors, but they had been designed with a half-inch gap at the bottom to promote air circulation.

CODES

The building was constructed under the 1920's New York Building Code and currently falls under the New York State Multiple Dwelling Law. As long as the existing use is not substantially altered, the building is considered to be in compliance and not subject to fire protection upgrading. The Fire Department of New York conducts fire safety inspections of all buildings of this type and on previous occasions cited the building owners for propping open fire doors.

The wood paneling in the doctors' offices does not meet the current code; a sprinkler system would-be required in the offices to be in compliance. However, the paneling was permitted as "decoration" over the old walls under the old code. Because the renovation did not exceed 20 percent of the cost of the building, the new code did not apply.

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

The building is equipped with a single 4-inch standpipe located in Stairwell A with a 2 1/2-inch hose valve located at each floor level. The building does not contain a sprinkler system, fire alarm system, emergency lighting, or illuminated exit signs.

Most, if not all, of the living units had a battery operated smoke detector. However, fire department personnel found that the majority of the detectors they were able to check after the fire either had dead batteries or were without batteries.

THE FIRE

The fire was discovered by a visitor, Katryna O'Neill. As she entered the apartment building at about 2015 she smelled a faint odor of smoke. She proceeded to the waiting room of the psychologist's office on the first

floor where there was an even stronger odor of smoke, and called out to see if anyone was there. Receiving no answer, she walked down the corridor to the doctor's area. When walking past office Room 103, she felt heat on her face, coming off the door. She then noticed heavy black smoke coming from underneath it. She started back toward the waiting room door and saw two men coming toward her--the building superintendent and the doorman. She reported the fire to them. They went directly to Room 103 and attempted to put out the fire. Mrs. O'Neill returned to the lobby and, used the telephone located adjacent to Stairwell A to dial 911 to report the fire. The fire dispatcher asked her for the number she was calling from but the heavy buildup of smoke during the short time she was calling prevented her from reading the number on the phone. At this time she saw the superintendent leave the waiting room and head toward the elevator. (He later was rescued from a second floor front apartment by firefighters.)

At the same time, looking through the waiting room area in the doctor's office, she observed the other man left in office Room 103 attempting to stamp out the fire with his feet. She then began knocking on the doors in the office complex yelling "Fire." She went through the lobby to the outside of the building, and within seconds observed a doctor, a patient, and the doorman coming out through the front door.

The alarm was received by the Fire Department at 2019. First due units arrived on the scene within four minutes at 2023. When entering the lobby door, firefighters encountered heavy smoke rolling over their heads and coming from the direction of the waiting room area. A set of glass doors separating the waiting room from the lobby had completely melted.

Using a 2 1/2-inch handline, firefighters began to work their way down the corridor. A second handline was placed in operation in the lobby toward Stairwell A. (The door to Stairwell A had been left propped open, thus allowing smoke and heat to quickly fill the upper floors of the structure.)

At 2029, a second alarm was ordered. Those units would be committed to rescue. Upon arrival, they observed several tenants at the windows in

the front of the building. Ground ladders were placed on the 1-story foyer roof via which 50 occupants were eventually rescued. By this time, the public areas of the entire building were charged with heavy black smoke.

Firefighters beginning their search inside discovered a male victim on the landing of Stairwell B between the first and second floors. He was transported to the hospital where he later died. A second body (female) was found just inside her 9th floor apartment with the door open. It was surmised that she had attempted to leave her apartment, encountered heavy smoke and went back inside where she was overcome. Her apartment had heavy smoke damage and was next to the stairwell. It also had a fire escape; she need not have gone into the corridor to escape.

Heavy smoke and the need for additional manpower were handicapping rescue efforts.

At 2047, a third alarm was ordered, These firefighters also were committed to the rescue operation. They attempted to use exterior fire escapes located at the rear of the building, but were hampered by occupants evacuating.

Two more bodies were found on the 10th floor landing of Stairwell A at the door to the roof. Both of these people had lived off Stairwell B and apparently went down the corridor and into Stairwell A looking to escape.

By this time, the fire had been extinguished, but the building was still charged with heavy smoke. A fourth alarm was ordered at 2115. Arriving units were used to augment personnel in rescue operations. Firefighters went through the building and instructed tenants to remain in their apartments, as the fire was under control and they were out of danger. At about this time the Fire Department communications center was receiving numerous calls from tenants reporting smoke in their apartments. They were advised the situation was under control and to remain in their apartments near windows.

