

United States Fire Administration



Technical Report Series

Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse Fire Dayton, Ohio

**With Supplement on
Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire
Basel, Switzerland**



Federal Emergency Management Agency



**United States Fire Administration
National Fire Data Center**

**Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse Fire
Dayton, Ohio
(May 27, 1987)**

**With Supplement on
Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire
Basel, Switzerland**

**Investigated by: Tom D. Copeland
Philip Schaenman**

This is Report 009 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.



Federal Emergency Management Agency



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SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues	Comments
Cause	Spark from lift truck ignited spilled contents of cans.
Industrial Firefighting	Ineffective; could not stop initial fire.
Sprinkler Systems-	Overwhelmed in warehouse. Helped save office building adjoining warehouse. Question whether standard is adequate for this occupancy.
Fire Wall	Failed.
Incident Command	Highly effective. Quick, appropriate decision by first arriving district chief not to let crews in close. Courageous decision by Chief Glenn Alexander not to vigorously attack fire with water precluded environmental disaster to aquifer and city water supply.
Insurance	To be paid despite decision not to extinguish.
Municipal Liability	None apparent in this case but cannot generalize.
Pre-fire Plan	Did not address threat to aquifer.

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES (cont'd)

I s s u e s

Comments

Environmental Pollution	Apparently little to none. Tradeoff of air versus water pollution considered early, unlike Swiss Sandoz fire. Air and water experts on the scene early.
Firefighter Safety	A major factor in decision not to fight in close. Only one firefighter slightly injured in four-day fire.
Employee Safety	Difficulty in accounting for employees who escaped. Only one employee seriously injured.

SHERWIN-WILLIAMS PAINT WAREHOUSE FIRE

Dayton, Ohio, May 27, 1987

INVESTIGATED BY: Tom D. Copeland

**LOCAL CONTACTS: Chief Glenn Alexander
District Chief Paul Hemmeter
District Chief Gary Douglas
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Dayton Fire Department
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Dayton, Ohio 45402
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Mark Chubb, Plans Examiner
Douglas Hall, Water Department**

OVERVIEW

The Dayton, Ohio Fire Department avoided a double disaster by not attempting to extinguish a massive fire in a paint warehouse. The fire started on May 27, 1987, and completely destroyed the Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse. The dollar loss was \$32 million, but only one employee was seriously injured and one fire fighter sprained his leg. The noncombustible, sprinklered warehouse contained over 1.5 million gallons of paints and other products and was located over the aquifer from which wells provided the water supply for about one-third of the area's 400,000 people. Uncontained water and chemical run-off from firefighting could have contaminated this water supply and caused a greater loss than the fire itself, as occurred in Switzerland after the Sandoz chemical warehouse fire in 1986 contaminated the Rhine.

THE FACILITY

The Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse was a large one-story building with an attached office building. An adjoining roofed-over area was used for drum storage. Trailers, some loaded, were located at the docks and within the fenced-in area of the facility. Direct exposure to properties outside the storage complex was minimal. (For a diagram of the site see Figure 1 in Appendix B.)

The main building's outside walls were of "tilt-up" concrete construction with a fire division wall of similar construction dividing the warehouse into two areas. The roof was supported by unprotected steel bar joists and columns. The facility was built in 1977 and contained about 190,000 sq. ft. with walls about 33 ft. high.

The building had a sprinkler system and diesel fire pump; The 2,500 gpm fire pump was located in a small detached building. Fire department connections to supplement the system were located on the warehouse side of the pumphouse.

The pump was supplied by a 12" line connected to a 16" public water main. The pump supplied a 10" loop around the site with connections to various sprinkler risers, external exposure sprinklers along the outside wall at the drum storage, fixed monitors for the drum storage area, and private hydrants. Water flow alarms were monitored by a central station. The ceiling sprinklers had a reported design density of 0.32 gpm per sq. ft. over 4,000 sq. ft.

The warehouse contained over 1.5 million gallons of paints and related flammable liquids mostly in small containers up to 5 gallon sizes. There was-also considerable storage of aerosol cans. Drums were store outside under the canopy area. Trailers contained additional products. The warehouse had extensive rack type storage, up to four tiers of pallets high. Approximately 30 employees were working at the time of the fire.

THE WATER SYSTEM

The public water supply for Dayton, Ohio and surrounding areas is drawn partly from an aquifer over which the Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse was built. The warehouse was within a major well field with wells on and adjacent to the site. (See Appendix D for map of wells.)

Chemicals can migrate down from the surface and contaminate the water. This was a concern when the industrial park where the warehouse was located was first developed. No detailed plans had been made by the fire department to deal with a threat to the water supply, although the threat was anticipated and discussed several years before the fire.

THE FIRE

During the evening of May 27, 1987, a workman using a motorized lift truck accidentally knocked over and spilled several cans of flammable liquid in the east portion of the warehouse. The liquid probably was ignited by a spark from the electric motor of the truck. The lift truck operator received serious burns and was helped by other employees to put out his flames and escape. The employees quickly decided that the fire was beyond their ability to extinguish, and all evacuated without further injuries. They credited company training for knowing what to do.

The Dayton Fire Department received the alarm automatically from the fire alarm central station when the plant's sprinklers activated, along with many calls from the public and employees. Three engines, one truck, and a district chief were dispatched at 2107. While responding, the district chief quickly decided to request a second alarm at 2108. This resulted in four additional engines, two additional trucks, and another district chief. The first engine on the scene reported complete building involvement at 2113. The first-in district chief requested a third alarm as he arrived on the scene at 2114.

A total of 84 Fire Department personnel responded with ten engines, five trucks, and twelve other vehicles. Most of the equipment was staged and not actually used.

The fire was through the roof, and the east half of the warehouse was totally involved when the first units arrived. Aerosol cans were raining on the crews and hurtling for distances. The initial concerns were for protecting the drum storage, office, and other exposures, and for fire fighter safety. The district chief quickly decided not to let his fire

fighters hook up to the sprinkler supply of the pumphouse, which was close to the wall of the warehouse and exposed to intense heat, danger from exploding and the hurtling cans, and the threat of a wall collapse. Also, it was thought that the sprinkler system was probably compromised already. The initial attack was directed at the office, drum storage, and loaded trailers in the docking and parking areas.

The fire spread past the fire wall and was involving the west half of the warehouse before plans could be implemented to cut the fire off at the wall. At 2132, the dispatcher was advised that the building would be a total loss. (The fire ultimately did destroy the main warehouse, and 17 trailers also were heavily or totally damaged. The office, its records, and the outdoor drum storage were saved.)

The warehouse sprinkler system was overwhelmed almost immediately and had little impact on the main fire. Water was observed discharging from broken sprinkler piping early in the fire. Sprinklers did apparently contribute to saving the office building. The fire pump supplying the sprinklers was manually shut down at about 2235 or 2245.

Automatically-opening plastic vents almost directly over the incipient fire operated early and may have released heat that otherwise would have built up quickly and caused more sprinkler heads to go off, suggested Dayton Chief Glenn Alexander. In any event, the sprinkler system design was not adequate for controlling this fire.

Chief Alexander assumed incident command early on and ordered that no water be applied to the fire in the warehouse. Water was to be used only to protect exposures and to extinguish fires where the run off could be monitored on paved areas. Because of his concern about the water supply well field, Chief Alexander called the director of the water department prior to responding and requested the director to meet him at the scene.

The contents of the warehouse, the problem of air pollution versus water pollution, and other conditions were considered. In addition to local water authorities, state air and water pollution experts were on the scene the first day. It was agreed that it would be best not to increase

the threat to the water system by applying water to the warehouse fire. The smoke was not causing a direct life safety exposure and was described as being similar in hazard to diesel exhaust.

Douglas Hall, Environmental Protection Manager for the Dayton Water Department, said the early decision not to put water on this fire was clear cut. The decision was made easier due to the knowledge that there were no highly toxic materials present and no residential areas close-by. If it had not been for the threat to the underground water supply, they probably would have recommended applying water to the fire and controlling runoff. Although the fire department avoided applying much water to the warehouse itself, the sprinkler system 2,500 gpm fire pump did operate for a while and there also was runoff from the initial attack. Thus some contaminated water reached the nearby Miami River. On day one of the fire, paint solvents were skimmed and pumped from the river. A water containment dike was, started on the fourth day of the fire in preparation for the final extinguishment operation. Since the fire, numerous test and recovery wells have been dug. There is some ground contamination, but the contamination apparently is being managed and has not yet affected the water supply.

The fire was reported contained at 0012 hours on May 28, 1987 but not under control until 1004 hours on June 2, 1987, almost six days after it started.

CODE COMPLIANCE

The warehouse was in compliance with the Ohio Building Code, as best could be determined. That code allowed unlimited space in the warehouse so long as it was fully sprinklered. No performance standards or guidelines are provided in the code as to what constitutes adequate sprinklering for such a facility.

There is some question as to what would be the most cost-effective fire protection design that would comply with the code for a warehouse such as this, full of highly flammable liquids.

One alternative is to subdivide the building into many compartments, each with a high flow sprinkler system -- practically like preparing to flood a magazine compartment on a ship. Another is to build large open spaces with few fire walls, lower flow sprinkler system that may handle some fires (such as cardboard cartons igniting or a small spill) but not one such as occurred. A third approach -- not in compliance with most codes -- build a lightweight, "disposable" building or shed (such as was involved in the Swiss Sandoz chemical warehouse fire discussed in the supplement) but built in a safe, remote environment (unlike the Sandoz fire) where it could be allowed to burn. Containment ponds and dams can be built-in to catch water runoff if water pollution could be a problem. Further fire protection studies are needed to examine the various other options for such warehouses.

LIABILITY

Was the fire department exposed to liability suits by deciding not to extinguish the fire? Do insurance companies have to pay insurance in these cases? In this case, the answers were largely moot because the building was judged to be on its way to becoming a total loss when the decision was made, and the insurance company tentatively agreed to pay the loss without protest. Here is a synopsis of the liability situation, but this is no substitute for seeking legal advice for your own area.

1. The fire department has very broad rights to take action in an emergency. It even can destroy property to save other property; for example, during the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, rows of buildings were dynamited to provide a fire break to stop the fire. The owners, however, can seek indemnification from the city for destroying their property. The insurance company also can sue.
2. The fire department and the city can be liable for negligence (unreasonable actions) unless state statutes limit that liability or unless the cities have "sovereign immunity." Most states no longer recognize the latter. States vary in their liability laws. Liability questions need to be answered state by state.

3. Most states have laws that limit the liability of a fire department for negligence or poor judgment. The limit may be zero as in California. In Minnesota, it is \$300,000 or the limit of negligence insurance it carries, whichever is greater.

4. If a fire department decides to let a building burn that could have been saved in order to protect a greater loss to the community, they could be sued by any party -- the property owner, insurance company, public, etc. if found negligent, then 2) applies. If not, they are home free -- except for legal expenses.

5. The insurance company usually has to pay for the loss regardless of the fire department actions. Although the insurance company reasonably expects the fire department to fight a fire if their insured property burned, it is their hard luck if the fire department does not fight the fire. However, knowing this possibility exists may cause premiums to go up for properties that could cause pollution if they burn. Also, the insurance company might claim that the building owner did not reveal all hazards, and try to hold back a part or much of the insurance, or delay payment.

6. The insurance company might have to pay for environmental damage up to the limit of the policy as part of fire losses. It depends on the details of the policy and or the details of the situation.

7. This is all on the edge of a new area legally, environmentally, ethically, and from fire fighting points of view. It needs further exploration. Fire departments should discuss the issue with local city attorneys. The fire department, while it generally appears to be safe, may fall into some loophole or have an adverse interpretation of the law in light of the new circumstances.

LESSONS LEARNED

1: **Risk Management** -- The most important lesson learned because of this fire is not simply that some fires should be allowed to burn but that the consequences of all actions and "inactions" must be knowledgeably Considered.

Chief Alexander describes today's fire chiefs as "risk managers." This is a good application of the term and broadens a chief's role and responsibility. Risk management of such fires as this involves the consideration of:

- Characteristics of materials and chemicals involved,
- Air versus water pollution,
- Wind and weather conditions,
- Capability to extinguish or control the fire,
- Ability to contain run-off,
- Short-term versus delayed hazards,
- Life safety and property exposure, and
- Evacuation problems.

2 . **Water Pollution** -- In this fire, the decision not to apply water to the warehouse fire resulted in far less contamination to the ground water and little if any difference in property loss. State and local air and water pollution experts were brought to the scene early to consult. The Swiss Sandoz chemical plant fire, which polluted the Rhine, demonstrated what can happen when water run off is not considered. (A summary of that fire is presented below.) However, it may not always be possible to allow such fires to burn when there is a high exposure hazard or an air pollution problem. Applying water to avoid a fire or air pollution catastrophe may be the lesser evil at times; it depends on the situation. Containment of water runoff should be a consideration both in pre-fire planning and in planning fire protection systems for a structure or complex which has significant amounts of hazardous materials.

3 . **Insurance and Law Suits** -- According to Chief Alexander, the insurance company for the warehouse said it will not sue the Fire Department for not applying water to extinguish the warehouse fire. A key factor here was that the warehouse building was essentially a total loss at the time the decision to stop applying water was made by the Chief. If the building could have been saved, the same finding might not have been made.

The liability of the city might have been much greater if the water supply had been damaged, let alone the adverse local and national publicity that would surely have ensued. Nevertheless, fire departments that plan ahead of time to let a fire burn because of environmental considerations should one occur on a particular property need to discuss that possibility beforehand with the city attorney and the property owner as part of pre-fire planning.

4. **Sprinkler Systems** -- Two important fire safety features provided in this warehouse failed: the sprinkler system and the fire wall. Apparently, the sprinkler system was quickly overwhelmed and could not provide the necessary water density. This may have been affected by the venting system releasing heat directly above the incipient fire and stopping heat build-up that might have triggered other heads quickly. The system was considered in compliance with current standards and the Ohio codes; Chief Alexander has called for a reexamination of the standards for such high-risk occupancies.