Some of the tenants had stopped up their doorways with towels, rags, or whatever was handy to keep out the smoke. Most did not try to enter hallways filled with smoke. Some found only light haze in their corridor, but saw heavy smoke in the stairwell and went back to their apartments.

Apartments that did not respond to firefighters' knocks at the door had to be forceably entered to make sure there were no casualties within, The doors to the apartment units are metal and each was equipped with various locks, which made entry laboriously difficult.

At 2142 a fifth alarm was ordered. The additional personnel were primarily used to augment the search and the general overhaul of the scene, A total of 200 fire fighting personnel and 38 units participated in the incident. (See list in Appendix I.) The situation was considered under control (search operation completed) at 2216.

Origin and Spread of Fire and Smoke

The fire began in the upholstered sofa of a psychologist's office on the first floor off the waiting room area. The cause of the fire is unknown and was still under investigation when this report was written,

The wood paneling utilized throughout the office complex allowed the fire to spread quickly while generating tremendous heat and smoke. The spread of smoke was exacerbated by the open stairwell doors from the lobby area, which allowed rapid movement through the upper stories. Heat from the fire broke the glass, in the mail chute which goes from the lobby area to the 10th floor. This provided another avenue for the smoke to travel upward.

Tenants attempting to exit the building from the upper stories unknowingly aided the spread of smoke by opening doors, which created drafts. The fire department also was of the opinion that several corridor doors on the upper stairwells were propped open and contributed to the heavy smoke damage throughout the building.

Smoke penetration into individual apartments was aided by the 1/2-inch gaps at the bottom of the doors. However, all who stayed in their apartments survived.

Flame damage was confined to the first floor. This was due the to quick and effective fire attack and the sound construction of the building.

Rescue and Evacuation

Approximately 50 people were removed from apartment unit windows located on the front of the building by firefighters using ground ladders. The rest exited by the fire escapes that were only on the rear side of the buildings or stayed in their apartments.

Apartments located in the rear of the building have direct access to the fire escapes by way of windows. The windows have metal security grates which had to be unlocked and opened. They may have provided obstacles to tenants evacuating the units. They were certainly an obstacle for firefighters attempting to gain entry for search and rescue.

As noted earlier, the two stairwells each begin in the lobby and terminate on the 10th floor with entrances from the stairwells to the roof. The two doors leading to the roof were latched with slide bolts. Two tenants who attempted to escape through these doors were unable to unlatch them in the heavy smoke. Their bodies were found at the doors. Further complicating escape were inadequate lighting in the stairwells and the absence of illuminated exit lights in the halls.

Several apartment units on each floor exit directly into Stairwell B. Obviously in this situation escape was not possible through the smoke-filled stairwell. Also, many people residing on the front of the building would have had to use stairwells and corridors to gain access to other people's apartments and the fire escapes. Because of the smoke-filled stairwells and corridors, these tenants were unable to use them.

FATALITIES

There were four fatalities, all residents of the building. The first victim (male) was found in Stairwell B on the landing between the first and second floors. He was alive when discovered by firefighters and died a few hours later at the hospital due to smoke inhalation and third degree burns. He lived in apartment 6J and apparently decided to go down his stairwell, where he was overcome.

The second victim (female) was found just inside her apartment, unit 9L. She was D.O.A. and was later determined to have died from smoke inhalation.

The third and fourth victims (one male, one female) were found on the 10th floor landing of Stairwell A at the door leading to the roof. Both victims were D.O.A. It was determined later that they had died of smoke inhalation. The male victim lived in apartment 10F; the female victim in apartment 9H. They probably left their apartments, found the stairwell full of smoke, crossed through the corridor to the other side of the building, saw smoke in the stairwell and attempted to flee to the roof, but could not get out the door.

The location of the victims prior to the fire is not known for sure. However, the three victims found in stairwells--one downstairs and two at the roof--all had apartments that exited directly into Stairwell B. (See floor plans for exact location of the victims.)

INJURIES

Building Occupants -- There were two occupants who received injuries requiring hospital treatment:

- The building superintendent, a 42-year-old male, was removed by firefighters from apartment 2E and transported to the hospital where he was treated for smoke inhalation and minor facial burns. He was kept in the hyperbaric chamber overnight and released the following day. He had gone by elevator to the basement to get a portable fire extinguisher, after having investigated the fire. Along the way he had taken in a good deal of smoke. When returning from the basement, the elevator stopped on the second floor. He staggered into the hallway, and was assisted into apartment 2E by occupants who were returning to their apartments after having tried to escape down the stairwell but finding it full of smoke. The superintendent apparently did not remember much of what happened after entering the elevator until he was outside the building.
- A second tenant, a 27-year-old male in apartment 6A, was removed by firefighters and transported to the hospital where he was treated for chest pains. He was released the following day.

An unknown number of building occupants were treated at the scene for smoke inhalation. None required hospital treatment.

Firefighters -- Five fire service personnel were injured. One was admitted to the hospital for smoke inhalation and exhaustion; he was released the following day. Three required outpatient hospital treatment for smoke inhalation and/or minor burns to the ears and neck and lacerations. One off-duty lieutenant who joined the firefighting slipped in the street and fell into an open manhole, injuring a leg and an arm. An additional four firefighters who had come in contact with body fluids or who administered mouth-to-mouth resuscitation were checked by medical personnel at the scene and released. (The Fire Department now keeps records of such contacts.)

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

Fire damage was confined to the first floor office and lobby areas. There was no damage to structural components due to the building's sound construction and effective firefighting techniques. The partition walls in the office complex that had been covered by wood paneling were severely damaged as were the dropped ceilings and door components. The pre-finished wood paneling was composed of highly combustible smoke-generating materials and contributed to the tremendous amount of heat and smoke present in the first stages the fire.

Smoke damage was heavy throughout the entire structure, especially in public areas.

The individual apartment entrance doors, having multiple locks, were subjected to considerable damage when fire fighters had to force them open for search and rescue.

Dollar loss to the structure was extensive; the actual loss figure was not available at the time of this report.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. **Codes for Existing Buildings** - Regardless of when they were constructed, multiple occupancy residential buildings should be subjected

to current fire codes regarding minimum installation of fire protection equipment. This building's fire experience is testimony to the urgent need for such equipment. A simple set of panic hardware on the doors to the roof would probably have prevented two deaths. Smoke detectors in the doctors' offices hooked to an alarm system would have detected the fire earlier. Whether or not required by codes, building owners should have enough sense of responsibility to provide at least a modicum of protection to their buildings.

2. **Code Enforcement** - Fire department inspection programs must be ongoing, thorough, and effective. This may require increasing the authority and resources available to inspectors when repeated violations of codes are encountered. The propping open of doors to the stairways contributed to all four deaths here and had been cited in previous inspections. Penalties for propped open doors are rarely significant enough or immediate enough to have impact on building operators and owners. In some countries, the owners and operators would be subject to jail terms if negligence in allowing propped open doors was proven.

3. **Fire Safety Education** - Owners and occupants of residential buildings must be made aware of the need not to circumvent the building's fire defenses, such as by opening doors at the bottom of stairwells and opening doors from corridors into the stairwells. Information must be provided and posted in appropriate areas within such buildings explaining steps to take in case of fire or other emergencies. City-wide public education of apartment residents explaining what to do in the event of a fire would help, too. In New York City, WCBS-TV has run excellent programs showing what to do in a fire. All four fatalities might have been prevented if the victims had seen and heeded the message to quickly close your door if you find smoke in the corridor.

4. **Building Operator Training** - Building personnel made several basic mistakes that may well have contributed to the damages and could have caused their own deaths. Building operators need fire safety training to protect themselves and the people who depend on them.

In this fire, for example,

- the building personnel did not immediately report the fire.
- they did not close the door to the office suite with the fire, thereby letting the smoke escape.
- the superintendant apparently did not realize he should not use an elevator in a fire nor how fast a fire can grow. He went to fetch an extinguisher using the elevator and was overcome by smoke by the time he returned again on the elevator.
- building personnel either allowed the stairway doors to be propped open or propped them open themselves.

5. Mail Chutes - Many old high-rise buildings have mail chutes, that are one continuous channel with open slots at each floor. These can be a channel for smoke transport between floors, especially when they have glass components that can break in a fire, as happened here. They need to be removed or improved with more fire-safe components.

6. Fire Department Manpower and Leadership - The Fire Department of New York demonstrated once again why adequate levels of well-trained manpower and good leadership can be so important in preventing a disaster. By getting large numbers of personnel to the scene quickly, the Department was able to evacuate 50 people by ladder and search the building for victims while the fire fighting attack stopped the spread of the fire and extinguished it. New York City has had an exceedingly good record in fighting high-rise fires.