Turning off the fire pump and then the water supply to the warehouse was a calculated risk primarily in regard to the office area. The warehouse was not being affected by the sprinkler system, but the office area had been saved to that point by several heads that operated. It was felt that the threat to the aquifer outweighed the potential loss of the office building. However, after the fire, the office building was found to have received very little damage.

5. **Fire Wall** -- The fire wall did not withstand the rapid fire build-up and intense exposure. A hole developed in it. Chief Alexander stated that the fire doors in the fire wall did close except in one case where only a door on one side of the wall closed. The opposite door was jammed by debris. The opening was protected by the door from one side. Again, standards for fire walls in such high-risk facilities need to be reexamined.

6. **Firefighter Safety** -- It was remarkable and a tribute to Dayton's incident command and fire fighters that they sustained only one minor

injury in the course of this fire. (It was a strained leg from lifting hose.) As it should be, fire fighter safety was considered right from the early decisions not to supply the sprinkler system and to pull units well away from the walls.

7. **Land Development Decision** -- The threat to the aquifers would not have existed if the paint storage facility had not been allowed to be built amidst the water well field. The city had had second thoughts about allowing development on this land and had stopped the full development originally planned. Environmental impacts need to be and often are a major factor in land development decisions. Potential impacts from fires are not always considered in these studies, and fire departments should try to make sure that they are where appropriate.

8. **Employee Training--** A Sherwin-Williams employee accidentally started the fire. Whether such fires can be totally prevented is debatable, and may not be economically feasible (e.g.; not allowing equipment that can produce sparks anywhere near flammable liquids should there be breakage and a spill.)

The employees were well trained to evacuate quickly and rendezvous, and to extinguish the flames on the clothes of the lift truck driver. However, the place they were to rendezvous at was being barraged by exploding cannisters, so the employees did not stay together, and a head count could not be taken to ensure all had escaped. Unnecessary time was spent tracking them down and ensuring that no one was missing. Employees should be instructed to go to a meeting place that, as far as can be determined in advance, will be safe and/or to check in after a disaster occurs.

9. **Incident Reporting** -- Training is needed to ensure consistent and accurate reporting of fire incidents. In this case, for example, the sprinkler systems operated, but were not so reported. With understandable intent, the fire officer filling out the report noted that the sprinkler performance was "other-not described above" because the sprinklers were overwhelmed. In analyzing this data across many fires, this clear case of sprinkler system failure would not have been counted.

10. **Incident Command** -- The fire was a near textbook example of the use of a good incident command system. Higher level chiefs smoothly took over as incident commander as the alarms built up. There were no major communications problems. The dispatchers did a good job of coping with a large number of callers who reported the fire or asked about its risk. The incident command helped hold casualties and losses down.

* * * * *

Because historically the objective of firefighters has been to extinguish hostile fires, it is hoped that a review of this fire will make it apparent that risk management is a higher objective and that it is necessary to make decisions that result in the lowest possible immediate and long term loss even if that means letting the fire burn.

It is instructive to compare the results of the Sherwin-Williams fire with the 1986 fire in the Sandoz chemical plant in Basel, Switzerland, which is described in the following supplement.

Supplement

Pollution of Rhine River Due to Runoff from Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire in Basel, Switzerland'

Thirty tons of toxic material washed into the Rhine River with water firefighters used to fight a warehouse blaze at a riverside Sandoz chemical plant and storage facility near Basel, Switzerland in the early morning hours of November 1, 1986.

By the time the chemicals, mostly pesticides, had traveled 500 miles down the winding scenic river, half a million fish were dead, several municipal water supplies were contaminated, and the Rhine's ecosystem was badly damaged with virtually all marine life and a large proportion of microorganisms wiped out.

The approximately 25-mile-long chemical slick drifted slowly downstream from the Swiss border to the North Sea. It contained about 30 tons of insecticides, herbicides, and mercury-containing pesticides, and threatened the North Sea's winter cod harvest. Environmental groups called for a boycott of Sandoz products.

In the weeks following the fire, citizen protest rallies occurred, the Swiss government as well as Sandoz Corporation received damage claims from other countries, and Switzerland had to respond to strong criticism for its handling of the emergency from France, West Germany, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and the Common Market Commission.

The Facility -- The warehouse where the fire started was built in 1967. It was part of a large Sandoz chemical complex in Schweizerhalle, a small community six miles east of Basel on the Rhine's left bank. The

¹ The following sources were used in this supplement: Associated Press stories following the fire; a presentation by Hans Wackerlig, Fire Prevention Service, Zurich Switzerland at the NFPA Fall Meeting, Portland, Oregon, November, 1987; personal discussion between Wackerlig and Philip Schaenman, November, 1987, "The Lessons Learned From the Sandoz Fire," Hans Wackerlig, 1987.

warehouse was about 295 feet long by 82 feet wide, with an adjoining second half another 82 feet wide separated from the first by a wall down the length of the building. It had no sprinklers because the risk of a fire was considered low. The building in effect was a light shed intended to provide shelter from rain and extremes of temperature, rather than being a solid warehouse. Its height ranged from 26 feet to a peak of 39 feet.'

The half of the building where the fire started was stacked with about 1250 tons of chemicals in barrels four pallets high, somewhat like the Sherwin-Williams storage. The chemicals stored were mainly flammable liquids, including pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides, some with 30,C flashpoint. Among these were phosphoric acid and organic mercury compounds. Among additional raw materials present were ferric ferrocyanide, which may have been a key factor in the ignition sequence. The other half (82 foot width) of the building had mostly harmless chemicals.

The Incident -- In response to simultaneous reports by a police highway patrol alarm and the plant night watchman at 0019 on November 1, 1986, three Sandoz plant brigade fire fighters and the chief responded to the warehouse. Flames were shooting from the roof when the fire was first noticed. Upon arrival, the chief immediately realized that he could not cope with the situation alone and called for an all-out alarm. By 0045, 200 fire fighters were in action at the scene.

The cause of the fire has not been positively determined. It might have been started by the ignition of the ferric (ferrocyanide in the warehouse) by a butane-powered machine used to shrink-package chemicals in plastic films. The ferrocyanide was being packaged earlier in the day. This chemical has the insidious property -- discovered only after the fire--of smoldering without releasing any smoke or odor, and then suddenly breaking into almost explosive burning. Ironically, the packaging of the chemicals was started by a zealous employee who wanted to tidy up the storage while this seems the likely cause, arson has not been ruled out.

Because the fire was not discovered until it was already large and being fed by a warehouse full of highly flammable chemicals, it was accepted from the start that the warehouse would be a total loss. Attention was focused on stopping exposure fires, no mean task since barrels of flammable chemicals were hurtling through the air. At first the fire fighting was defensive, but then the chief decided to try to extinguish the fire with massive amounts of water to stop the fire spread and avoid a catastrophe to the nearby city and three major chemical complexes nearby. There also was a great deal of attention given to the risk from the possibly toxic clouds of gases being generated and whether the nearby populations in Switzerland, France, and Germany would have to be evacuated.

More than 3,000 gallons of water a minute was being pumped from the Rhine to fight the fire and keep it away from neighboring warehouses and outdoor storage. The peak pumping rate reached 8,000 gpm.

A 12,000 gallon catch basin into which both water and chemicals collected began overflowing into the river. Flames rose to 200 feet above the warehouse. Steel drums of chemicals exploded like bombs in the intense heat, gas and smoke spread towards the outskirts of Basel. At 3:30 am, a hastily convened regional crisis staff declared an emergency. No evacuation was needed. The fumes were not thought to be toxic but included mercaptans, one of the most malodorous chemicals known to man, one which causes people to feel sick and fearful that they are being poisoned. Area sirens were sounded and radio announcements urged the population to close windows and stay indoors. (Many sirens were down for routine maintenance and could not be used.)

Public transport into the area was halted, and gas masks were prepared at the civil defense arsenal. Officials ended the emergency 90 minutes later when readings showed no dangerous concentrations of toxicity in the air. No one was hurt and calm returned to Basel.

But slowly the massive run-off began moving down the Rhine. The management of the Sandoz chemical plant sent telexes to all municipal water systems along the 520 miles of river between Basel and the Dutch North Sea port of Rotterdam, urging tests on pollution levels. It listed eight toxic

chemicals, most of them used in pesticides, that may have washed into the river. A number of West German water systems were shut down and populations supplied with drinking water by tank trucks. Dutch authorities ordered services closed to keep contaminated water out of Rhine estuaries. Most of the water applied to the fire flowed off through storm drains to the Rhine. By 4:30 a.m. the fire was under control. Incredibly, however, no serious thought seems to have been given to the potential water pollution. It was not the immediate and present danger.

Aftermath -- The full extent of the ecological damage was not evident for a few days. West Germany's Parliament was told that half a million fish were killed and aquatic life had ended in large stretches of the river. Fisheries officials said new fish for breeding probably would not be introduced for several years and it might be ten years before the river recovers. Heavy metal pollutants which sank to the bottom continued to be stirred up, sending out additional waves of pollution. It was especially tragic because the fishlife had only recently returned to the Rhine after massive clean up operations in the previous years.

But the predictions were overly pessimistic: life appears to be returning to the river today, one year after the disaster caused by man.

The warehouse where the fire originated and its adjoining twin (the double width) were destroyed, but none of the others nearby nor the open air storage were destroyed. Though the Rhine was seriously polluted, it could have been a much worse, more toxic fire had it spread further to other nearby warehouses. There were no injuries, though about 150 civilians and fire fighters were given blood tests to see if they had elevated mercury levels or other problems of the blood. They are still being monitored to see if any long term effects appear, but none have so far.

Lessons Learned - The Swiss View -- There were many lessons learned from this fire. The largest and most important lesson was that water pollution has to be considered in fire fighting, along with other environmental factors. Fires may need to be allowed to burn. "Whereas fire prevention and environmental protection were previously regarded as

two completely independent fields with some slight overlap of common interest...The interface is now realized to be, much more important than had been assumed." ²However, it is still thought that it was necessary to extinguish the fire to keep it from spreading.

How to contain the water runoff needs to be considered in planning fire protection, especially where toxic chemicals or things that produce toxic chemicals when burned are present.

A third major lesson was the need for greater security around warehouses. Fifty percent of warehouse fires in Switzerland are from arson, they report. Even if this fire had not been started intentionally, the potential was there. Plant security was deemed far too lax. This was especially so for a chemical industry under political attack, as was Sandoz at the time of the fire.

A fourth lesson was the need to better to label toxic substances as to fire hazard, personal hazard, and environmental hazard. A set of new symbols has been proposed for Common Market use by a working group organized to study the fires implications.

A fifth lesson was that fire prevention and built-in fire protection for chemical warehouses need to be rethought. Present planning has proven inadequate.

Appendices


- A. Dayton Fire Department Photographic Slides (with master file copy at U.S. Fire Administration).
- B. Photographic Slides from Investigator (with master file copy).
- c. Fire Incident Report
- D. Map of Wells near Sherwin-Williams Plant (with master file copy).
- E. Transcripts from Fire Department Telephone, Radio, and PA.
- F. Newspaper Articles with Map of Site Reprinted with permission of the Dayton Daily News and Journal Herald. (Additional articles are with the master file copy at USFA.)

SHERWIN-WILLIAMS WAREHOUSE FIRE

Description of Slides

DAYTON FIRE DEPARTMENT PHOTOGRAPHIC SLIDES


- 1D. View of large flame mass from west (?) side of warehouse.
- 2D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. View toward east with south side of building to right and west side to near left.
- 3D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. View to west side of warehouse.
- 4D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. Southwest corner of building in foreground. Note concrete tilt-up outside walls still standing at east end of south wall.
- 5D. View of remains after fire. Note paint cans and twisted steel columns.
- 6D. View of sprinkler head and pipe fallen amid debris of aerosol cans in area of fire origin.
- 7D. View of remains of fallen, reinforced concrete "fire wall" after fire.
- 8D. View of north end of north/south fire wall. Note large spalled hole through wall.
- 9D. View of water discharging from broken sprinkler risers on west side of fire wall. (Note hole in fire wall for reference.) Fire pump believed to have been shut off prior to this photograph and water flow is from bypass around pump.
- 10D. View of 55 gallon drum storage under canopy at east end of warehouse.



DAYTON FIRE DEPARTMENT PHOTOGRAPHIC SLIDES

Area or Direction of View of Slides
(Description Attached)

267T 1043	10-10-87
Sherwin-Williams Warehouse	
NTS	<i>[Signature]</i>

**SLIDES:**

- #1 Diagram of Site with Information (Provided by Dayton Fire Dept.).
- #2 View toward SE showing remains of "Fire Wall", small attached bldg., and east wall with office beyond in left background.
- #3 Closeup of fire wall remains showing hole in walk Only one panel remaining,
- #4 View of south side of fire pump house. Pump and connections have been removed.
- #5 View toward SW showing remains of dock and east wall.
- #6 View toward SW showing closeup of east wall and openings into office area.
- #7 View toward south showing remains of canopy where drums were stored.
- #8 View toward west showing office area and remains of east wall of warehouse.

267T1043	8-2-87
Sherwin-Williams Warehouse	
NTS	<i>LBC</i>



OHIO FIRE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

INCIDENT REPORT

1 DELETE
2 CHANGE

Fire Department

A	FDNO 517011	INCIDENT NO 95244	REP 65	MO 2	DAY 7	YEAR 78	DATE OF WEEK 7 Sundays 2 Months 5 Months	ALARM TIME 4	ARRIVAL TIME 21107	DEPARTURE TIME 21116	TIME IN SERVICE 11904	
B	SITUATION FOUND		22-Not Call, Regular	64-Power line down	84-Report Party	72-Storm Spout	6/2/87					
	21-Structure Fire		32-Emergency Medical Call	45-Arriving automatic equipment	58-Unsubscribed burning	73-Alarm Malfunction	17					
	12-Cyprusian Dancer Lamp		33-Occupant trapped	48-Accident standby	57-Move-up	74-UNIFORMED INMATE						
	13-Window Fire		34-Search	47-Chemical spill	59-Other Service Calls	80-Unchecked	Clear					
	14-Shift glass, mirrors		35-Evacuation	51-Loose oil	61-Smoke alarm	81-Other						
	15-Tank, Pallet		41 Sp. Inv. - No Inv.	52-Water removal	62-Confined burn	82-Smoke gas in room for smoke	See page 17-19					
	16-Expansion No pressure		42-Furniture, Bottle returned	53-Breaker added removed	63-Smoke gas in room for smoke	83-Other						
	17-Curtain spill with fire		43-Lockdown heat	54-Structural damage	64-Other	84-Other						
C	ACTION TAKEN		4-Rescue HAZARD	8-Other Move up	MATERIAL AID		9					
	1-Extinguishment		5-Serve by	9-Other	1-Tool		17/1					
	2-Move up or down		6-Save	0-Underserved	2-Tool							
	3-Display/stop sign		7-Attend	PROTECTED EXPOSURES		3-Tool						
D	PLACED PROPERTY USE (Occupancy) Pg 73-83				IGNITION FACTOR Pg 44-45							
	PAINT STORAGE				8.6G5 FLAMMABLE LIQUID SPILL				141			
E	CORRECT ADDRESS (Up to maximum of 21 characters)						ZIP CODE		CENSUS TRACT			
	3671 DAYTON PARK DRIVE						451114		118017			
F	OCCUPANT NAME (Last, First, MI)				TELEPHONE		ROOM or APT.					
	SHERWIN WILLIAMS				236-5282							
G	OWNER NAME (Last, First, MI)				ADDRESS		TELEPHONE					
	SHERWIN WILLIAMS				3671 DAYTON PARK DR.		236-5282					
H	METHOD OF ALARM		4-None	8-VOICE light/audible alarm system	CO. INSPECTION DISTRICT		SHIFT		NO. ALARMS			
	1-Telephone alarm		5-Visual	9-Not classified above	3		12		2			
	2-Multiple alarm system		6-By alarm pull	0-Underserved or not reported					3			
	3-Private alarm system		7-Tank (21)									
I	NO FIRE SERVICE PERSONNEL RESPONDED		NO ENGINES RESPONDED		NO AERIAL APPARATUS RESPONDED		NO OTHER VEHICLES RESPONDED					
	84		10		5		12					
J	NUMBER OF INJURED				NUMBER OF FATALITIES							
K	FIRE SERVICE				OTHER							
L	COMPLEX Pg 61-62				MOBILE PROPERTY TYPE Pg. 43-45 (Complete Line 5)				NA = UN			
	98								105			
M	AREA OF FIRE ORIGIN Fu 67-66				EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN IGNITION Pg 71-72 (Complete Line 7) 86				9.9			
	411											
N	FORM OF HEAT IGNITION Pg 74-72		TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED Pg 78-73		FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED Pg 80-81							
	26		21		57							
O	METHOD OF EXTINGUISHMENT		LEVEL OF FIRE ORIGIN		ESTIMATED TOTAL DOLLAR LOSS							
	1-Not extinguished		1-Ceiling down to 4'		32.4 million							
	2-Water spray		2-10 to 18 feet		11214010101010							
	3-Portable extinguisher		3-20 to 36 feet									
	4-Extinguisher in room		4-30 to 48 feet									
			5-50 to 70 feet									
P	Number of Stories				CONSTRUCTION TYPE							
	1-1 story				1-Unsprinkled noncombustible							
	2-2 to 4 stories				2-Heavy timber							
	3-5 to 12 stories				3-Process noncombustible							
	4-13 to 24 stories				4-Unsprinkled wood frame							
	5-25 to 48 stories				5-Protected masonry							
	6-50 stories or more				6-Unsprinkled masonry							
	7-Multiple of stories				7-Process noncombustible							
	8-Underserved or not reported				8-Underserved wood frame							
					9-Protected masonry							
					10-Unsprinkled or not reported							
Q	EXTENT OF DAMAGE		DETECTOR PERFORMANCE		SPRINKLER PERFORMANCE							
	1-Damage to floor, walls, or ceiling		1-On in room or space of fire origin		1-Equipment operated							
	2-Damage to part of room or wall strength		2-On in room or space of fire origin		2-Equipment did not operate							
	3-Damage to part of pipe		3-On in room or space of fire origin - no water		3-Equipment did not operate							
	4-Damage to part of pipe, wall, ceiling, or floor		4-On in room or space of fire origin - not water		4-Equipment did not operate							
	5-Damage to pipe or ceiling		5-On in room or space of fire origin		5-Underserved or not reported							
	6-Damage to part of room		6-Not connected or not reported		6-Not connected or not reported							
	7-Extensive damage to part of room		7-Underserved or not reported		7-Not connected or not reported							
	8-Extensive damage to part of room		8-Underserved or not reported		8-Not connected or not reported							
	9-No damage or not reported		9-Underserved or not reported		9-Not connected or not reported							
	10-Underserved or not reported		10-Underserved or not reported		10-Not connected or not reported							
R	TYPE OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 103-104				AVENUE OF SMOKE TRAVEL							
	2-SMOKE SINKING				1-At ceiling level							
	3-Down				2-Corridor							
	4-Other				3-Opening in construction							
					4-Down							
					5-Opening in construction							
					6-Down							
					7-Opening in construction							
					8-Down							
					9-Opening in construction							
					10-Down							
S	FORM OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 108-109											
T	IF MOBILE PROPERTY		YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO	LICENSE NO					
U	IF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN IGNITION		YEAR	MAKE	MODEL	SERIAL NO						
	FORK LIFT											
	MEMBER MAKING REPORT		DATE	OFFICER IN CHARGE (if other than)		DATE						
	E. F. Michael Kennedy			D. C. Bay R. Douglas		6-3-87						

Remarks: See attached notebook sheet.



OHIO FIRE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

INCIDENT REPORT

NFIRS-1

1 DELETE
2 CHANGE

Fire Department

A	FD# 570111	INCIDENT NO. 55244	EXP. MO. 11	DAY 05	YEAR 2017	DAY OF WEEK 2	ALARM TIME 20:07	ARRIVAL TIME 21:16	INC. BY SERVICE 071010						
B	SITUATION FOUND 11-Structure Fire 12-Quarant Door Lock 13-Window Fire 14-Drift (smoke, ledges) 15-Triax Fluoresc 16-Exposure hot near ltr 17-Outside soft with ltr			22-Ad Case Rupture 23-Emergency Medical cal 24-Search 25-Evacuate 26-Escape 27-Escape with ltr 28-Exposure, Room returned 29-Lack of ltr			44-Pinch the door 45-Arming alarm, equipment 46-Arching alarm 47-Glass break 51-LOCK-OUT 52-Alarm rangin 53-Service door removal 54-Adm. Rescuer			55-Alarm Police 56-Unauthorized burning 57-Alarm up 58-Other alarm call 59-Smoke alarm 60-Controlled burn 61-Alarm (get attention for alarm) 62-Alarm (get attention for alarm)			70-Board Scarp 71-Alarm Malfunction 72-Alarm (get attention for alarm) 73-Alarm (get attention for alarm)		
C	ACTION TAKEN 1-Alarm 2-Alarm 3-Alarm			4-Remove Hazard 5-Contain 6-Extinguish 7-Extinguish			8-Fill in Move up 9-Extinguish 10-Extinguish			INITIAL AID 1-First Aid 2-First Aid 3-First Aid					
D	FIXED PROPERTY USE (Occupancy) Pg 23-43 TRAILER			IGNITION FACTOR Pg 24-45 EXPOSURE FIRE											
E	CORRECT ADDRESS (Up to maximum of 21 characters) 3671 DAYTON PARK DR			ZIP CODE 45424			GENSIB TRACT 181017								
F	OCCUPANT NAME UNKNOWN			ADDRESS 110019			TELEPHONE			ROOM or APT.					
G	OWNER NAME UNKNOWN			ADDRESS			TELEPHONE								
H	METHOD OF ALARM 1-Telephone direct 2-Municipal Alarm System 3-Private alarm system			4-Voice signal municipal alarm system 5-Alarm 6-Understand or not reported			DO. INSPECTION DISTRICT 3			SHIFT 12					
I	NO. FIRE SERVICE PERSONNEL RESPONDED 8			NO ENGINES RESPONDED 10			NO AERIAL APPARATUS RESPONDED			NO. OTHER VEHICLES RESPONDED 2					
J	NUMBER OF INJURIES			NUMBER OF FATALITIES											
K	FIRE SERVICE			OTHER			FIRE SERVICE			OTHER					
L	COMPLEX Pg 61-62 No. Complex 198			MOBILE PROPERTY TYPE Pg 63-65 (Complete Line 5) 17 Tractor Trailers			HA = 08								
M	AREA OF FIRE ORIGIN Pg 67-68 Vehicle			EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN IGNITION Pg 71-72 (Complete Line 7) 147			NO. EQUIPMENT 198								
N	FORM OF HEAT IGNITION Pg 74-76 EXPOSURE			TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED Pg 77-78 1811 FLAMMABLE LIQUID			FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED Pg 80-81 Bulk Storage			157					
O	METHOD OF EXTINGUISHMENT 1-Extinguished 2-Not extinguished 3-Extinguished above 4-Extinguished below			LEVEL OF FIRE ORIGIN 1-Under level to 1 2-10 to 19 feet 3-20 to 29 feet 4-30 to 39 feet 5-40 to 49 feet			ESTIMATED TOTAL DECLAR LOSS 1-Under \$1000 2-\$1000 to \$9999 3-\$10000 to \$99999 4-\$100000 to \$999999 5-\$1000000 to \$9999999 6-\$10000000 to \$99999999 7-\$100000000 to \$999999999 8-Under \$1000000000 9-Under \$10000000000 10-Under \$100000000000 11-Under \$1000000000000 12-Under \$10000000000000 13-Under \$100000000000000 14-Under \$1000000000000000 15-Under \$10000000000000000 16-Under \$100000000000000000 17-Under \$1000000000000000000 18-Under \$10000000000000000000 19-Under \$100000000000000000000 20-Under \$1000000000000000000000 21-Under \$10000000000000000000000 22-Under \$100000000000000000000000 23-Under \$1000000000000000000000000 24-Under \$10000000000000000000000000 25-Under \$100000000000000000000000000 26-Under \$1000000000000000000000000000 27-Under \$10000000000000000000000000000 28-Under \$100000000000000000000000000000 29-Under \$1000000000000000000000000000000 30-Under \$10000000000000000000000000000000 31-Under \$100000000000000000000000000000000 32-Under \$1000000000000000000000000000000000 33-Under \$10000000000000000000000000000000000 34-Under \$100000000000000000000000000000000000 35-Under \$1000000000000000000000000000000000000 36-Under \$10000000000000000000000000000000000000 37-Under \$100000000000000000000000000000000000000 38-Under \$1000000000000000000000000000000000000000 39-Under \$100 40-Under \$1000 41-Under \$100 42-Under \$1000 43-Under \$100 44-Under \$1000 45-Under \$100 46-Under \$1000 47-Under \$100 48-Under \$1000 49-Under \$100 50-Under \$1000 51-Under \$100 52-Under \$1000 53-Under \$100 54-Under \$1000 55-Under \$100 56-Under \$1000 57-Under \$100 58-Under \$1000 59-Under \$100 60-Under \$1000 61-Under \$100 62-Under \$1000 63-Under \$100 64-Under \$1000 65-Under \$100 66-Under \$1000 67-Under \$100 68-Under \$1000 69-Under \$100 70-Under \$1000 71-Under \$100 72-Under \$1000 73-Under \$100 74-Under \$1000 75-Under \$100 76-Under \$1000 77-Under \$100 78-Under \$1000 79-Under \$100 80-Under \$1000 81-Under \$100 82-Under \$1000 83-Under \$100 84-Under \$1000 85-Under \$100 86-Under \$1000 87-Under \$100 88-Under \$1000 89-Under \$100 90-Under \$1000 91-Under \$100 92-Under \$1000 93-Under \$100 94-Under \$1000 95-Under \$100 96-Under \$1000 97-Under \$100 98-Under \$1000 99-Under \$100 100-Under \$100								
P	EXTENT OF DAMAGE 1-None 2-Light 3-Moderate 4-Heavy 5-Catastrophic			DETECTOR PERFORMANCE 1-None 2-Partial 3-Complete 4-Understand or not reported			SPRINKLER PERFORMANCE 1-None 2-Partial 3-Complete 4-Understand or not reported								
Q	TYPE OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 103-104 FLAMMABLE LIQUID			AVENUE OF SMOKE TRAVEL 1-Through door 2-Through window 3-Through shaft 4-Through opening in roof 5-Through opening in floor 6-Through opening in wall 7-Understand or not reported			5								
R	FORM OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 108-109 Bulk Storage														
S	IF MOBILE PROPERTY TRACTOR Trailers			YEAR UNKNOWN			MODEL UNKNOWN			SERIAL NO. UNKNOWN					
T	IF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN IGNITION			YEAR			MODEL			SERIAL NO.					
U	MEMBER MAKING REPORT FF Michael Kenning			DATE 5-27-07			OFFICER IN CHARGE (If different) D. C. Day L. Douglas			DATE 5-27-07					