7. Escape or Seek Refuge - In this particular fire it was not clear for a long time during the incident whether people should stay in their apartments or attempt to escape via ladders and fire escapes. The fire situation and the smoke situation were both uncertain, and the smoke

throughout the building appeared highly ominous. The spaces under doors meant that smoke might enter every apartment, especially if windows were open, unless the doorways were stopped up by the residents -- and not all of the residents did that. The Fire Department made an appropriate decision to get the people out while the smoke situation was uncertain. Later, when the danger seemed less, they went through the building and told people to stay in their apartments. There also was concern about stopping "jumpers."

8. **Desirability of Better Smoke Information** - Most current commercial smoke and fire detection systems do not show whether apartment units (as opposed to public areas) have been infiltrated with smoke. This fire was a case where it would have been useful to have detection systems that indicated the presence of smoke within individual apartment units, to aid in decisions about rescue operations.

Appendices

- A. New York Fire Report
- B. Statement of Katryna O'Neill (witness)
- C. Floor Plan of First Floor
- D. Floor Plan of Second through Ninth Floors
- E. Floor Plan of Tenth Floor and Roof
- F. Copy of Dwelling Law Regulating Existing Structures
- G. Medical Officer Field Record
- H. Fire Department Fatality Reports
- I. Units Used at the Fire
- J. Fire Department Dispatch Log
- K. List of Photographs and Slides



BUREAU OF FIRE INVESTIGATION
FIRE REPORT

Incident Number	177-1001-1000
Incident Date	1/11/88
Incident City	Manhattan

APPENDIX A

Page 1 of 1
F.E. Case No.

Date Reported	1/11/88	Unit Reporting	Manhattan Base	Location	135 East 50th Street, Manhattan, N.Y.			
Time U.S.	2017 (1/11/88)	Received	2045	1/11/88	Inspected	2045	1/11/88	
Name	N/A	Address	17th St	Box	858	Room	N/A	
Weather	Clear, cold	Monday	Street	10	Material	Brick	Rooms per floor	15
Class of Occupancy	Multiple dwelling	Owner	Sylvia Handler	Occupied by	Dr. Patricia Saunders	Occupation	Psychologist	
Insurance	Insurance Building	Insurance Co.		Insurance Contents				
Occupant Present?	Residing Office	Reason	2nd Floor	Code				
Fire Cause	NO	Structure	NO	Building				
Disposition	NO	Disposition	NO	Disposition				
Time of Arrival at Premises	1/11/88	Time	2100	Origin and Extension	rear office, hallway, waiting room, west & east stairwell entrances			
Name of Fire Marshal Assigned	William Gaultman	Flu-Exits	4	Flu-Exits	13			
Equipment Involved	Form of Heat Ignited	Type Material Ignited	Form Material Ignited					
Ignition Factor	Area Fire Origin	Mobile Property Inv.	Items Involved					

ORIGIN DETAILS:

Examination showed and investigation disclosed that the fire originated on the first floor of the subject premise, in the north rear office, adjacent to the east wall in a combustible material (sofa upholstery). Fire extended vertically to the east wall and ceiling next to and directly above the point of origin, via direct flame impingement, to combustible material (wall paneling and drop ceiling). Fire extended horizontally to the floor, all four walls and ceiling throughout the entire office. Fire extended via horizontal void (open doorway) to the ceiling of the main entrance hallway and further extended horizontally to west and east corridors leading to west and east stairwells. Fire further extended horizontally west to the first floor stairwell. Fire further extended horizontally east to adjacent office and was confined thereto and extinguished.