Remarks



OHIO FIRE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

INCIDENT REPORT

1 DELETE
2 CHANGE

Fire Department Dayton Fire Dept

FILE NO <u>5770111</u>	INCIDENT NO <u>255140</u>	EXP <u>12013</u>	MO <u>01</u>	DAY <u>27</u>	YEAR <u>87</u>	CITY OF WEEK 1 Building 2 Warehouse 3 Factory 4 Other	ALARM TIME <u>4</u>	ARRIVAL TIME <u>21107</u>	TIME IN SERVICE <u>211160700</u>				
SITUATION FOUND			22 - Air Call Reported 33 - Emergency Medical call 33 - Lockup in progress 34 - Search 36 - Evacuated 41 - Spill, leak, up line 47 - Explosive, bomb removed 43 - Excavate Heat			44 - Power line down 45 - Arcing electric equipment 46 - Air/Gas leak(s) 47 - Chemical spill 51 - Lock out 52 - Power Off/Back 53 - Gases odor removed 54 - Animal Release			55 - Alarm Police 56 - Unattended burning 57 - Move up 58 - Other service call 61 - Smoke scare 62 - Corroded burn 64 - Gas leak regulator for alarm 71 - Malicious fire			72 - Bomb Boom 73 - Alarm Malfunction 74 - Unresponsive team 99 - Unchecked Other _____ See page 17-19	
ACTION TAKEN		4 - Remove hazard 5 - Stand by 6 - Spill/leak 7 - Assistance		3 - Evacuate, Move up 4 - Not called 6 - Alarm in hand		MUTUAL AID		1 - Not used 2 - Called N/A		13 NA			
FIXED PROPERTY USE (Occupancy) Pg 28-43 <u>Parking Lot</u>					IGNITION FACTOR Pg 44-45 <u>Exposure</u>					<u>Fire</u>		<u>6.5</u>	
CONNECT ADDRESS (to 10 maximum of 21 characters) <u>3671 Dayton Park Dr</u>							ZIP CODE <u>45424</u>		CENSUS TRACT <u>1118107</u>				
OCCUPANT NAME (LAST, FIRST, MI) <u>UN Known</u>					TELEPHONE			ROOM or APT.					
OWNER NAME (LAST, FIRST, MI) <u>UN Known</u>					ADDRESS			TELEPHONE					
METHOD OF ALARM		4 - Radio 1 - Telephone direct 2 - Municipal alarm system 3 - Private alarm system		5 - Voice signal municipal alarm system 6 - Not classified above 0 - Not classified or not recorded		CO INSPECTION (DISTRICT) <u>3</u>		SHIFT <u>112</u>		NO. ALARMS <u>2</u>			
NO. FIRE SERVICE PERSONNEL RESPONDED <u>15.4</u>		NO. ENGINES RESPONDED <u>1.0</u>		NO. AERIAL APPARATUS RESPONDED <u>1.5</u>		NO. OTHER VEHICLES RESPONDED <u>1.2</u>							
NUMBER OF INJURIES		NUMBER OF FATALITIES											
FIRE SERVICE		OTHER		FIRE SERVICE		OTHER							
COMPLEX Pg 81-82 <u>No complex</u>		MOBILE PROPERTY TYPE Pg 63-65 (Complete Line 5) <u>1987 (3) Tractors</u>		NA = 00 <u>0.3</u>									
AREA OF FIRE ORIGIN Pg 67-68 <u>Vehicle</u>		EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN IGNITION Pg 71-72 (Complete Line 11) <u>417 NO Equipment</u>		<u>7.8</u>									
FORM OF HEAT IGNITION Pg 74-76 <u>Exposure</u>		TYPE OF MATERIAL IGNITED Pg 78-79 <u>1811 FLAMMABLE LIQUID 121</u>		FORM OF MATERIAL IGNITED Pg 80-81 <u>Bulk Storage</u>		<u>18.0</u>							
METHOD OF EXTINGUISHMENT		2 - Fire contact hose/line and 3 - Fire contact hose/line with nozzle 7 - Hoses and nozzle/foam draft extinguisher 8 - Self contained device 9 - Not classified above 0 - Unchecked or not reported		LEVEL OF FIRE ORIGIN		ESTIMATED TOTAL DOLLAR LOSS							
1 - Not extinguished 2 - Alarm only 3 - Portable extinguisher 4 - Automatic extinguisher		1 - 0 feet to 6 ft 2 - 6 ft to 12 ft 3 - 12 ft to 24 ft 4 - 24 ft to 48 ft 5 - 48 ft to 72 ft		6 - Over 72 ft 7 - Down in light 8 - Base of propane tank 9 - Not classified above 0 - Unchecked or not reported		<u>1</u> <u>undetermined</u> <u>fold 44</u>							
Number of Stories		CONSTRUCTION TYPE		4 - Unprotected noncombustible 5 - Protected noncombustible 7 - Protected wood frame		3 - Unprotected wood frame 6 - Not classified above 0 - Unchecked or not reported							
1 - 1 story 2 - 2 story 3 - 3 or more		4 - 5 to 6 stories 5 - 7 to 12 stories 6 - 13 or more stories 7 - 25 to 48 stories 8 - 49 stories or more 9 - Not classified above 0 - Unchecked or not reported		1 - Fire resistant 2 - Heavy timber 3 - Protected noncombustible		<u>1</u> <u>0</u>							
EXTENT OF DAMAGE		DETECTOR PERFORMANCE		SPRINKLER PERFORMANCE									
1 - Confined to one object or one ft 2 - Confined to part of room or area of origin 3 - Confined to room of origin 4 - Confined to the immediate vicinity of origin 5 - Confined to floor of origin 6 - Confined to structure of origin 7 - Extended beyond structure of origin 8 - No damage to the structure 9 - Unchecked or not reported		1 - One in room or space of origin - open 2 - One in room or space of origin - closed 3 - One in room or space of origin - no open 4 - One in room or space of origin - not open 5 - Not in room or space of origin 6 - Not in room or space of origin 7 - Not classified above 8 - Unchecked or not reported 9 - No detector present (N/A)		1 - Equipment operated 2 - Equipment should have operated and did not 3 - Equipment present but the fire was too close 4 - Not classified above 5 - Unchecked or not reported 6 - No equipment present (N/A)									
1 - 1 2 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 4 5 - 5 6 - 6 7 - 7 8 - 8 9 - 9		1 - 1 2 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 4 5 - 5 6 - 6 7 - 7 8 - 8 9 - 9		1 - 1 2 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 4 5 - 5 6 - 6 7 - 7 8 - 8 9 - 9									
TYPE OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 103-104 <u>FLAMMABLE LIQUID</u>		AVERAGE OF SMOKE TRAVEL		3 - Ledge opening in room 4 - No opening in room 5 - No opening in room 6 - No opening in room 7 - Not classified above		1 - 1 2 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 4 5 - 5 6 - 6 7 - 7 8 - 8 9 - 9							
1 - 1 2 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 4 5 - 5 6 - 6 7 - 7 8 - 8 9 - 9		1 - 1 2 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 4 5 - 5 6 - 6 7 - 7 8 - 8 9 - 9		1 - 1 2 - 2 3 - 3 4 - 4 5 - 5 6 - 6 7 - 7 8 - 8 9 - 9									
FORM OF MATERIAL GENERATING MOST SMOKE Pg 108-109 <u>Storage</u>		IF MOBILE PROPERTY		IF EQUIPMENT INVOLVED IN IGNITION									
YEAR <u>(3)</u>		MAKE <u>International</u>		YEAR <u>(3)</u>									
MODEL <u>Tractor</u>		SERIAL NO. <u>Tractor</u>		LICENSE NO.									
MEMBER MAKING REPORT <u>FF Michael Kenney</u>		DATE <u>5-21-87</u>		OFFICER IN CHARGE (if different) <u>D.C. David P. Douglas</u>									
DATE <u>5-21-87</u>		DATE		DATE									

Remarks: International On Lic: 16 N 37
ALA Lic: X8 65121 3) International ALA ALX 865182
2) International



FIRE SERVICE CASUALTY REPORT

NFIR-3

OHIO FIRE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

Fire Department Dayton Fire Dept

1. CALLER REPORT
2. CHASE

FA	ROID <u>57011</u>	INCIDENT NO. <u>15510</u>	EXPOSURE NO. <u>100</u>	CASUALTY NO. <u>112</u>	INJURY OCCURRED <u>5/21/87</u>	MO. DAY YEAR <u>5/21/87</u>	TIME OF INJURY <u>10:01/12</u>	
FD	CASUALTY NAME (LAST, FIRST, MI) <u>Bergman Mark</u>			TYPE OF CASUALTY 1 Reported injury after 72 hours 2 Reported injury after 72 days 3 Injury due to equipment failure 4 Not an accident (e.g. falling off stairs) 5 Not an injury (e.g. slip and fall) 6 Physical assault 7 Other (specify)		PRIMARY APPARENT SYMPTOM Pg. 151 <u>STRAIN</u>		
FC	AGE <u>31</u>	SEX <u>M</u>	CASE SEVERITY 1 Minor 2 Moderate 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			PRIMARY APPARENT SYMPTOM Pg. 151 <u>STRAIN</u>		
FD	PRIMARY PART OF BODY Pg. 53 <u>Leg</u>			TREATMENT TAKEN TC 1 First aid 2 First aid only 3 Hospitalized 4 Hospitalized & operated on 5 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged 6 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died 7 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried 8 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated 9 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs 10 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes 11 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated 12 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated & donated organs		1 Hospitalized 2 Hospitalized & operated on 3 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged 4 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died 5 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried 6 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated 7 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs 8 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes 9 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated 10 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated & donated organs		
FE	ASSIGNMENT 1 Fire suppression 2 Emergency services 3 Fire prevention 4 Training 5 Administration 6 Fire investigation 7 Maintenance 8 Fire research 9 Fire testing 10 Fire education 11 Fire administration 12 Fire engineering 13 Fire science 14 Fire technology 15 Fire safety 16 Fire protection 17 Fire risk management 18 Fire loss prevention 19 Fire insurance 20 Fire claims 21 Fire litigation 22 Fire consulting 23 Fire advisory 24 Fire training 25 Fire education 26 Fire research 27 Fire testing 28 Fire evaluation 29 Fire assessment 30 Fire audit 31 Fire inspection 32 Fire investigation 33 Fire analysis 34 Fire investigation 35 Fire investigation 36 Fire investigation 37 Fire investigation 38 Fire investigation 39 Fire investigation 40 Fire investigation	NUMBER RESPONSES PRIOR TO INJURY 1 One 2 Two 3 Three 4 Four 5 Five 6 Six or more		PHYSICAL CONDITION 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		STATUS BEFORE ALARM 1 Awake 2 Asleep 3 Unconscious 4 Unconscious & not breathing 5 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt 6 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt & not wearing harness 7 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt & not wearing harness & not wearing life jacket 8 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt & not wearing harness & not wearing life jacket & not wearing survival kit 9 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt & not wearing harness & not wearing life jacket & not wearing survival kit & not wearing flotation device 10 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt & not wearing harness & not wearing life jacket & not wearing survival kit & not wearing flotation device & not wearing emergency locator transmitter 11 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt & not wearing harness & not wearing life jacket & not wearing survival kit & not wearing flotation device & not wearing emergency locator transmitter & not wearing personal locator beacon 12 Unconscious & not breathing & not wearing seat belt & not wearing harness & not wearing life jacket & not wearing survival kit & not wearing flotation device & not wearing emergency locator transmitter & not wearing personal locator beacon & not wearing electronic personal locator beacon		
FC	FIRE FIGHTER ACTIVITY-Pg. 161 <u>Hose Lines</u>			WHERE INJURY OCCURRED-Pg. 163 <u>Outside Ground Level</u>				
FG	CAUSE OF FIRE FIGHTER INJURY-Pg. 165 <u>Lifting Hose</u>			MEDICAL CARE PROVIDED 1 None 2 First aid 3 Hospitalized 4 Hospitalized & operated on 5 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged 6 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died 7 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried 8 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated 9 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs 10 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes 11 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated 12 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated & donated organs		1 Hospitalized 2 Hospitalized & operated on 3 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged 4 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died 5 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried 6 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated 7 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs 8 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes 9 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated 10 Hospitalized & operated on & discharged & died & buried & cremated & donated organs & buried with ashes & cremated & donated organs		
FH	PROTECTIVE COAT WORN 1 Full protective coat worn 2 Partial protective coat worn 3 No protective coat worn 4 Protective coat worn but not fastened 5 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves 6 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood 7 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 8 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 9 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 10 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 11 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 12 Protective coat worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF PROTECTIVE COAT 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH PROTECTIVE COAT 1 None 2 Minor 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			
FI	PROTECTIVE TROUSERS WORN 1 Full protective trousers worn 2 Partial protective trousers worn 3 No protective trousers worn 4 Protective trousers worn but not fastened 5 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves 6 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood 7 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 8 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 9 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 10 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 11 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 12 Protective trousers worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF PROTECTIVE TROUSERS 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH PROTECTIVE TROUSERS 1 None 2 Minor 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			
FJ	BOOTS/SHOES WORN 1 Full protective boots/shoes worn 2 Partial protective boots/shoes worn 3 No protective boots/shoes worn 4 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened 5 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves 6 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood 7 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 8 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 9 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 10 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 11 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 12 Protective boots/shoes worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF BOOTS 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH BOOTS/SHOES 1 None 2 Minor 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			
FK	HELMET WORN 1 Full helmet worn 2 Partial helmet worn 3 No helmet worn 4 Helmet worn but not fastened 5 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves 6 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood 7 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 8 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 9 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 10 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 11 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 12 Helmet worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF HELMET 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH HELMET 1 None 2 Minor 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			
FL	FACE PROTECTION WORN 1 Full face protection worn 2 Partial face protection worn 3 No face protection worn 4 Face protection worn but not fastened 5 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves 6 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood 7 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 8 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 9 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 10 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 11 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 12 Face protection worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF FACE PROTECTION 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH FACE PROTECTION 1 None 2 Minor 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			
FM	BREATHING APPARATUS WORN 1 Full breathing apparatus worn 2 Partial breathing apparatus worn 3 No breathing apparatus worn 4 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened 5 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves 6 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood 7 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 8 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 9 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 10 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 11 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 12 Breathing apparatus worn but not fastened & not wearing gloves & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF BREATHING APPARATUS 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH BREATHING APPARATUS <u>None</u>			
FN	GLOVES WORN 1 Full gloves worn 2 Partial gloves worn 3 No gloves worn 4 Gloves worn but not fastened 5 Gloves worn but not fastened & not wearing hood 6 Gloves worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 7 Gloves worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 8 Gloves worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 9 Gloves worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 10 Gloves worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 11 Gloves worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF GLOVES 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH GLOVES 1 None 2 Minor 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			
FO	SPECIAL EQUIPMENT WORN 1 Full special equipment worn 2 Partial special equipment worn 3 No special equipment worn 4 Special equipment worn but not fastened 5 Special equipment worn but not fastened & not wearing hood 6 Special equipment worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet 7 Special equipment worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield 8 Special equipment worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus 9 Special equipment worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection 10 Special equipment worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection 11 Special equipment worn but not fastened & not wearing hood & not wearing helmet & not wearing face shield & not wearing self-contained breathing apparatus & not wearing eye protection & not wearing hearing protection & not wearing communication system		STATUS OF SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 1 Good 2 Fair 3 Poor 4 Very poor 5 Unknown		PROBLEM WITH SPECIAL EQUIPMENT 1 None 2 Minor 3 Major 4 Critical 5 Fatal 6 Unknown			
FP	OFFICER IN CHARGE <u>D. C. Gary L. Dwyer</u>		DATE <u>5-21-87</u>		MEMBER MAKING REPORT <u>F. F. Michael R. Kenny</u>		DATE <u>5/21/87</u>	

Remarks



OHIO FIRE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM

CIVILIAN CASUALTY REPORT

NFIIRS-2

Fill In This Report In Your Own Words

Fire Department Dayton Fire Dept

FD# <u>57011</u>	Incident No. <u>125134</u>	Exp. No. <u>810</u>	Mo. <u>05</u>	Day <u>27</u>	Year <u>87</u>	Day of the week <u>Wed</u>	Alarm Time <u>18:21:10P</u>
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CASUALTY SEVERE ENOUGH TO CHECK ON LATER YES NO ENTER CORRECT CODE NUMBER IN BOX CASUALTY NUMBER 111 1 DELETE 2 CHANGE

CASUALTY LAST NAME GRIFFITH FIRST NAME Curtis MI DOB UNKNOWN AGE 29 TIME OF INJURY 12/1/1010

HOME ADDRESS SI 2720 Sherer TELEPHONE 276-3449

SEX 1 Male 2 Female CASUALTY TYPE 1 Fire Casualty 2 Other Casualty 3 EMS Casualty SEVERITY 1 Injury 2 Death AFFILIATION 1 Fire Service 2 Other Emergency Personnel 3 Other

FAMILIARITY WITH STRUCTURE 1 Less than 1 Day 2 1 to 7 Days 3 8 to 30 Days 4 1 to 3 Months 5 3 to 6 Months 6 7 to 12 Months 7 Over 1 Year 8 Not a Structure LOCATION AT IGNITION 1 Immediately involved with ignition 2 In the room or space of fire 3 On same floor as origin of fire 4 In same building as origin of fire 5 Outside of building of the origin 6 Not casualty of property of the origin 7 Uninvolved or not reported CONDITION BEFORE INJURY 1 Asleep 2 Engaged in other physical recreation 3 Injured by drugs, alcohol 4 Under restraint 5 Too young to sit 6 Too old to sit 7 Mentally handicapped, senile 8 Undetermined or not reported

CONDITION PREVENTING ESCAPE 1 No time to escape, explosion or fire progressed too rapidly 2 Fire between casualty and exit 3 Locked doors 4 Stairs gates, locks 5 Clothing and casualty burning 6 Injured too slowly 7 Victim incapacitated prior to ignition 8 No conditions prevented escape or not a factor 9 Not classified above 10 Undetermined or not reported ACTIVITY AT TIME OF INJURY 1 Exercising 2 Resting/sleeping 3 Preparing to sit 4 Preparing to sit 5 Cleanup, salvage, mop-up 6 Sleeping 7 Unable to sit 8 Uninvolved or not reported CAUSE OF INJURY 1 Caught in, under, between, tripped by 2 Exposed to fire products 3 Tripped to electrical equipment 4 Fall or slip on, over, into 5 Overexertion 6 Slipped by contact with 7 Blucked 8 Not classified above 9 Uninvolved or not reported 10 Not applicable

NATURE OF INJURY 1 Burns, superficial/major 2 Burns only 3 Multiple smoke only 4 Inhalant, eye, breathing 5 Dehydration, blisters 6 Contusion or pain 7 Shock 8 Strain, sprain 9 Not classified above 10 Undetermined or not reported PART OF BODY INJURED 1 Head, neck 2 Back, trunk, back 3 Arm 4 Leg 5 Hand 6 Foot 7 Internal 8 Multiple parts 9 Not classified above 10 Undetermined or not reported DISPOSITION 1 Released home 2 Treated at scene and released 3 Taken to hospital by fire dept. vehicle 4 Taken to hospital by non fire dept. vehicle 5 Taken to other than a hospital 6 Dead 7 Not classified above 8 Undetermined or not reported

SEE REMARKS ON BACK SEE ADDITIONAL REPORT

CASUALTY SEVERE ENOUGH TO CHECK ON LATER YES NO ENTER CORRECT CODE NUMBER IN BOX CASUALTY NUMBER 1 DELETE 2 CHANGE

CASUALTY LAST NAME FIRST NAME MI JOB AGE TIME OF INJURY

HOME ADDRESS SI TELEPHONE

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SEE REMARKS ON BACK SEE ADDITIONAL REPORT

OFFICER IN CHARGE AT INCIDENT D. C. Koenig Date 5-27-87 REPORT MAKING REPORT FF Michael R. Kenney Date

Fire-building approximately 180,000 sq.ft., one-story tilt-up construction on slab. Steel bar joist roof on center steel post supports, approximately 30 ft. high. Building used for warehousing auto paint finishes, with thinners, additives, etc. Exposure on east: approximately 1400 drums of thinners-lacquers-paints stacked two-three high on pallets. One story office area also on east side of warehouse.

ADT alarm on initial dispatch; also dispatcher reported several phone calls. Second alarm staged at Wagner Ford when large column of black smoke visible from Keowee Street. Upon arrival had third alarm staged.

On arrival, flame showing through roof and entire east half of building involved. Engine 12 on hydrant and supplied Engine 8 deck gun to protect office and drum storage on east side. Engine 21 on hydrant in front of structure; supplied Engine 14 and Truck 14 to protect trailers in dock and parking areas. Aerosol cans raining on crews. Decision not to supply sprinkler system: severe exposure hazard so close to building with sprinkler connections facing fire building - especially since sprinkler piping already probably compromised.

Truck 11 assigned to east sector, under command of Central 2. West 2 assigned as planning sector. Unmanned monitors set up on east exposures as fire progressed.

Tactical decision to attempt to stop fire at north-south firewall in center of structure. However, planning sector found heavy extension into west side before any actual company assignments could be made.

Occupants of structure, approximately 30, reported an employee injury to arriving firefighters, and Engine 4 assisted Medic 4 with lift - truck operator burned seriously on legs. Engine 4 later assigned as brand patrol.

At approximately 2150 Chief I took command, made Chief 3 operation sector. Chief I's strategy was to maintain streams on exposures - which were all on drained concrete pad - but to throw no water on burning structure. The building sits directly over city wellfields, and possible contamination of water supply from run-off became first priority.

Warehouse area of structure a total loss. Drum storage never involved in fire, though some damage later as walls collapsed. Offices sustained some minor water damage, but records preserved and recovered. Seventeen truck trailers on scene heavily or totally damaged; dozens of others not damaged and later removed from parking area.

Injury to firefighter minor (pulled muscle).

Fire officially contained at 0012 on 5-28-87, and under control at 1004 on 6-2-87.

REMARKS:

Fire allowed to burn freely until self-extinguished: Goal to not contaminate water supply:

Thursday (28th): Met with Sherwin-Williams and OEPA, RAPCA, other interested parties, to determine effect of fire on environment, while developing plan to continue protection of exposures on east side of building. Fire still free burning. Flare up caused staging of a 2nd alarm assignment at site. Run-off to Miami River contained and solvents skimmed and pumped off. Basic operation still geared around protecting well field. Command trailer installed. Valuables in office area turned over to Sherwin-Williams representatives.

Friday (29th): Met with federal and state EPA and RAPCA to secure site safety plan. Smoke and fire diminishing, but still visible throughout complex. Sherwin-Williams given permission to remove undamaged semis and trailers.

Saturday (30th): Sherwin-Williams contracted with O-H Material to be prime clean up contractor. Environmental monitoring showed no contamination of groundwater, but some of ground in site and river neardrains. Sherwin-Williams given permission to remove all **items** in the office area. Dave Tabar of Sherwin-Williams removed inventory sheet from command post. Total inventory as of 5-16-87 in excess of 1.7 million gallons.

Sunday (31st): Removal of trailers next to building. Walls dismantled. Fire down to 5-6 spots, glow with light smoke. Site safety plan supposed to be developed by O-H Material for review by fire department. Containment dike for run-off under construction.

Monday (1st): Containment dike completed. Fire still smolders - some hot spots and vapors. Some barrels removed from east side - removal of trailers. Site safety plan in place. Clean up to start at No. 1 door at front loading dock. Work during daylight only. Reduced fire department to one engine and one truck at night. Barrel removal halted until proper forklift is at site.

Tuesday (2nd): Fire placed under control and loss established.

Sherwin Williams Fire - Wednesday, May 27, 1987, at 2107 Hours - Third Alarm
3671 Dayton Park Drive at Wagoner Ford Road

TELEPHONE BOARD #1

Dispatcher: 2105
Yeah, Fire Box No. 455 goes to Sherwin Williams, 3671 Dayton Park Dr.

Dispatcher: What was that, 30 what
3671 Dayton Park Road

Dispatcher: 455
Right

Dispatcher: OK, are you going to have a runner enroute
got one enroute now

Dispatcher: OK, we'll get them on the way

Dispatcher: 2106 Dayton Fire Department
Caller: I want to report a fire at the Sherwin Williams Warehouse on
Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: We got them on the way sir
Caller: OK, you might want to send some ambulances

Dispatcher: 2107 Dayton Fire Department
Yes, I'm an employee of B & O Railroad, there's a fire at
Dayton Industrial Park, has there been a report

Dispatcher: At Sherwin Williams
Caller: Ah, I guess I'm not sure where it's at
Dispatcher: There on Dayton Park Road, we got them on the way sir
All right, thank you
Thank you

Dispatcher: 2108 Dayton Fire
Yeah, there's a fire out here I'm at Troy and Stanley

Dispatcher: Yes ma'am we've got them on the way
Thank you

Dispatcher: 2108 Dayton Fire
Yes I have an emergency, need ah fire, we have a fire
at 3671 Dayton Park Drive (employee)

Dispatcher: They're on their way ma'am
Thank you very much
Bye

Dispatcher: Yeah, Dispatch
There is a fire, I think it's right in front of North Lake Hills
but I can't tell from where I'm standing

Dispatcher: Over by Chuck Wagon Lane, over in that area
Caller: North Lake Hills, Old Troy Pike
Dispatcher: Yeah, we've got them on the way ma'am
OK, thank you
OK

TELEPHONE BOARD #1 - Page 2

Dispatcher calling Police Dispatcher

Dispatcher: Dispatch (Police)
We need a little assistance out at Wagoner Ford and Needmore

Uh huh, do you need any traffic control there today

Dispatcher: Ah, probably going to -

Dispatcher: OK
It's on Dayton Park Road is where the fire is

Dispatcher: Dayton Park Road, OK

Dispatcher: OK, thank you

Dispatcher: Dispatch
Ah, Rescue 1 is back in quarters, at Co.2's and I've got four guys if you want me. to man an Engine 2, or I've got four guys however you want me to do, the truck crew my engine crew went ahead and put the truck in service and took that

Dispatcher: OK, you might as well put the engine in service then

Dispatcher: OK, we'll be in service with Engine 2

Dispatcher: OK, thanks

Dispatcher: 2117 Dayton Fire
Yeah, this is Mr. _____ speaking, have you got a report of a fire off Troy Street

Dispatcher: Yes we do sir, we've got them on the way

Dispatcher: OK, that's really smoking

Dispatcher: 2118 Dayton Fire
Yes, I'm sure you're aware there's a fire at Sherwin Williams on Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: Yes sir, we are
OK, now we're directly across the street from there, is there any danger to my people working there

Dispatcher: As far as I know, at this time sir, I can't say, but if there is apparently any danger, I'm sure that they will evacuate

Dispatcher: OK, I can leave my people working

Dispatcher: As far as I know

Dispatcher: OK

Dispatcher: We've got people out there working, you know, if they see if things are dangerous, they'll get them out

Dispatcher: OK

Dispatcher: 2118 Dayton Fire
Yeah, could you tell me are paramedics or ambulance on the way to 3671 Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: Yes ma'am

Dispatcher: OK, cause we got a guy burning, and I didn't know if the ambulance had

Dispatcher: They're on the way

Dispatcher: OK, thanks

TELEPHONE BOARD #1 - Page 3

Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire
Yes sir, we're up on Earnst and North Main is there a fire burning on the other side of Riverside somewhere.