Investigator Assigned	William Gaultman #92	File Number	839249	Investigator Assigned	E.M. Al. Nollig
Reporting Fire Unit	Manhattan Base	Reporting Fire Unit	Manhattan Base	Reporting Fire Unit	Manhattan Base
Fire Marshal	William Gaultman	Fire Marshal	Robert Norkle	Fire Marshal	William Gaultman

11-102-2107-0-01 58 18 1254

COMPLAINANT FOLLOW UP INFORMATION		INTERVIEW SHEET				FACT	OR	TRIAL
Location of the 135 East 50 Street		Pat 17	Complaint No.	Date of this Report 1-12-88				
FD Job No. 305	Unit Reporting BUREAU OF CRIME INVESTIGATION	Branch MAN	C.R. No. 6	ID Case No.				
Unit 2019	Date 1-11-88	Report 2030	Date 1-11-88	Report 2040	Date 1-11-88			

DETAILS:

SFM Knoblich conducted the following interview via telephone at 0120 hours on 1-12-88

Katryna Oneill, F/W DOB: 10-23-62
1103 Washington Street
Hoboken, New Jersey
Phone # 201-653-4225

Ms. Oneill states that sometime around *:30 PM, 1-11-88 she entered the waiting area of the bldg. just inside the lobby. She smelled smoke right away, and looked around to find where it was coming from. She saw smoke coming from under the door directly in front of her, (straight back from the lobby entrance.) At this time she noticed a few people behind her, one of whom she believes to be the super. He was on the tall side, and thinnish around 30-40 years of age, with some kind of foreign accent/


She touched the door, and it felt hot. She told the super that there was a fire and that the door was hot, and that he should call the Fire Dept. he said "No, I'll care of it." She told him not to open the door because it was hot, and she went to a pay phone out side the waiting area, and dialed 911 to report the fire. The smoke was getting heavy in the bldg., because when the 911 operator asked her for the number of the phone she was calling from, she had trouble seeing the numbers on the phone.

She then returned to the waiting area, and saw that the door to the fire room was open, and someone was inside trying to stamp out the fire, in the right rear of the room as you face it. She could not tell who was in the fire room, but assumes it was the super. While she was on the phone with 911, she was out of sight of the fire room, and does not know how the door was opened, or who opened it.

She then banged on a few doors, and then left the bldg., to await the arrival of the Fire Dept. She told arriving units that a man was in the fire room when she had left the bldg.

She had no further information, and stated that she did not really know any of the people in the bldg; and had only been there a few times prior to the fire:"


MA COPY




FIRST FLOOR PLAN
NOT TO SCALE

EDM: BT.

1525 24 88 5



152 3-4-84



Miscellaneous Application Provisions §14

2. It shall be unlawful to keep any horse, cow, calf, swine, rabbit, sheep, goat, chicken or duck, or any pigeon except Antwerp or homing pigeons. In or on any multiple dwelling or on the lot or premises thereof unless permitted by and in accordance with local law or regulation.

3. It shall be unlawful to use any multiple dwelling or any part of the lot or premises thereof for the keeping, storing or handling of any combustible article or any article dangerous or detrimental to life or health, unless a permit is obtained for such use in conformity with provisions prescribed by local law, and where such local law does not exist, in conformity with provisions prescribed by the fire department.

*(As amended L. 1969, ch. 1063, sec. 6, effective on the 30th day after May 26, 1969, L. 1969 omitted paragraphs a-c and added "any combustible article *** the fire department.")*

Sec. 13. Application of chapter to existing dwellings.

Any building erected and occupied on or before April eighteenth, nineteen hundred twenty-nine, or thereafter, as a tenement, which is not recorded as such in the department, shall be required to comply with all the provisions governing dwellings of like class or kind erected after such date. Except as otherwise expressly required in this section and in sections nine and twenty-five, subdivision six of section thirty-one, and sections thirty-three, sixty-six and sixty-seven and in articles six and seven, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to require any Change in the construction, use or occupancy of any multiple dwelling lawfully occupied as such on April eighteenth, nineteen hundred twenty-nine, under the provisions of all local laws, ordinances, rules and regulations applicable thereto on such date; but should the occupancy of any such dwelling be changed to any other kind or class after such date, such dwelling shall be required to comply with the provisions of section nine.

(As amended by L. 1960, ch. 865; approved by the Governor April 25, 1960, in effect July 1, 1960.)

See Legislative Note which appears at the end of the amendment to section 4, subd.18.)