Dispatcher: Yes sir, there is, and I'm too busy to talk to you at this time sir
OK, thank you

Dispatcher: Yes sir
Caller: Has anybody reported a fire out here on Brandt Pike
Dispatcher: Yes
OK, thanks

2120 Dayton Fire
I don't know if anybody's called or not, I live at 2329 Troy St.
Dispatcher: Yeah
And, ah behind the trailers back here, there's something burning back here
Dispatcher: Yes sir, we're aware of it, they're on'the scene
OK, thank you

2121 Dayton Fire
Caller: Yes, I live at 104 Delaware looking out my back door, toward Main Street, there's a huge of black smoke and
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, we're well aware of that, we have fire equipment on the scene there
Oh, OK

2121 Dayton Fire
Caller: Yes, we have a fire here off of Troy Street, have you gotten that
Dispatcher: Yes, ma'am, they're there
OK, then, I didn't hear the fire trucks, I thought I better call
Dispatcher: Thank you ma'am
Thank you

2121 Dayton Fire
Yes, I live out around 202 and I'm in an apartment building and see flames coming above the apartment building, I'm not quite sure how far over it is, but I know it's on Route 202
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, we've got fire crews on the scene over there
Already
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am
Thank you, bye bye

Dispatcher: 2122 Dayton Fire
Has anybody reported a fire across the street from the
Dispatcher:
Yes ma'am, they have
OK, thank you

2124 Dayton Fire
Yes, I'm on St. Adalbert across from the Sohio Oil thing, and it's on fire
Dispatcher: There's a fire out there, yes ma'am, we've got equipment on the scene
OK, with-me living this close, should I leave
Dispatcher: At this time ma'am, I would say no
OK, ah, will we be contacted if we should
-Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, you will be
OK, thank you
Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, bye

TELEPHONE BOARD #1 - Page 4

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire
 Yes, I live on Vermont Street, and I can see that flames and
 I was wondering

Dispatcher: Yes ma'am, we've got crews out there now
 Well everybody on the street is taking off, and I was

Dispatcher: Well, I'm sorry ma'am, I really don't have time to talk to
 you, as far as I can tell at this time: you're in no danger
 Oh, can you tell me what it is

Dispatcher: It's a building out there burning, ma'am
 Is it chemicals or

Dispatcher: Ma'am I don't know, I'm not there, I'm sorry I'm curt with
 you but I'm awfully busy right now
 We're in no danger

Dispatcher: No ma'am
 All right, thank you

2125 Dayton Fire
 Ah, yes I want to report a possible fire in the, in the
 200 block of Baltimore Street

Dispatcher: 200 block of where
 Baltimore Street

Dispatcher: Beckmore

Dispatcher: I'll I
 B A L T I M O R E

Dispatcher: Oh, Baltimore
 Right across from the park, Patterson Park

Dispatcher: Ah, do you have any idea what's burning
 No, I don't know, I just see smoke up in the air and there's
 a bunch of flames shooting down there, I don't know what it is
 but I live in the 100 block and some of the neighbors next door
 went up that way, and I said well I'll go head and call

Dispatcher: Well, we have a fire out that way, we've got crews on the scene
 Oh, do you, Oh, I didn't know, then I was just making sure
 someone knew about it

Dispatcher; OK, thank you
 OK, thank you

2125 Dayton Fire
 Hi, this is Joe _____, night supervisor at Earnst Enterprises
 on Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: Yes sir
 I was wondering if I should get my men out of here or not
 I noticed that fire down there at AGA or whatever it's at

Dispatcher: Well, all I can tell you at this time sir, is they haven't
 said anything to us about any evacuations
 OK

Dispatcher: I'm sure if it gets to the point that somebody should be evacuated
 they will do it
 All right

TELEPHONE BOARD #1 - Page 5

2126 Dayton Fire
 Hello, I was wondering if you have any information about a fire on Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: No sir, I have no information at this time
 You don't know what it is that's burning there

Dispatcher: No sir, and I don't have to talk about it
 OK

Dispatcher: Thank you

2126 Dayton Fire
 Yeah, this is Greg from Preston Trucking, we're pretty close to that fire that is down the street, ah is that that chemical place

Dispatcher: Ah, Sherwin Williams Paints
 Sherwin Williams
 Yeah

Dispatcher: Is there going to be any evacuation
 Ah, at this time we haven't heard anything about any anticipation of it

Dispatcher: OK, cause we're pretty close
 Well, I'm sure if they feel that it's necessary, they will evacuate the other people in the area sir

Dispatcher: Thank you very much
 Yes sir

2126 Dayton Fire
 Yes, are you aware of the fire at Sohio

Dispatcher: It's not Sohio sir, and yes we have equipment out there
 Is-it should we leave the area

Dispatcher: Ah, at this time I would say no sir, they have not been any alarm for evacuation
 And it's not Sohio

Dispatcher: No it's not
 OK

Dispatcher: Sir, I'm sorry I don't have time to talk to you I'm really busy

2127 Dayton Fire
 OK, I live at 3801 South Shore Drive, in Dayton, and there's a fire over the apartment across from my window I didn't know if anyone had called

Dispatcher: Are you sure it's coming from the apartment or are you looking over the top of it
 I'm looking over the top of the apartment across the yard from me

Dispatcher: OK, and you're seeing an extreme amount of smoke and flames
 I 'm seeing flames and smoke, yes black smoke

Dispatcher: OK, could that fire you're looking at be over ah off Wagoner Ford Road
 I don't think so, I think it's right here in this housing development, cause it's the only thing I can see from where I' m at

Dispatcher: 3801 South Shore
 Yeah, that's my address, I don't know what that address is over there but if you come around here, you'll see it yourself

Dispatcher: Well we've got a big fire down on Needmore Road there and the flames may be what you're looking at
 I don't know

Dispatcher: What's your phone number
 M phone number here is 237-8078

Dispatcher: OK, have you attempted to walk over to that building and see

TELEPHONE BOARD #1 - Page 6

No my family lives there and I 'told them to call the Fire Department and they ran out of the house so I thought I'd call, I don't know, maybe I'm just being an alarmist maybe you're right, you know, but
 Dispatcher: 38 across from 3801 South Shore, we'll get somebody to check it out
 OK, thank you

2129 Dayton Fire
 Yeah, this is Jerry over at Andy's, you got a report on this fire over here
 Dispatcher: Oh, yes sir
 Where's that at over here, I can see flames
 Dispatcher: Over off Needmore Road
 Off of Needmore, all right

2129 Dayton Fire
 Ah, hi, I live at 606 Brandt, which is right across the street from all the gas and oil tanks, has anybody reported a fire
 Dispatcher: They sure have ma'am
 Oh, OK, cause we haven't seen any action yet, OK, thanks
 Right

2129 Dayton Fire
 Do you have anything about a fire on Wagoner Ford Road
 Dispatcher: Yes sir we do
 Is there any point in anybody being evacuated at this time
 Dispatcher: Not at this time no sir
 Well, OK, we live close to it and I'm just wondering if we should be out or anything breathing it
 Dispatcher: No, I don't know of any reason for alarm at this time
 OK, thank you

2130 Dayton Fire
 Yes sir, that fire's that's on the east end, can you tell me if that's some, that 's coming from that is toxic or not
 Dispatcher: No
 You don't know
 Dispatcher: As far as I can tell you at this time, we have no reason for alarm
 OK, I just wanted to check, I had some kids out playing and
 Dispatcher: Right; I can understand that sir.

(Tape Transcription from Dispatch Log Tape Ended) Hours

Sherwin Williams Fire - Wednesday, May 27, 1987 at 2107 hours - Third Alarm
3671 Dayton Park Drive at Wagoner Ford Road

TELEPHONE BOARD #2 -

Dispatcher: 2106 Dayton Fire Department
Ah, yeah I don't know if there's been a report but there's a fire at the Sherwin Williams Warehouse at on Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: They're on the way sir
OK, ah you might want to send some ambulances down there too

Dispatcher: Where's that
The same place

Dispatcher: Why's that, are there a lot of people still there
Oh, yeah, they're working

Dispatcher: Do they know it's on fire
They're out of the place but it's burning bad

Dispatcher: OK
Thank you

Dispatcher: Thank you

Dispatcher: 2107 Dayton Fire Department
Yeah, this is Ted _____ at Kittyhawk Golf Course, there's a big explosion

Dispatcher: Yeah, we've got them on the way, Sherwin Williams
Yeah, right off Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: Yeah, we got them on the way
OK

Dispatcher: Thank you sir

Dispatcher: 2109 Dayton Fire Department
Ah, yes we need a fire truck out on Troy Pike, Troy Street you know where North Lake Hills is, right across the street from North Lake Hills, they have a great big old bundle of fire

Dispatcher: What's burning
I have no idea, my husband just went over there to find out

Dispatcher: Now we've got a fire over on Dayton Park Drive, is that what he's seeing
Dayton Park Drive, is that close to Troy Street

Dispatcher: Well yeah, you can see it from there, it would be over there by the golf course, is it a building
I can't tell we just see big black smoke coming up in the air

Dispatcher: OK, that would be over there at that Dayton Park Drive, we've got a second alarm fire over there and from where you're at you can see straight through
OK, I just wanted to make sure

Dispatcher: OK, thank you

(Several calls from residences -interrupted on transcription by hearing Radio and PA conversation)

2112 Dayton Fire Department I know you're busy,
Yes, this is Patty from Huber Heights Fire, /do you have a fire in the area of Needmore and Wagoner Ford.

Dispatcher: Yeah, up there on Chuck Wagon Lane
Bye

Dispatcher calling Chief 3

Hello

Dispatcher: Yeah, Paul, we've got , Paul

No, this is his son I don't know where he is right now

Dispatcher: OK, if you can get a hold of him, tell him we have a third alarm fire at Dayton Park Drive
Dayton Park , all right

Dispatch

Hemmeter: We've got a third alarm at Sherwin Williams over on
Dayton Park Drive, I'm on my way

Dispatch calling Chief 1

Chief's Wife: He's on the other phone, he'll be with you in a minute

Chief 1 Send 15's on up will you please

Dispatcher: Chief

Just send 15's on up I'm hearing it

Dispatcher: OK

Chief 1 Thank you

Dispatcher: 2116

Ah, yes sir, anybody called in for that fire over

Dispatcher: Yes they have, they're already over there

All right, thank you

Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire Department

Yeah, there's a fire over on, I think it's Commerce Park

Dispatcher : Yeah, we've got a third alarm fire going ma'am

Betterhurry

Dispatcher: They're there, they're there

Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire Department

I'm calling from 150 Jenny Road

Dispatcher: Yeah, we've got crews on the scene for a big fire over there
OK, I called to make sure

Chief 1: What companies do you have

Dispatcher: Hold on just a second

Dispatcher: Coleman Yeah, Chief

Chief 1: What companies do you have in reserve

Dispatcher: Ah, the way it looks right now we don't have anybody left

Chief 1: No, no what reserve apparatus, what companies have reserve
apparatus (Call transferred to Supervisor's position in

Dispatch Center - not recorded on Dispatch Log Tape)

Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire Department

Ah, yes I live off of Valley Street, looking from Valley
over toward Brandt you have a big fire

Dispatcher: Yeah, we've got a third alarm fire going sir

Oh, sorry

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire Department
Yes, have you been called about the fire on _____

Dispatcher: Yes we have
OK, thank you

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire
Yeah, I live on Vermont Street and I can see the flames
and I wondered

Dispatcher: Hung up

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire
Yeah, we're at R & R over on Valley have you got a report of a fire

Dispatcher: Yeah, it's over on it's by the Golf Course,
Golf Course

Dispatcher: Dispatch
Chief 1 just come to 15's and told us to call and tell
you that Engine 15 is sitting here in the barn

Dispatcher: Well they shouldn't be
Well it is

Dispatcher: Huh
They told him he called down there they said they you guys
told somebody that we weren't that there was nobody here
we have not been dispatched, we're still here

Dispatcher: OK, thanks

(Tape Transcription from Dispatch Log Tape Ended) - 2126 Hours

Sherwin Williams Fire - May 27, 1987 (Wednesday) at 2107 Hours - Third Alarm
3671 Dayton Park Drive at Wagoner Ford Road

RADIO AND PA

Dispatcher: Box 455 that will be at Sherwin Williams Paints,
3671 Dayton Park Road

That's Box 455, that will be Sherwin Williams Paints,
3671 Dayton Park Road, we've received a couple calls on
this, Chuck Wagon Lane will be your cross

That will be Engines 12, 21, 8, Truck 14 and the East Chief
Engines 12, 21, 8, 14, Truck 14, and the East Chief
OK, Engine 12, 21, 8, Truck 14, East Chief - All Clear
2107 Bowersock

Dispatcher: Dispatch to East 2 we're still receiving numerous calls,
says there's an explosion and quite a bit of fire at'
Sherwin Williams

East 3: Clearly; there's a large amount of smoke in the area, go head
and dispatch me a full second. alarm, stage them to the
entrance there by the Kittyhawk Golf Course

Dispatcher: 2108

East 2: East 2 Dispatcher, go head and start me that second
chief, make sure you notify Chief 3

Dispatcher: 2108

Central 2: Central 2 Dispatcher, Central 2's responding

Dispatcher: OK, Central 2, 2109

Dispatcher: All companies, we're on master, we have a fire at
Sherwin Williams Paints, 3671 Dayton Park Road, first
alarm response is enroute we're dispatching Engine 14, 4, 2,
Engine 18, Truck 2, Truck 11, Central Chief

Dispatcher: That's Engines 14, 4, 2, 18, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief
OK, Truck 2, Truck 11 you clear on the air

Dispatcher: Dispatcher, Engine 14 is clear and responding
OK Engine 14, 4, 2, 18's, Central Chief clear,
Truck 11 are you clear on the air
2110 Bowersock

Truck 2 dispatcher, Truck 2 is out of service, you can
place Rescue 1 back in service
That's clear Truck 2 2111

Engine 9's in service

Truck 2 dispatcher, Truck 2 is in service, Engine 2 is out
of service, Truck 2 is responding!!

Engine 9's in service
OK, Engine 9 2111
Clear

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA Page 2

Paramedic 2 is in service, I'll be enroute to the other scene
 2111

Paramedic 2: Do you have a medic unit responding over there
 Dispatcher: Not yet, 2111
 Clear

Engine 18 Dispatcher, give us a repeat on the address
 That will be 3671 Dayton Park Road
 18 clear
 2111

Dispatcher: Medic 4 to Dispatch, we can respond
 Car calling repeat
 Medic 4 to Dispatch, we can respond to that fire
 Dispatcher: OK, Medic 4 respond to 3671 Dayton Park 2112
 4's clear

West 2's in service
 2112

Truck 2 Dispatcher, we're responding on that Engine 2 is
 out of service .

Engine 8's on the scene, we have a whole building completely
 involved
 Dispatcher: 2113

East 2 Dispatcher, I'm on the scene, we've got a large
 building, about 200 x oh possibly 300 , pretty well fully
 involved. Stage me a third alarm make sure the third alarm
 response stays out on Wagoner Ford Road. I'll also need
 dispatch the foam truck, I'll be Sherwin Williams Command.
 2114

Dispatcher: Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16, Truck 15, and the West Chief
 respond to 3671 Dayton Park Drive, that will be Sherwin
 Williams, that's a third alarm
 Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16, Truck 15 and the West Chief
 OK, Truck 15, Engine Truck 16, Engine 9 you clear
 Engine 9 clear

Dispatcher: Engine 11 (responding) Companies on the scene you're on master
 You're on Channel **1**

Engine 11 you clear
 Clear

Dispatcher: West Chief
 West Chief clear
 All clear 2116

Paramedic 2 to dispatcher, would you have all the medic
 crews use their telemetry channel 9 to your communication,
 so they don't mess up our radio traffic out here
 Dispatcher: OK, Paramedic 2
 All Medic companies are you clear on that, use your telemetry
 instead of the radio channels

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA - Page 3

East 2: We'll need one, two medics here on the fire scene,
 as soon as you can get them here, we do have injuries
 also, give newrundown of the second alarm response you've
 got staged out there on Wagoner Ford

Truck 11 on the scene
 21:18

East 2: Command to Dispatcher, tell me again what was my second
 alarm dispatch

Dispatcher: OK, command your second alarm response was Engine 14,
 4, 2, 18, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief

Chief 3 to Dispatcher, we're going to need a lot of
 traffic control on Wagoner Ford, this is a huge building
 fully involved, and we have gawkers taking up all of
 Wagoner Ford
 2120

Command to Dispatcher, quote, listen carefully, I need
 a run down of the first alarm, second alarm, third alarm
 companies, give it to me slow so I know exactly what
 I've got here, what you dispatched

Dispatcher: OK, Command, first alarm - Engine 12, 21, 8, Truck 14
 Clear so far

Dispatcher: Standby a second. OK, Command your second alarm
 Engine 14, 4, 2, 18, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief
 Clear, third alarm

Dispatcher: Third Alarm - Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16 and Truck 15

Chief 1 dispatcher, responding
 2127

Dispatcher: Are you aware there is somebody at 15's, Engine 15
 Chief 1: We are now

Medic 15 to the dispatcher, we're in service from Good Sam
 do you want us to report to the fire scene

Dispatcher: Standby at this time, Medic 15
 Clear standing by

Medic 4 removing one to the Valley, burn 'victim
 2128

Dispatcher: 4's is clear

16's in service from St. Elizabeth
 Engine 16's in the staging area
 2129

Chief 13: Command to Dispatch, this entire structure it is a very
 large 1 story structure full of flammables. It is completely
 involved and it will be a total loss
 2132

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA - Page 4

Chief 3: As far as possible, I'm going to commit no more resource to the area, our position right now is one of standing by in a very defensive posture
 2133
 Clear

Dispatcher: Engine 2, made an investigation in the 2000 block of Troy Street, we dont' know if that's a separate fire or if the people are seeing the fire over on Dayton Park Drive but we're getting a lot of calls about, I have no other information except it's in the, gentleman called from 2050 Troy and he said across the street from him there was a large amount of smoke, your cross street will be Jergens
 OK, Engine 2, 2135 West

Medic 8's in service from Good Sam, do you want us to report to the fire scene
 Ah, standby in the area Medic 8
 C l e a r

Dispatcher: Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command
 Go head

Dispatcher: Do you need any medic units over there.....Dayton Park Command, were you clear on that?
 Command to Dispatch, ah hold that, we have two medic units on the scene that we are aware of! Medic 10 and Box 21 is on the scene, that will be sufficient for the time being

Dispatcher Very good, thank you much, we need them

Inspection 1 is on the air and heading out for the scene
 2137

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 in service
 2137

Chief 1 on scene

Engine 2 dispatcher, this call that was called in on Troy Street is part of their large third alarm fire, you can place Engine 2 in service

Dispatcher: OK, that's what I thought, 2142
 Engine 2 clear

Chief 3 to Dispatch, Chief 3 to all units on the fire scene
 Chief 1 will be Incident Command, Chief 3 will be Operations Command, please address us by those titles, I want all Sector Officers go to Channel 3, are you clear on that dispatch

Dispatcher: OK, Chief 3, you are Operations
 That's clear
 Chief 1 is
 Chief 1 will be Incident Command

Dispatcher Incident, OK, and what was the rest of it then?
 All Command bfficers to Channel 3 Chief 1 will be Dayton Park
 2144 Command
 Clear

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire .
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA- Page 5

Investigator 8 Dispatcher, I'm in the area at the scene
 2145

Chief 1 Dispatcher, I'm taking command of the fire, Command
 Post remains at the northwest corner of the building, this
 is, a 200 x 100' 20 ' single story building, totally involved
 probable total loss, will casualties, two we know of, one
 reported missing. I also have exposures to trailers.
 Long time on this operation

Dispatcher: Thank you 2146
 Clear

Dispatcher: Car calling, repeat
 West 1 dispatcher, what is the address of the third alarm fire
 3671 Dayton Park Drive, that runs off Chuck Wagner Lane
 which is a street that goes into , ah, off Wagoner Ford Road
 Clear
 2149

Dispatcher: Dayton Park Command dispatcher, I'll need police assistance
 on the scene, we're starting to get infiltration of spectators
 Police have been notified about this
 I need them on the scene
 2150

Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command, I informed the Police
 of the situation and asked for as big as task force as I
 could possibly muster 2151
 That's clear, we're going to have a tremendous problem with
 the crowd overrunning this fire scene and it is exploding
 and still detinating in and around the fire, we cannot
 guarantee anybody's safety, let alone ours
 I've asked for a batallion (interruption by sounding signal)
 (conversation ended)

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 responding to Station 15
 That's clear, 2152

Investigator 1 on the air
 2155
 Clear

Dayton Dispatcher Kettering 4 out at Station 15

Chief 1: Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, can you give me a run
 down of what we've got in protecting the rest of the city
 in terms of Chief Officers and equipment

Dispatcher: OK, at this time we have Engine 10, we have at Co. 2's
 15's at Co. 4's, Madison, truck and a Moraine engine at Co. 11's
 We got Engine and Truck 13 in quarters, Harrison Township has
 a truck and an engine at Co. 14's, Kettering engine and truck
 at 15's and Engine 17. We're well covered as far as the
 city's concerned

Chief 1: Do you have Chief Officers in three districts?

Dispatcher: There's some enroute now

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27. 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA - Page 6

Chief 1: Take your first 3 chief officers that report on the air and assign them districts, send the next chief officers to this fire. I do not need chief officer support more than I need them to protect the city

Dispatcher: That's clear, we have Chief 4 at Headquarters also

Dispatcher to East 1, Dispatcher West 1
 East 1: Go head, East 1

Dispatcher: Yeah, are you enroute to quarters now
 I'm enroute to 2's to pick up a driver

Dispatcher: That's clear, then you'll take the East side Chief then East 1 clear

Dispatcher to West 1
 West 1, I've been given assignment by Operations Command
 I'm nearly on the scene of the fire now

Chief 1: Cancel that, this is Incident Command, go run the district we'll get you something else

Dispatcher: West 1 you'll be West Side Chief
 West 1 clear
 2159

Investigator 4 on scene
 2204

Dispatcher to Incident Command, have any removals been made to area hospitals
 Dispatcher: We have an indication that we have 1 removal but I don't know where the individual was removed to
 That's clear 2204

Medic 4 to Dispatch that removal was made by us to the Valley
 2205
 4's is in service and clear

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher. has the City Manager been notified of this incident?'

Dispatcher: Could you repeat your message please
 Has the City Manager been notified of this incident?
 We're notifying him now
 Thank you
 2205

Dispatcher to Incident Command
 Chief 1: Command go head

Dispatcher: We're getting a lot of calls, has there been any talk about evacuation out there

Chief 1: No, evacuation at this point is not necessary, we have a fire that is essentially isolated with the exception of an exposure of trailers around the building, the closest other structures are at least 100' away, there is a considerable amount of exploding and evolving fire, at this point however, does not need evacuation

Dispatcher: That's clear, 2209

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA - Page 7

Dispatcher: Chief 1, the Assistant Manager is concerned with the reclamation fields out there as far as water tables, is there any concern there, does he need to contact anybody?

Chief 1: We have made contact with the Water Department, they're enroute and we also have the Environmental Specialist from the Water Department on scene monitoring that situation You can assure him that we're taking a close look at it and we'll make whatever decisions we need to secure the water system

Dispatcher: He requested that we contact him if there is any significant changes, so if you want to relay that through us, we can handle it

Dispatcher: Dispatcher to Incident Command
 Command go head

Dispatcher: Yes sir, we have the names of six employees from out there and when this incident occurred they fled the scene, but we do have six names here if you need any

Chief 1: I would like to confirm if all six are able to talk to you, we've made one removal, if you can talk to the other five or talk to someone who has, I'd like to know that, we're treating it as though we have victims

Dispatcher: OK, each one of these people on the list have been confirmed

Chief 1: So, in other words, all six have been confirmed as alive

Dispatcher: That is correct, 2212
 One injury

Dispatcher: We've have Medic call us when they get back with the injury and get a report
 Thank you
 2212

Dispatcher: Investigator 1 Dispatcher why don't you contact Investigator 7 have them: stop by the Valley and let him talk to that person
 2213, Investigator 7
 Go head

Dispatcher: Would you stop by the Valley and talk to the person removed from Wagoner Ford
 I couldn't copy you

Dispatcher: Would you stop by Miami Valley Hospital and talk to the individual who was removed from Wagoner Ford Road
 That's clear sir

Dispatcher: That is per Investigator 1 at 2213

Dispatcher: Command to Dispatcher, could you confirm whether or not you talked to a Joe Crone

Chief 1: No , we that's not one of the names we have sir
 That's the one we're hunting
 2213

Inspector 4 in service
 2213
 Inspector 4 clear

Training Center responding to the fire on Dayton Park
 2214
 Clear

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA Page 8

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, were you able to contact the Public Information Officer
 Dispatcher: We're working on that now
 Thank you

Dispatcher Dayton Fire Command
 Chief 1: Command go head
 Do you have a Medical Sector there, we need to know what medics we have on the scene
 Chief 1: I'll get back with you in just a second, we do have Chief 5
 yes, Chief 5 is Medical Sector
 2217

Investigator 1 is on the scene
 2218

Command to Dispatcher, we have Medic 4 and Medic 10 along with Harrison Township Medic, and a Box 21 Unit assigned to this, make that Medic 8 and Medic 10
 Dispatcher: Thank you, 2218
 That's clear, we'll hold those by the way
 Dispatcher: That's clear, 2218 .

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, do you have any other day off chief officers responding to this fire
 Dispatcher: That's negative
 None available
 Dispatcher: We have them in the district we can send out
 I'm asking you were they contacted and they did not respond
 Dispatcher: Command, every chief that we got a hold of is responding:!
 Chief 1 I can't hear you
 Dispatcher: Every chief we got a hold of is responding
 Chief 1 That's clear, now I'm going to ask you again, do you have enough that your districts are filled and a surplus of chief officers are coming to the fire scene
 Dispatcher: We have no surplus at this time
 That's clear
 Dispatcher: The districts are covered
 Al 1 three districts are covered
 Dispatcher: Affirmative
 Thank you
 2220

Investigator 7 I'll be out at the Valley,
 2223

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher can we get some kind of a canteen out here, we've got some people that are getting pretty thirsty and dehydrated, Box 21, Red Cross, somebody would help
 Dispatcher: I believe Red Cross is enroute and Box 21 also
 Chief 1: That's clear

Command to Dispatcher, have you been able to contact anybody from the Training Center
 They're on their way out there
 Chief 1 Clear, thank you
 2227

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA - Page 9

Investigator 5 on the scene
 2232

Dispatcher: Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command
 Chief 1: Command go head
 The man that you were looking for, Joe Crone, he is home

Chief 1: Clear, thank you
 2230

Garage 4 Dispatch
 Go head
 Garage and Garage 2 are on their way to the scene on the air
 2234

Maintenance 3 Dispatch
 Go head
 Maintenance 3 and 4 we're enroute to the scene with fuel
 Dispatcher: Would you repeat your message please
 Maintenance 3 and 4 enroute to the scene with diesel fuel
 2237

Maintenance 3: Do you go off Wagoner Ford Road
 Would you repeat your message
 Is the location off Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: At Dayton Park Drive
 Clear
 2237

Dispatcher: Incident Command, have the site management people from that company contacted you at the scene
 Yes they have

Dispatcher: Clear they have a liaison established at the Radisson they were contacting us to make sure you had people on the scene
 Yes plant manager's been here

Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, can you give me a rundown on the time of alarm, and calls for equipment
 Dispatcher: OK, Incident Command at 2107 we sent the first alarm, at 2110 we sent a second alarm response, and then at 2116 a third alarm response was sent

Chief 1: That's clear, thank you
 2249

Command to Dispatcher, has EPA been notified of this fire
 Not at this time

Chief 1: Ah, call their office and at least make them aware of what's happening
 2253
 Clear