Sec. 14. Application of chapter to uncompleted dwellings,

1. The provisions of this chapter relating to multiple dwellings erected after April eighteenth, nineteen hundred twenty-nine, shall

THE NEW YORK STATE MULTIPLE DWELLING LAW BOOK I



1987-1988

GOULD PUBLICATIONS
199/300 STATE STREET
BINGHAMTON, N.Y. 13901-2782

MD-120 (Revised 12/24/76)

Medical Officer: Dr. MILLER

Driver/Clerk: R. PETER

Destination: 111881 to 0600 U.S. 111881

(Central Base: Manhattan)
(For DTG USE ONLY)

Page: 1 of 2

ICM-104 SERIAL	TIME OF ALARM	RESPONDING ENEMY NAME/BATT	INJURED MEMBER			PRELIMINARY DIAGNOSIS	APPROVED TO: DTG BASE	SIC LEAVE	INC. TIME		DATE NOTIFY	TIME ARRIVE	TIME DEPT.	BORG
			LAST NAME	FIRST INITIAL	UNIT				AGE	V				
485			BESIGNANO	T.	F1	L 28	28	28				0940	0940	
58	2019	OFF	HINE	R.	F1	L 40	40	40				2345	2345	
6	"	Duty	HAMILTON	B.	L1	E 46	46	43			Y	2:00	2:00	2355
7	"	"	TURBEE	M.	F1	E 31	31	31				"	"	"
8	"	"	COTTON	J.	F1	E 31	31	31				"	"	"
9	"	"	WILSON	T.	F1	E 32	32	32				2:45	2:45	2355
10	"	"	BOLGONIS	E.	F1	L 41	41	41				"	"	"
11	"	"	OPFER	E.	F1	L 32	32	32				"	"	"
12	"	"	MOPKINS	J.	F1	L 27	27	27			Y	"	"	"
13	"	"	SPILLMUE	J.	L1	L 30	30	30			Y	"	"	"
14	1715		GRAVES	R.	F1	L 20	20	20						
15	2059		VOLPE	R.	F1	L 14	14	14						

11/13
11/13

BUREAU OF FIRE INVESTIGATION
 REPORT OF 10-45 - 1

LOCATION OF FIRE 135 E 50 St BORO MAN CASE NO. _____
 DATE 1/11/88 DAY MON TIME 2019 SIGNAL 55-858 COMPANY DISTRICT 6-2
 WHERE FIRE ORIGINATED 1st Floor Rear
 CAUSE OF FIRE _____

NAME OF 10-45 Andrew Schneider
 DATE OF BIRTH _____ AGE 37 SEX _____ RACE White
 ADDRESS 135 E 50 St BORO MAN
 NATURE OF INJURIES SMOKE INHALATION + 3rd Burns
 REMOVED TO HOSPITAL? YES NAME OF HOSPITAL Cornell Burn Center NY Hosp.
 IF 10-45-1, DATE OF DEATH 1/11/88
 CAUSE OF DEATH Smoke Inhalation + Burns DOCTOR _____
 IF 10-45-2,3, EXTENT OF INJURIES _____

FIRE MARSHAL'S SIGNATURE _____

FOR CODE 2 OR 3

DATE CONDITION

DATE FINAL DISPOSITION

R-31 884

SIGNATURE _____

BUREAU OF FIRE INVESTIGATION
 REPORT OF 10-45 - 1

LOCATION OF FIRE 135 E 50th St BORO MAN CASE NO. _____
 DATE 1/11/88 DAY MON TIME 2019 SIGNAL 55-858 COMPANY DISTRICT 6-2
 WHERE FIRE ORIGINATED 1st Floor Rear
 CAUSE OF FIRE _____

NAME OF 10-45 Fabulous DePaul #7018
 DATE OF BIRTH 3-27-55 AGE 32 SEX M RACE Black
 ADDRESS 135 E 50th St BORO Manhattan
 NATURE OF INJURIES Smoke Inhalation
 REMOVED TO HOSPITAL? NO NAME OF HOSPITAL _____
 IF 10-45-1, DATE OF DEATH Smoke Inhalation 1-11-88
 CAUSE OF DEATH Smoke Inhalation DOCTOR _____
 IF 10-45-2,3, EXTENT OF INJURIES _____

FIRE MARSHAL'S SIGNATURE _____

FOR CODE 2 OR 3

DATE CONDITION

DATE FINAL DISPOSITION

R-31 884

SIGNATURE _____

BUREAU OF FIRE INVESTIGATION
 REPORT OF 10-45- 1

LOCATION OF FIRE 135 E 50th BORO _____ CASE NO. _____
 DATE 1/11/84 DAY MON TIME 3:19 SIGNAL 55-PSK COMPANY DISTRICT L-2
 WHERE FIRE ORIGINATED 1st Floor Room
 CAUSE OF FIRE _____
 NAME OF 10-45 Tanet DORNSHIDOFF
 DATE OF BIRTH _____ AGE _____ SEX F RACE White
 ADDRESS 135 E 50th BORO Manhattan
 NATURE OF INJURIES Smoke Inhalation
 REMOVED TO HOSPITAL? NO NAME OF HOSPITAL _____
 IF 10-45-1, DATE OF DEATH 1-11-84
 CAUSE OF DEATH Smoke Inhalation DOCTOR _____
 IF 10-45-1-1, EXTENT OF INJURIES _____