Dispatcher to Incident Command
 Go head

Dispatcher: Did you say you did have a fatality out there
 Chief 1: We are unable to determine that at this time
 OK, so you won't be needing the chaplains or anything out there
 We will notify you

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27. 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA - Page 10

Dispatcher: That's clear 2255

Dispatcher to Incident Command, EPA has been aware of the situation

Chief 1: That's clear
2257

Investigation 7 cleared from Miami Valley enroute to the scene
2304

Medic 14 Dispatcher .
Go head
We're in service with the medic
2306

Command to Dispatcher, I understand you had an inquiry about the need for a chaplain
Yes we did

Chief 1: I don't think we'll need them for anybody in the normal sense here, we believe we've got everybody accounted for ah, and short of some kind of injury to personnel here or breakdown by management here, I don't think we'll need any of the chaplains assistance at this point

Dispatcher: 2316:

Dispatch to Incident Command

chief 1: Incident Command Dispatcher, go head

Dispatcher: OK, Wright Pat called us on the phone and said if there is a need for foam that they do have a foam truck available

Chief 1: That's clear, we'll keep that in mind as a resource, we're still trying to determine whether or not we should make an application of an extinguishing agent because of the possible contamination of the wellfield
2327

Chief 1: Thank you

Medic18 Dayton Dispatcher, Medic18 will be in service
Medic 18 2328
Medic 18 clear

Dispatcher: Medic 18' come down to fill in at 4's
Clear
2328

Dispatcher: Medic 18 fill in at 13's
Clear
2329

Medic 18, Dispatcher to Medic 18
Go head
Are you a two person crew right now
Affirmative
Medic 18, go by Co. 14's pick up 1 paramedic there and you'll be running with 3 paramedics
That's clear we'll be enroute to Co. 14

Dispatcher: That's clear 2333

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
 Radio and PA - Page 11

Inspection 3 enroute to the fire scene
 Dispatcher: Maintenance 3 did you say you're enroute to the fire scene
 Inspection 3, that is correct
 Dispatcher: Maintenance 3 you're breaking up cannot copy
 Inspection 3 is enroute to the fire scene
 Dispatcher: That's Inspection 3?
 That's correct
 2335

Investigator 1 to Dispatcher, do you have a location as to
 where the employees went to-m t
 Dispatcher: They've been calling in from all over
 They didn't go to meet at one place or location
 Dispatcher: Not that I know of
 Clear
 Dispatcher: 2336

Dispatcher to all companies, if you have any unassigned
 personnel in quarters', call 3316,
 That's dispatcher to all companies, if you have any unassigned
 personnel in quarters at this time, call 3316. 2340

Dispatcher to Investigation:
 Investigator 1 Dispatch
 Go head
 You called me
 Yes sir, we have a report that a few of the employees from
 there are up at the restaurant on Webster and Wagoner Ford
 At Webster and Wagoner Ford
 That's correct
 Clear thank you
 2342

Medic 18 to Dispatch, we have our third person enroute to
 co. 13's
 2347

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 leaving Station 15 enroute to
 quarters
 Dispatcher: Thank you, Kettering 2347

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Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, this fire is essentially
 confined, not under control, we will probably have crews
 here throughout the night, but I do want to indicate that
 it is no longer in such a mode that it is continuing to
 expand, but what we got will burn for a considerable length.
 of time
 Dispatcher: Thank you command 0012
 Thank you

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
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 Radio and PA - Page 12

Dispatcher to Incident Command
 Chief 1: Command go head
 Dispatcher: Will you be needing anymore Garage personnel out there, they have 3 at the Garage at this time

Chief 1: I don't know, we're going to have a fueling problem that kind of problem over a long hall operation, these crews will be here all night and probably into tomorrow
 Dispatcher: 0018

Command to Dispatcher, would you have the Central Chief get his explosive meter and run it out here, if he's not sure as to the operating condition of the explosive meter, poll the chief officers on duty, get one that works, get it out to me as quick as we can, please.
 Dispatcher: 0038
 Clear

Dispatcher to Incident Command
 Chief 1: Clear
 OK, Central Chief is on his way to 11's to pick up that explosive meter, they'll be enroute to your location
 Chief 1: That 's clear
 0045

Command to Dispatcher, can you give me the time that I indicated this fire was confined
 Dispatcher: That time will be 0012
 Thank you
 Dispatcher: 052

Dispatcher to Incident Command
 Chief 1: Incident Command, go head
 Have you got a mechanic there that you can release to go to Miami Valley Hospital, Medic 15 will not start
 Chief 1: We got a mechanic running around here, we'll relay the message
 134

Dispatcher: Dispatch, this is Garage 4
 Go head
 Ah, we're enroute to pick up some more diesel, you want us to swing by the Valley and check it out
 Dispatcher: Yes sir you can do that, you going to go before you get the diesel?
 Ah, yeah, we can stop by before we fill up

Dispatcher to Incident Command
 Command, go head
 Do you have an urgent need for diesel fuel at the scene there
 Chief 1: I haven't been made aware of any
 Dispatcher: That's clear, 135'

Dispatcher: OK, Garage 4 continue on to the hospital the Valley
 Ah, that's a roger, we're enroute right
 Dispatcher: 135

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
 May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
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Dispatcher to Medic 15
 15's go head
 Dispatcher: Garage 4 is enroute to your location at this time
 Clear
 136

Dispatcher: Incident Command, Dispatcher, would you send us your
 closest engine with an AP and we'll release one of your
 staged engines, we've got some brush fires that we need
 to deal with out here, we'll need a four wheel drive vehicle
 156
 Clear

Dispatcher: What do you actually have in staging at this time?
 Chief 7: We have Engines 9, 11, 16, Truck 15 and Truck 16 and Engine 18
 well release Engine 18
 Dispatcher: That is clear

Dispatcher: Engine and AP 15 respond to the fire scene, that will be
 3671 Dayton Park Drive
 That's Engine and AP 15 respond to 3671 Dayton Park Drive
 that's at the fire scene
 OK, Engine 15 and AP 15 158 Coleman
 Engine 18 Dispatcher, we're in service from the fire scene
 enroute to quarters

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, can you tell me what we've got'
 staffing our stations right now and where they're located
 Dispatcher: Co. 2's we have Engine 10; Co. 4's we have Engine 110
 and Medic 4; Co. 8's we have Engine 108; Co. 11's we have
 Engine 111; and Truck 111; Co. 12's we have Huber Heights
 Reserve and standby personnel; Truck 13 at 13's; Engine
 13 at 13's; Engine 116, Truck 113 at Co. 14; Engine 118 at
 Co. 15's; Engine and AP 17 at Co. 17's; Engine 18 enroute
 to Co. 18's; Engine 2, Truck 102 at the fire scene at
 115 Samuel; that's it for now.

Chief 1: Thank you, it looks like we're still in pretty good shape
 Dispatcher: That's true, and we do have a chief for each district
 at this time
 Chief 1: Thank you
 206

Engine 15's on the fire scene
 214

Investigator 1 Dispatcher, all investigators have been
 released from the fire scene
 217
 Clear

Dispatcher: Investigator I Dispatcher, when Investigator 6 clears the
 scene on Samual would you inform him that you can send him home
 That's clear, Investigator 6 are you clear on that message

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
Radio and PA - Page 14

Dispatcher to Investigator 6
228

Dispatcher: Investigator 6 clear of Samuel, and out to the fire scene
Ah, per Investigator 1, you are released to go home
OK, Investigator 6 is clear, thank you
236

Investigator 7 I'll be off the air
239
Investigator 6 off the air
241,

Medic 10 dispatcher we're released by Incident Command
we'll be remaining out of service, going to the Valley
for equipment
2 5 6
Medic 10's clear

Chief 1: Incident Command to Dispatcher, I'm going to be releasing
Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 15, Truck 16, and Truck 2 and
you can release all day-off personnel when they go in service
Dispatcher: That's clear, 257 .

Chief 1: For all intensive purposes, this fire will continue to burn
throughout the night into the morning, part of the day
tomorrow I guess, we're going to continue to let this burn
and the companies that are on scene will be evaluated
as to what will be kept and released when I shift command
over

Dispatcher: 257
Clear

Truck 16's in service from the fire scene
302
Truck 16 clear

Truck 2's in service from the fire scene
303
Truck 2 clear

Paramedic 2 in-service
303
Paramedic 2 clear

Truck 15 in service leaving the fire scene
303
15 clear

Engine 9's in service
303
Clear

Sherwin Williams Third Alarm Fire
May 27, 1987 at 2107 Hours
Radio and PA - Page '15

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, command of this incident
 is being transferred to Chief 3, Chief 1 will be in
 service, these crews, again, will be here most of
 the night, in fact, all night.

Dispatcher : 304

(Tape Transcription Ended from Dispatcher Log Tape)

'Environmental nightmare come true'

By Jim Babcock
STAFF WRITER

For Sierra Club leader Joe Bockelman, the fire-ravaged Sherwin-Williams Automotive Distribution Center had long been "a problem waiting to be an accident."

For Dayton City Commissioner Mark Henry, the raging, chemical-fed conflagration at the paint warehouse was "an environmental nightmare come true."

What worried both men and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency as well, was the building's proximity to Dayton's 830-acre Miami River Well Field.

"The whole situation out there is one that never should have happened," Bockelman, who is vice chair of the local Tecumseh Group of the Sierra Club, said Thursday.

"I would point to that as an example that well fields and industrial parks are two beasts that do not belong together - especially where the geologic setting affords no protection to our ground water."

The charred, still-smoldering remains of the Sherwin-Williams warehouse are near the center of an 84-acre site known as the Concourse 70/75 Industrial Park.

The city-owned site was opened to industrial development in 1973, and at one time was envisioned as the core of an industrial park that would spread over much of the Miami well field - which presently is occupied by the Kittyhawk Golf Course, a system of city water department recharge lagoons and a water-treatment plant and pumping station.

"But the way that City Hall weighed the policy options then, I guess, was a little different than we probably would now,"


said Henry, who was elected to the City Commission in 1983.

"It would be my position now that that site wouldn't be used for any other industry - unless they want to propose a cotton-candy warehouse or something like that."

The city changed its mind about expanding Concourse park in 1983, after a Florida consulting firm warned that further development would greatly increase "risks in destroying the water resource" underlying the site and the adjacent well field.

The consultant, CH2M Hill, also warned that "a significant potential hazard" already existed at five of about 29 structures on the site. And the company recommended a series of steps to prevent the release of hazardous substances - including keeping

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KEVIN BILLEY/STAFF

□ Environment

CONTINUED FROM/1

out "prospective tenants which use or have as a byproduct . . . any material listed or classified as hazardous."

The CH2M Hill recommendations led to a June 22, 1983, City Commission resolution promising that Concourse park would not be expanded and that all future development with the park would be carefully screened to assure that it posed minimum potential for contaminating ground water.

But that step failed to satisfy the Ohio EPA, which had specifically cited the Sherwin-Williams warehouse as a highrisk in an October 1980 letter asking the city to take steps to minimize the potential for ground water contamination from chemical spills.

The letter noted that the warehouse contained an estimated 1.5 million gallons of paint and paint solvents that could cause extensive contamination if they were accidentally spilled.

Ironically, city and Sherwin-Williams officials agreed that a "major fire" at the warehouse could pose the greatest hazard if paints and solvents were carried onto the wellfield with water from firefighters hoses.

But the officials also said fire was a remote possibility, because the warehouse was equipped with an automatic sprinkler system. And the Sherwin-Williams spokesman surmised that if there were a fire, most of the chemicals would be consumed by flames.

Fire officials said Thursday, though, that the fire was so intense because of these chemicals that it overwhelmed the sprinkler system.

After speaking out in 1980, the Ohio EPA did not again make its concerns public until early 1983, when it criticized the city for permitting another Concourse tenant, Purolator Courier, to bury two 12,000-gallon fuel tanks at the company's new location in the park.

Then in 1984 -- after traces of cancer-causing industrial degreasing solvents were detected in several wells near the north end of Kittyhawk Golf Course -- the state agency began intensified negotiating the led to an agreement committing the city to refrain from developing any remaining vacant parcels in the industrial park.

The January 1985 agreement also committed the city to development of a well field protection and management plan and to requiring Concourse's existing tenants to establish safeguards to prevent chemical and fuel spills from escaping to areas where they could seep into ground water.

Henry said he feels the agreement has helped establish "an uneasy middle ground."

"The tough question we all reach at some point in time is what do we do about business development that already exists in environmentally sensitive areas? . . . You make it as safe as possible. You take all the steps you can take and put in safeguards so that if things do happen, you don't get hurt as bad," Henry said.

Henry also said the Sherwin-Williams warehouse "was the greatest concern" because of the sheer quantity of the contaminants they handled.

But he surmised that safeguards already installed in the warehouse may have helped contain unburned chemicals.

"For example, a concrete apron they were required to extend probably helped keep runoff from spreading," he said.

Bockelman saw the situation differently, however. The Sierra Club officials charged that the city has been slow in implementing the wellfield protection steps called for by the agreement.

"The city has been playing the game too long -- kind of toying with the risks," he said.

"They should have tried to relocate Sherwin-Williams right away. It just flies in the face of modern environmental protection. . . . These water problems we're facing are just textbook illustrations of what government is supposed to prevent."

Bockelman also said his criticisms of Dayton's wellfield protection efforts extend as well to the city's Mad River Well-Field, which stretches between Finley Street and Rohrer's Island in East Dayton.

"I guess this has brought us to the point where we feel we've got to abandon the (Concourse) industrial park. The water is just too delicate a resource to jeopardize with facilities such as Sherwin-Williams. And if that's true, we must abandon Gateway (Industrial Park, near the Mad River field) as well.

"But we've committed millions of dollars," Henry said. "and the city is trying to implement one of the most progressive water management plans in the country."