FIRE MARSHAL'S SIGNATURE _____

FOR CODE 1 OR 3

ATE CONDITION

DATE FINAL DISPOSITION

R-131 (8/84) SIGNATURE _____

BUREAU OF FIRE INVESTIGATION
 REPORT OF 10-45- 1

LOCATION OF FIRE 135 E 50th BORO MAN CASE NO. _____
 DATE 1/11/84 DAY MON TIME 3:19 SIGNAL 55-PSK COMPANY DISTRICT L-2
 WHERE FIRE ORIGINATED 1st Floor Room
 CAUSE OF FIRE _____
 NAME OF 10-45 ALICE SCHWARTZ
 DATE OF BIRTH _____ AGE _____ SEX F RACE White
 ADDRESS _____ BORO Manhattan
 NATURE OF INJURIES Smoke Inhalation
 REMOVED TO HOSPITAL? NO NAME OF HOSPITAL _____
 IF 10-45-1, DATE OF DEATH 1/11/84
 CAUSE OF DEATH Smoke Inhalation DOCTOR _____
 IF 10-45-1-1, EXTENT OF INJURIES _____

FIRE MARSHAL'S SIGNATURE _____

FOR CODE 1 OR 3

--- CONDITION

UNITS USED AT THE FIRE

Equipment:

22 Engines

11 Ladder Trucks

2 Heavy Rescue Units

1 Satellite Unit C (High Volume Pumper)

1 Search Light Unit

1 Mask Service Unit

200 Personnel (approximately)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
 DATE: 10/15/54
 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

NO.	DESCRIPTION	DATE	INITIALS	REMARKS
101001	AGENTS GUY	10/15/54		
101002	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101003	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101004	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101005	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101006	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101007	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
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101097	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101098	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101099	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		
101100	UNIT ASSIGNED	10/15/54		

UNIT	DESCRIPTION	DATE	TIME	LOCATION	STATUS
20 1501	UNIT 1501	10/15/81	10:15	1501	ASSIGNED
20 1502	UNIT 1502	10/15/81	10:15	1502	ASSIGNED
20 1503	UNIT 1503	10/15/81	10:15	1503	ASSIGNED
20 1504	UNIT 1504	10/15/81	10:15	1504	ASSIGNED
20 1505	UNIT 1505	10/15/81	10:15	1505	ASSIGNED
20 1506	UNIT 1506	10/15/81	10:15	1506	ASSIGNED
20 1507	UNIT 1507	10/15/81	10:15	1507	ASSIGNED
20 1508	UNIT 1508	10/15/81	10:15	1508	ASSIGNED
20 1509	UNIT 1509	10/15/81	10:15	1509	ASSIGNED
20 1510	UNIT 1510	10/15/81	10:15	1510	ASSIGNED
20 1511	UNIT 1511	10/15/81	10:15	1511	ASSIGNED
20 1512	UNIT 1512	10/15/81	10:15	1512	ASSIGNED
20 1513	UNIT 1513	10/15/81	10:15	1513	ASSIGNED
20 1514	UNIT 1514	10/15/81	10:15	1514	ASSIGNED
20 1515	UNIT 1515	10/15/81	10:15	1515	ASSIGNED
20 1516	UNIT 1516	10/15/81	10:15	1516	ASSIGNED
20 1517	UNIT 1517	10/15/81	10:15	1517	ASSIGNED
20 1518	UNIT 1518	10/15/81	10:15	1518	ASSIGNED
20 1519	UNIT 1519	10/15/81	10:15	1519	ASSIGNED
20 1520	UNIT 1520	10/15/81	10:15	1520	ASSIGNED
20 1521	UNIT 1521	10/15/81	10:15	1521	ASSIGNED
20 1522	UNIT 1522	10/15/81	10:15	1522	ASSIGNED
20 1523	UNIT 1523	10/15/81	10:15	1523	ASSIGNED
20 1524	UNIT 1524	10/15/81	10:15	1524	ASSIGNED
20 1525	UNIT 1525	10/15/81	10:15	1525	ASSIGNED
20 1526	UNIT 1526	10/15/81	10:15	1526	ASSIGNED
20 1527	UNIT 1527	10/15/81	10:15	1527	ASSIGNED
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20 1540	UNIT 1540	10/15/81	10:15	1540	ASSIGNED
20 1541	UNIT 1541	10/15/81	10:15	1541	ASSIGNED
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20 1547	UNIT 1547	10/15/81	10:15	1547	ASSIGNED
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20 1595	UNIT 1595	10/15/81	10:15	1595	ASSIGNED
20 1596	UNIT 1596	10/15/81	10:15	1596	ASSIGNED
20 1597	UNIT 1597	10/15/81	10:15	1597	ASSIGNED
20 1598	UNIT 1598	10/15/81	10:15	1598	ASSIGNED
20 1599	UNIT 1599	10/15/81	10:15	1599	ASSIGNED
20 1600	UNIT 1600	10/15/81	10:15	1600	ASSIGNED

204917	UNIT ASSIGNED	UNIT ASSIGNED	UNIT ASSIGNED
204918	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO
204919	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO
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204949	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO
204950	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO
204951	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO
204952	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO	UNIT MADE TO

UNIT MADE TO: INVESTIGATION TIR-403-100

TIME	UNIT	LOCATION	STATUS	REMARKS
210918	6024
210942	6023
211127	6025
211346	6026
211336	6131
211413	6026
211418	6027
211422	6028
211423	6029
211427	6030
211427	6031
211441	6032
211443	6033
211444	6034
211445	6035
211447	6036
211450	6037
211453	6038
211514	6039
211649
211724	6040
211812
211804
211904
211921
211923
212031
212141
212143	6046
212143	6045
212123	6104
212133	6042
212136
212136	6050
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212139	6197
212139	6198
212139	6199
212139	6200

LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS AND SLIDES

Photographs

1. Front of building and one story foyer.
2. Firefighters removing occupant from front of building.
3. Front of building showing windows where victims were removed by firefighters.
4. Doorway to roof on west side of building. Note slide bolt broken off (2 bodies found at base of door).
5. West corridor damage in office area.
6. Office on first floor; note pre-finished paneling on walls and bars on windows.
7. Fire damage to rear office unit.
8. Fire damage to corridor in office area.
9. Mail chute on upper floor.
10. Fire damage to lobby area; note elevator door.
11. Entrance to floor from stairwell B. Note heavy smoke damage.
12. Occupant being tended by fire service personnel.
13. Typical corridor on upper floor. Note smoke damage.

14. Landing to roof exit where two bodies were found.
15. Doorway of stairwell A from lobby and telephone location.
16. Office #103, room of fire origin.
17. Point of origin in Room 103 - east wall.
18. Standpipe system and hose rack in stairwell A.
19. Typical window on rear of building; note folding security gate.
20. Security grate from typical apartment unit on rear of building.
21. Roof exit door from 10th floor. Note sliding bolt and heavy smoke damage.
22. Apartment entrance doors located off stairwell B.
23. Looking down from roof area to front of building on 50th street.
24. Variety of locks on typical apartment door.
25. Newly installed panic hardware, after fire event.
26. Entrance from roof onto fire escape.
27. Looking down from roof on rear of building, showing fire escape location,
28. Floor plan shown on elevator door on upper floor.
29. Waiting room doors which had melted.
30. Half-inch gap at bottom of apartment doors.

Slides (in master copy at USFA)

1. Windows in stairwell.
2. Parapet wall around roof area.
3. Entrance doors into lobby from 50th Street,
4. Fire damage to ceiling in lobby area. Note the relative good condition.
5. Apartment entrance doors into stairwell B.
6. Entrance door onto roof, west side of building. Two bodies found on the landing.
7. Mail chute and box In lobby area; note broken glass in chute,
8. Rooftop apartment units in rear of building showing windows.



OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT



OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT



OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT



OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT



OFFICIAL - PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT



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OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT



OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT




OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT




OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPH - NEW YORK FIRE DEPARTMENT



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
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


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IN CASE OF FIRE
USE STAIRS UNLESS
OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED



△ TOWARDS WHERE YOU ARE



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